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FOREWORD
This report documents the accomplishments of Phase I of contract
NAS8-27926 whose scope is the design of an Automatically Reconfigurable
Modular Multiprocessor System (ARMMS). The Phase I time period was
from October 8, 1971 to March 15, 1972. The design is being performed
by the Data Processing Products Division of Hughes-Fullerton. M & S
Computing, Inc. is providing support in the area of executive software
design under subcontract to Hughes. The design is being directed by the
Astrionics Laboratory of the Marshall Space Flight Center. The Contracting
Officer's Representative is Dr. J. B. White.
In accordance with the data requirements of NAS8-27926, this report
consists primarily of reproductions of internal reports which have not been
edited nor retyped for this report. As such, it reflects the evolution of the
design rather than its culmination and must be read from that perspective.
Each report is preceded by a brief discussion of its content and conclusions.
Major individual contributors to the report include the following:
W. L. Martin - ARMMS Phase I Architecture
J. H. Engleman - Preliminary ARMMS Reliability Feasibility
Study
ARMMS Reliability Data Base
W. G. Tees - Partitioning Study of the SUMC Processor
J. L. Bricker - A Unified Method for Analyzing Mission
Profile Reliability
B. Cohen Investigation of Inter-Module
S. A. Simpson Data Transmission Rates for ARMMS
T. T. Schansman (M&S) Mission Analysis Profile
E. I. Eastin (M&S) Synchronous vs. Non-Synchronous
K. H. Schonrock (M&S) Scheduling Control
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SECTION 1
SUMMARY OF PHASE I OF THE ARMMS DESIGN
The primary objective of contract NAS8-27926 is to perform the system
design of an advanced modular computer system designated the Automatically
Reconfigurable Modular Multiprocessor System (ARMMS). ARMMS is addressing
the anticipated requirements for both higher computing capacity and reliability
which may characterize spaceborne computers in the late 1970's to mid-1980's.
ARMMS is intended to achieve both of these objectives through a highly modular
computer architecture which can be configured as a multiprocessor for maximum
computing speed or as a triple modular redundant (TMR) system with standby
spares for extremely high reliability. Moreover, the configuration will be dynamic;
that is, it will be possible to change the configuration in real time as needed by
various mission phases or events. A peak computing capacity of several million
instructions per second is planned, while the probability of a minimum computing
capacity surviving for 5 years is to be 0. 99.
ARMMS is an outgrowth and extension of two NASA development programs,
the MSFC Space Ultrareliable Modular Computer (SUMC) and the ERC Modular
Computer. The SUMC program has emphasized the development of a processor
which is effectively partitioned for LSI implementation. To date, a breadboard
TTL prototype has been constructed and a MOS LSI version is nearing completion.
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A version of SUMC is anticipated to be the processor module of the ARMMS
system. The breadboard of the ERC Modular Computer is undergoing evaluation
at MSFC, and the experience gained will be relevant to ARMMS. The ERC
Modular Computer had the common objective with ARMMS of achieving a variable
configuration for varying levels of processing capacity and reliability.
In addition, the experience of numerous NASA, Air Force, and Navy architectux
and design studies is being reviewed and incorporated into the ARMMS design wher
appropriate. In general, these efforts have considered a subset of the ARMMS
objectives. For example, the JPL STAR is oriented toward long-life reliability.
The MSC reconfigurable guidance and control computer study considers primarily
space shuttle requirements. Other studies have considered space station computel
requirements. All have identified design principles which form a substantial base
of experience for the ARMMS development.
The 18-month contract is divided into three phases. The overall plan is shown
in Figure 1. At the inception of the contract, an initial baseline description was
provided by MSFC. The primary efforts in Phase I have been to establish general
design guidelines necessary to achieve the ARMMS reliability and performance
objectives; to survey published estimates of performance requirements for
future space computers, and to refine the initial baseline.
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The specific objectives to be achieved within the 18 month period are the
following:
1. To perform the detailed design (to the gate level) of all module
interfaces and switches.
2. To define the design of all ARMM modules types to the detailed
block-diagram (register) level.
3. To perform the functional design of the executive software as it
pertains to error detection and correction. (M & S Computing, Inc.
is performing this task under subcontract to Hughes. )
4. To define the overall system response to all classes of failures.
5. To develop sample packaging-concepts for an eventual implementation
of ARMMS.
6. To simulate the computational performance of ARMMS in its high
computing capacity mode.
7. To develop and apply reliability models as needed to support the
design.
As specified in the contract data requirements, the Phase Reports are to i
consist primarily of reproductions of contractor internal documents written during
that phase. The remaining sections of this report consist of documents prepared
at various stages of Phase I. The general subject of each is listed below:
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Section 2. ARMMS Architecture Status - Phase I
An overview of the architecture as modified
and refined in Phase I is given.
Section 3. Mission Analysis Profile
The data extracted from more than 30 sources
concerning mission requirements is presented.
Section 4. Synchronous vs. Non-Synchronous Scheduling Control
As a first step in the executive software design, the
two major scheduling approaches are discussed.
Section 5. Preliminary ARMMS Reliability Feasibility Study
An initial model was programmed to allow design
requirements for the 5-year survival of a simplex
computer to be explored.
Section 6. ARMMS Reliability Data Base
Based on a survey of available data, a set of part
failure rates have been tabulated for use in future
analysis.
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Section 7. Results of the Initial Partitioning Study of the
SUMC Processor
It was initially believed that the reliability objective
would necessitate extensive subpartitioning. The
SUMC logic design was studied in an effort to discover
reasonable approaches to subpartitioning without
requiring redesign.
Section 8. Data Transmission Study
A key design factor ARMMS will be the characteristics
of the inter-module data paths. An initial study of
feasible speeds and interconnection methods is presented.
Appendix A A Unified Method For Analyzing Mission Profile Reliability
For Standby and Multiple Modular Redundant Computing
Systems which Allows for Degraded Performance
This appendix is the manuscript of a paper submitted to
the IEEE Transactions on Reliability Theory describing
the second reliability model deve loped for the ARMMS
program.
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SECTION 2
ARMMS Architecture Status - Phase I
The report contained in this section was the first attempt
to use the efforts of the mission analysis, reliability, sub-
partitioning, and literature search to define a refined ARMMS
baseline concept. Its contents are summarized in the first
section.
ARMMS ARCHITECTURE STATUS - PHASE 1
Introduction and Summary
This report has the purpose of synthesizing the results of all ongoing
ARMMS design efforts as they have impacted and extended the ARMMS
baseline architecture as of Phase I of the contract. It is the first
refinement of the Baseline as defined at the inception of the contract
and as such makes no presumption of being definitive. Similar re-
definitions may be expected at least at the end of each phase of the
program. For convenience, the original baseline description is character-
ized as "Baseline 0" and the description provided here is called "Baseline 1".
Baseline 1 is perhaps more specific in the aspects of the design discussed
although it does not yet encompass the broad scope of topics (e.g. power
supply redundancy) touched upon by Baseline 0.
The specific topics discussed in the body of this report are listed below:
1. The possible major submodes of operation of ARMMS
are identified along with possible limitations. It is
specifically recommended that no more than one TMR
processor set at a time should be required and that no
more than three parallel inst ruction streams should
be required. It is also recommended that the inclusion
of a duplex processor mode be considered as the design
proceeds.
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2. The question of whether a dedicated executive should
be retained or whether a floating executive concept
should be reconsidered is discussed. The conclusion
is that the dedicated executive module should be retained
in the baseline concept.
3. The relative merits of task memory, cache memory, and local storage
are discussed. It is concluded that small local storage
(e.g. 128 words) in each processor module is preferable
to the larger (e.g. 4 K words) task memory modules.
4. A first attempt at detailing the data and control paths
of the ARMMS system is presented, including estimated
pin counts and interface speed requirements. Overall
summaries of module pin counts and number of voters
are given. Although the analysis given is particularly
tenuous, it still provides a framework for discussion
and for proceeding to the next level of design detail.
Restatement of the Fundamental Design Objectives of ARMMS
Any computer system justifies the cost of its development to the degree
that it provides new capabilities or allows earlier ones to be satisfied
at reduced cost. ARMMS is primarily oriented toward providing the
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following new capabilities for spaceborne computers for application
in the 1975 to 1985 tim.e period.
1. To provide a modular computer system which is
responsive to many mission types and phases.
2. To achieve through modularity a higher computing
capability than previously available for spaceborne
application. A target of several million instructions
per second has been chosen.
3. To provide the capability to choose to maximize
reliability through the use of redundancy or to maximize
processing capacity through multiprocessing. Moreover,
this multi-mode capability must be dynamic; that is, a
given system may alternate from one mode to another
as a function of real-time requirements.
4. To maximize reliability in all applications through the
incorporation of fault detection and recovery features and
through the use of high reliability components.
The first consideration of any ARMMS design tradeoff is to avoid
compromising these basic objectives. However, an advanced paper
design will surely remain only that unless continuous concern is
2-3
is maintained for the practical requirements of implementation.
Such design parameters as power density,. weight, volume, pin count,
device count, etc.,, must influence the design process.
The evolving baseline as presented here is oriented toward achieving
the ARMMS objectives within a practical hardware and software
context.
III. Major Phase 1 Factors Affecting Baseline I
Baseline I as described in this document, although not different in the
objectives it addresses from Baseline 0, is somewhat different in detail
from that implied by the original description. This has resulted from
several major factors identified during Phase 1 and described briefly
below.
The most major change is the deletion of the 4 K word task memory as
a major -functional unit in favor of a much smaller local memory within
each processor module. The tradeoff leading to this recommendation is
discussed in substantially more detail later, but the major factors are
(1) the questionable efficiency of a task memory in an aerospace software
environment; (2) its unquestioned addition of significant numbers of
devices and pins to the system which ame directly contrary to the
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reliability objectives; and (3) the problem of providing adequate
main memory to task memory bandwidth without resorting to unwieldy
(for an ultrareliable spaceborne machine) design techniques such as
wide data paths and memory interleaving.
The results of initial subpartitioning studies of the ARMMS modules
together with the gathering of the reliability data base are producing
conclusions somewhat different than might have been anticipated.
First, there is convincing evidence that device failure rates of 10"9
failures per hour are being achieved currently in spaceborne applications.
Although this failure rate is not projected to continue to decrease rapidly
in the coming years, this experience still predicts a gate failure rate
of 10- 11 per hour which is significantly better than had been anticipated
initially (by perhaps two orders of magnitude). The implication is that
the required degree of subpartitioning and interpartition switching can
be less for a given system reliability.
This somewhat positive conclusion is counterbalanced by the somewhat
negative results of the subpartitioning analyses. First, the SUMC
processor design was reviewed in some detail to attempt to identify
reasonable approaches to splitting it into 2 to 4 subpartitions. No approach
was found which appears to be acceptable largely because of the high
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number of interpartition pins required. Next, with regard to memory
subpartitioning, it appears that relatively.small capacity independent
storage modules are preferable to larger, internally partitioned modules
both from the point of view of long-term simplex reliability and from the
point of view of design feasibility, particularly if other than semiconductor
memory is used (e.g., it is difficult to partition and switch internal to
a plated wire memory). Finally, with respect to I/O subpartitioning, the
I/O unit appears to be very amenable to partitioning by independent
channel with each channel having an acceptable failure characteristic.
The net result of these two results is that at present the "best" parti-
tioning approach for ARMMS appears to be a functional one with the
optimum switchable partitions being at the level of major system units.
Unless this conclusion is overturned in the near future, it would appear
that the detailed subpartitioning effort planned for Phase II should be
curtailed in favor of more definitive system design and earlier detail
design.
A third major factor of significance which has emerged from Phase I is that
the previous common assumption of a low ratio dc dormant to active
failure rate is highly suspect. The value recommended for use as a
part of the reliability data base is 0. 8 (incontrast with values as low as
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0.01 which have been used). This is a highly significant conclusion
as it affects the design of long- life computers because it calls into
question the general assumption that reliability can be significantly
increased by turning power off in spare modules. (It does not remove
the significance of power switching for power conservation or electrical
isolation purposes.) The proper impact of this result on the ARMMS
design has not yet been fully studied.
IV. Mode Flexibility
ARMMS has been envisioned to provide two basic modes of operation:
the redundant mode (Mode 1) in which throughput capacity is sacrificed
to yield higher reliability in computation and the parallel processing
mode (Mode 2) in whi ch the converse tradeoff is made. A third mode
(the Simplex mode or Mode 3) is the state to which the computer may
degrade as a long-term mission progresses. Although Mode 1 has been
presumed to imply some form of TMR operation and Mode 2 presumed
to imply multiprocessing, these notions have not been made precise.
For example, one could imagine 3 processors executing a critical program
in lockstep while several I/O channels were receiving unrelated data from
distinct sources. That is, the system need not necessarily be homo-
geneous with respect to redundancy.
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Moreover, for a given maximum number of modules of a given type,
there are a large number of submodes which could be identified.
For example, if six processors are available, they could be distributed
in the following ways:
1. Two TMR machines
2. Three duplex machines
3. Six simplex machines
4. One TMR, one duplex, and one simplex machine
5. One TMR, and one to three simplex machines
6. Two duplex and one to two simplex machines
7. One duplex and one to four simplex machines
In addition, the various redundancy configurations of memory need
not necessarily parallel the processor configuration. For example,
program data from one memory could be simultaneously provided to
three processors whose critical output data could be voted upon prior
to transmission to an I/O channel.
Moreover, considering the possible individual restrictions on processors
which could be applied (for example, if two parallel TMR configurations
were allowed, should all subsets of three processors be able to form TMR
machines?), the possible number of identifiable configurations is astro-
nomical. It is clear, both from the hardware viewpoint of interconnections
and the software viewpoint of configuration control, that some meaningful
limitations must be accepted.
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Such limitations should emerge from two factors: 1) those degrees
of flexibility which cannot reasonably be envisioned as requirements;
or, 2) those which impose the most cost on the hardware and software
design.
Two of the eight major sub-modes listed above appear to fall in these
categories. First, the requirement for two parallel TMR computers
does not seem to be a reasonable design requirement. If a single ARMMS'
processor is capable of performing on the order of 1 MIP, then a single
TMR configuration of this capacity would seem to be adequate for critical
computations. However, the design should allow for all subsets of
three processors to be included in the single TMR machine. Second, the
ability to support six simplex processors is unwieldy in terms of software
control complexity, questionable in terms of need, and uncertain in terms
of ability to be programmed reliably. As a result of the Mission Analysis
Profile, the recommendation was rmade that three processors is a manageable
upper limit, and this will be used as the baseline value.
These recommendations do not place any necessary limitation on the
upper limit of number of processors connected. The number of processors
(greater or less ,than 6) should still ultimately he decided on the basis
of total hardware and software costs together with reliability requirements.
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However, the maximum of 1 TMR and 3 parallel simplex do
suggest limitations on the number of simultaneous data paths which
must be provided in the system.
As an additional proposed baseline design parameter, it will be assumed
that there may be a maximum of three parallel computers of any redundancy
level at any one time. Thus, for example, there may be 1 TMR and two
simplex machines, or 3 simplex machines in operation at any time.
The question of whether ARMMS should provide duplex computer capability
has not been discussed to date. The fundamental difference between
TMR and duplex operation is that TMR provides for failure correction
(fault masking) with a high degree of confidence while duplex operation
can provide only fault detection. Clearly, TMR is preferred for critical
real-time computations for which there is no opportunity to allow time
for recovery processes. However, duplexing does provide a complete
fault detection approach with less hardware required to be dedicated than
does TMR. Thus, for example, one could foresee configuring ARMMS
as three duplex processors to achieve maximum computing capacity while
retaining fault detection capability for those tasks which are "important"
but not "critical". (The distinction between these two criteria is a highly
subjective one which could never be adequately measured without reference
to a specific mission.)
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It would be premature to make a specific recommendation concerning
duplex operation in advance of the next phase of the program. However,
it is recommended that duplex processor operation be considered for
inclusion on the baseline with the maximum number of duplex configurations
to be determined a.s the detailed switch design proceeds.
The baseline capabilities with respect to allowed sub-modes (particularly
of the processors) are summarized in Table 1 .
The discussion here has centered on processor modes. Suggested
baseline memory and I/O modes are discussed in paragraphs vii and viii.
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Table 1
MODE FLEXIBILITY BASELINE DESIGN PARAMETERS
Maximum Number of Processors Possible upper limit of 8 will
depend on switch and BOSS
complexity, and reliability
analysis.
TMR Capability No more than 1 TMR processor set.
Any 3 processors can be utilized.
Multiprocessor Capability No more than 3 active processors.
Any 3 may form the active set.
One of the three may be the TMR set.
Duplex Capability To be considered as the design proceeds.
Potential upper limit of three parallel
duplex processors.
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V. Retention of the Dedicated Executive Module (BOSS)
The suggestion has been made that perhaps we should reconsider
the inclusion of a dedicated executive module (i. e. BOSS) in the
ARMMS baseline in favor of a floating executive approach. There
are a number of reasons why such an alteration might be potentially
attractive:
1. A floating executive concept allows all processors
to perform executive functions and thereby there
is no one module type whose failure cripples the
system.
2. A dedicated executive module imposes the added
burdens of another module type to be developed and
an "extra" module per system.
3. If the executive overhead (e.g. task scheduling, memory
allocation, etc.) approaches or exceeds the capacity
of the dedicated executive, then the total processing
efficiency can be lower than that of a floating concept.
4. With the Floating executive, different processors may
in fact simultaneously execute different executive functions.
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Hughes has significant experience with the floating executive, and
has in fact implemented the concept in two multiprocessor systems -
the H4400 and H-3118M. However, in the case of ARMMS, the pre-
ponderance of the evidence suggests that the dedicated executive
approach should be retained.
1. The development cost of BOSS and its addition to the
system is counterbalanced by a decrease in complexity
and reliability required for all other processors. For
example, configuration control and status monitoring
hardware is deleted from every processor. Moreover,
if these functions were implemented per processor, it
might well be necessary to implement them in an internally
redundant manner per processor. Therefore, which
approach is the more costly one is not a clear cut issue.
2. The fundamental ARMMS objective of mode flexibility implies
a system capability to schedule and implement configuration
changes. The problems associated with a processor reassigning
its mode role concurrent with monitoring status of all other
modules would be difficult to resolve.
3. There are several functions which are simply not amenable
to distribution among the processors. These include synchro-
nization, power control, disaster restart, and interrupt
reception. It is interesting to note that although the H4400 is
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nominally a floating executive system, several functions
including the above were centralized.
4. If the Baseline 1 recommendation that no more than
three parallel instruction streams be executed at once,
then the total executive overhead should be sufficiently
low that efficiency is not impaired by queues at the BOSS
interface.
5. Attempting to distribute potentially critical system functions
may have the effect of enlarging the hard core rather than
eliminating it.
Therefore, the original Baseline 0 concept of a centralized executive
control module is ratained in Baseline 1. In addition, it is believed that
the preferred design approach will be to strictly minimize the functions
performed by BOSS to those which are required for fault tolerance and
mode flexibility. This approach seems perferable from several viewpoints:
1. Minimizing BOSS complexity will minimize its inherent
failure rate.
2. Minimum complexity will lead to the lowest added development
and implementation costs.
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3. The least added burden for BOSS internal redundancy
will result.
4. It will make more feasible the goal of allowing smaller
applications to function without requiring a BOSS module.
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VI. Recommendation for the Deletion of Task Memory from Baseline 1
In an era when it is fashionable to design. increasingly sophisticated
memory hierarchies, one runs the risk of appearing foolish at
suggesting that a simpler structure is better for a given computer
development. However it appears that the weight of the evidence for
ARMMS is contrary to the inclusion of a task or cache memory in
favor of a small (e.g. 128 to 256 words) local storage unit integral
to each processing module. The following paragraphs discuss the
considerations leading to this conclusion.
1. Basic Characteristics of High-Speed Storage Alternatives
Some distinctions among possible approaches to providing
high-speed storage should first be not ed. One possible set of
categorizations is task memory, cache memory, and local storage.
The basic distinctions are as follows:
a. A task memory provides for storage of all instructions
(and some data) for a given task. Typical size may be
16 K bytes. When execution of a task is to take place,
it must first be transferred from main memory to the
task memory prior to program execution. It may also
require that the previous contents be restored in main
memory unless no alteration of task memory contents is
allowed.
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b. A cache memory implements the assumption that once
a reference is made to a specific memory location, the
probability that it and nearby locations will be referenced
again in the near future is high. Thus, when a task
references a memory address, an entire block of memory
(e.g. 8 words) is transferred to the high-speed cache.
All future program references to this block are then
accomplished at the speed of the cache rather than main
memory. Various algorithms for deciding which block
to discard when a new block is addressed may be implemented
(for example see C. J., Conti, "Concepts for Buffer Storage",
Computer Group News, March, 1969).
c. The possible usages of local storage in a processor are
diverse, and include such functions as instruction retention,
instruction look-ahead, index and base registers, local data,
scratchpad memory, and general purpose registers.
All of these share the common purpose of reducing the speed mis-
match between a high speed processor and lower speed main memory.
Or as an alternative statement, they give a processor access to a
large capacity, but relatively slow main memory while providing
a total speed close to that which could be achieved if all of memory
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were high speed. Typical speed ratios used are on the order
of 10 to 1 for the two memory types. For example, the IBM-
360/85 is said to achieve a typical speed equivalent to 81%o of
that which would be attainable with a single-level storage operating
at cache speed, even though the ratio of main memory cycle time
to cache cycle time is 12. 5 to 1.
Of course, one key motivation for such memories is to maximize
the performance/cost ratio. That is, the cost per bit of 1-2 usec
core has been lower than the cost per bit of high speed semiconductor
memory by a factor of the sam.e order as the speed ratio. Another
significant factor is that restricting the capacity, and therefore
the volume, of high-speed storage reduces propagation delay problems
associated with the large physical dimensions of commercial machines.
2. Some Performance Comparisons of Task and Cache Memories
Task and cache memories have substantially different characteristics
which can be categorized by the relative advantages given below:
The advantages of a task memory include these: 1) Some aspects
of the hardware implementation are simpler. For example, no
"hit-miss" logic is required since all instructions associated with
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the task are known to be in the task memory, and no decision
process concerning which block to discard is required. 2)
Execution time within a task memory is less subject to uncertainty
than with a cache memory and performance is independent of
addressing patterns. 3) In a multiprocessor system, the task
memory may present fewer difficulties in the event of a failure
or interrupt. That is, since task memory contents are relatively
static during task execution, the state of the system is easier to
know and accommodate.
The relative advantages of the cache approach include these:
1) The use of the cache is transparent to the user. Memory
appears to him as a single-unit. 2) The cache does not limit
task size as does the capacity of task memory. 3) The efficiency
in use of main memory is inherently better with a cache (if they
are of equal capacity). The task memory must load all instructions
associated with a task while the cache loads only those which are
most likely to be executed. 4) The efficiency of a cache is relatively
insensitive to task size.
3. The Inapplicability of the Task and Cache Approaches for ARMMS
In evaluating the above characteristics and relative mertis, we believe
2-20
that a very strong statement can be made: All of the underlying
assumptions and objectives of the task or cache memory approaches
are questionable with respect to spaceborne multiprocessors in
general and ARMMS in particular.
a) The cost effectiveness of task and cache memories depend
on high cost ratio between them and main memory. This
phonomenon does not occur with respect to plated wire and
semiconductor memories (probably the two primary ARMMS
candidates) particularly of flight-rated quality.
b) Their performance effectiveness depends on a high speed
ratio with respect to main memory. Again, this property
does not characterize the probable ARMMS choices.
c) The propagation delay problems averted by reducing the
proportion of memory which is high speed are less of a
factor for a spaceborne machine which must emphasize
packaging density as a matter of first priority.
Other requirements of an effective task or cache are undesirable
for ARMMS. Perhaps most notable is the sheer addition of devices,
pins, watts, cubic inches, and failures per hour, which they imply.
This penalty is large in the case of a multiprocessor where tle ratio
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of task memories to processors is at least one-to-one. Another
critical problem would be that although the main memory cycle
time may be longer than task memory cycle time, the cumulative data
rate into the task memory from main memory must approximately
equal the data rate between task memory and processor. This is
typically accomplished by the use of wide data paths and inter-
leaved data from main memory to the task or cache memory. (It is
in this way that the speed mismatch is resolved) For example, the
IBM 360/91 employed 8 or 16-way interleaving with a data path width
of 64 bits. Both of these attributes are undesirable for ARMMS
because of the multiplicity of connections involved and the difficulties
in reconfiguring and voting upon interleaved memory.
Based on the above factors, we conclude that neither the task memory
nor the cache memory approaches are sufficiently promising to be
retained in the ARMMS baseline, and we recommend that the concept
of a small, local store to be explored as described in the following
section.
4. Applicability of the Local Storage in the ARMMS Processor
A prime source of inefficiency in multiprocessing is contention for
memory access by theprocessors. Seve ral approaches involving
use of relatively small amounts of storage in the processors to reduce
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the number of main memory accesses may be employed. Of
course, the use of general registers is by now a classical
technique which allows intermediate operands to be retained
internal to the processor.
Two other basic local store uses can reduce the number of memory
accesses required. One is to retain the previous n instructions,
and should a branch backwards to within this bound occurs, then
no main memory instruction access is required. This technique
may typically reduce the number of instruction accesses by 4%o
if n = 8. More significantly, instruction retention speeds access
to perhaps 35%o of branch instructions. (These quantities are based
on detailed analysis of an extensive set of aerospace programs.)
Note that instruction lookahead, although a useful processor speed-
up device, actually increases memory accesses required because
some instructions accessed will not be executed because of branches.
The second additional opportunity to reduce memory bandwidth
through local store is to provide the ability to access and retain data
most frequently used by a given task. This requires the software
discipline of identifying by task which data should be pre-accessed
and stored. Although this would not be a popular requirement with
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programmers, the potential payoff is great. For example, if
64 local data locations are provided, they may be used for up
to 60% of the data references to memory. Note that this technique
is the converse of the task memory appwoach in which instructions
are pre-loaded and data is accessed as needed.
Local storage for these functions has the following advantages
in ARMMS:
1. Total memory accesses required per processor for
a given task are reduced by perhaps 15%.
2. The amount of hardware added per processor is small
relative to task or cache memories.
3. The amount of processor-oriented data which must be
considered upon interrupt or failure is reduced.
4. The local data area has potential as a temporary location
for accumulation of output data which may be a usable
adjunct to the memory data protect system.
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VII. OVERVIEW OF THE BASELINE 1 ARCHITECTURE
1. Module Classes - Baseline 1 contains four basic module classes,
processors, main memory modules, I/O units, and BOSS. Relatively
little intramodule switchable subpartitioning is foreseen except for the
internal redundancy which will be required by BOSS.. Also, the Baseline
1 memory includes spare bit planes which can be utilized after an internal
array failure. To date, internal fault detection within the other module
classes has not been considered in detail. This activity is scheduled
primarily for Phase II of the program. Bulk memory is considered to
interact with the system via the I/O units.
2. Maximum Number of Modules Per Module Class
The following upper limits of number of modules per module class will
be used as Baseline 1 values.
o Up to 8 processor modules which at any one time may be
configured into no more than 3 parallel processors (one of
which may be in TMR configuration).
o Up to 32 memory modules of varying capacities and techno-
logies. All will utilize common interface designs for
connection to the other module classes. An overall approach
to memory data protection will be specified later, but initially
it is expected that the ability to write into modules which
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contain instructions will be under strict control of BOSS.
o Up to 4 independent I/O units -capable of accommodating
a cumulative 107 bits per second data rate.
o There is one BOSS module which achieves high reliability
through internal redundancy. One important design goal
is to design the system so that smaller applications do not
require a BOSS module. Major implications of the goal are
that such systems would sacrifice the reconfiguration
capability afforded by BOSS and that the processor module design
must accommodate basic executive functions.
3. Module Interconnections and Data Paths
The following major data paths are defined.
o Memory Data to Processor and BOSS - Several busses
of sufficient width and speed to support three parallel
processors are provided. As subsequently discussed,
the speed of each line must approximate 15 x 106 bits
per second.
o BOSS, Processor, and I/O Data to Memory - The speed
of this path must be comparable to that of the memory
output data signal paths.
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o Processor to I/O Control and Data -The processors use
this path to initiate I/O operations and as an alternate path
for critical c ntrol signals to the outside world.
o Memory to I/O Data - This path is specifically identified
as a tentative one. Its independence of the memory to
processor data busses is prompted by the lower data rate
required to sustain I/O, and the greater requirement to
vote on memory to I/O data than on memory to processor
data (this latter statement is itself an arguable one). The
primary reason for including this path in Baseline 1 is to
stimulate the trade-off between voter complexity, circuit
speed, total system pins, and number of source and
destination modules.
o BOSS Control and Response Bus - Thi; is the path by which
BOSS interrogates and controls the remaining modules and
samples their internal status. A sequential, polling approach
is suggested as described later.
4. Voter Placement and Redundant Mode Operation
Placement of voters in ARMMS may have a critical impact on reliability
and cost. Insufficient use of masking redundance may fail to provide
the desired critical mission phase reliability while overzealous application
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could produce a cumbersome system with too much sacrifice in
cost and speed. The approach suggested here is a first attempt
at identifying the necessary balance.
The guidi ng principles adopted are the following:
1) All data which is sent to the outside world must be voted upon
at two distinct physical locations and at distinct times. This is
desirable to help to protect the system from transient faults and
permanent voter faults. 2) All output from the processor either
to memory or to I/O can be voted. This provides the most complete
fault detection and correction for processed data.
Under these principles, voters are postulated as follows: 1) From
processors to main memory; 2) from processors to I/O; 3) from
main memory to I/O; 4) Between the external word and I/O units
(for both input and output data).
Voting capability is not postulated as follows: 1) From main memory
to processors and BOSS (except perhaps internal to BOSS); 2) from
BOSS to other modules (except perhaps internal to BOSS); 3) from I/O
to main memory; 4) from modules to BOSS.
A brief discussion of how the system is visualized to operate in TMR mode
is in order. BOSS would identify that a critical phase or task is to be
2-28
accomplished and would schedule any three operational processors
to begin TMR operation. All instructions and data would be provided
synchronously to the three processors. This will require either that
a single memory module can output data to three processors at once
or that the programs be triplicated in storage. A possible goal would
be to provide the capability for either technique with the choice to be
made based on mission requirements. The second approach may have
more difficult hardware an d software implications because the three
processors wo uld be addressing different memory addresses and would
therefore have differing states of address generation logic.
Then as the processors execute instructions and store data in main
memory, all such processed data would be voted upon. Again there
is the choice of whether to return the data to one or to three memory
modules with corresponding hardware and software tradeoffs to be
studied. Another possible approach would be to implement TMR programs
to store all I/O data sequentially into three modules. The number of
active voters will differ for the various approaches.
When an I/O operation is to be initiated, this action would be voted at
the Processor/IO control interface. Here it is mandatory to be able to
activate three I/O units. Both I/O commands and short data blocks may
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be transmitted via this interface. Three active voters are probably
required at this interface.
The processors may activate three I/O units to transfer large blocks
of data via memory. The notion of voting on memory output data to
I/O depends on whether the data has been triplicated in memory from
the processors. If not, the value of memory to I/O voting is
brought intc qtestion, and critical output results should be transmitted
directly from the processor and voted again at the output of the I/O unit.
The Baseline 1 architecture as described in this section is shown in Figure 1.
Possible characteristics of the system data paths are given in the following
section.
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VIII. POSSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODULE INTERCONNECTIONS
AND DATA PATHS
i. Processor/Memory Interface Composition and Speed
The maximum intermodule data flow rate occurs between processors
and main memory. The combination of target processor speed, word length,
and number of parallel processors have the primary effects on the speed
required of the interface with added features such as error correcting code
bits and memory protect bits having a lesser effect.
As a sample case, consider the following parameters.
1.6 memory accesses per instruction
1. 8 million instructions per second per processor
3 processors maximum active
Processor Output/Memory Input Data
32 bit data word
20 address bits (1000 K words directly addressable)
16 control, memory protect, error codes, etc.
68 Total
Memory Output/Processor Input
32 bit data word
12 status, error codes, etc.
44 Total
Then for these figures, the data rate which must be accommodated by
the interface design is given by
R = 1.8x106xl. 6x3x(68+44) = 9.45x108 bits per second.
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A primary design requirement will be to minimize the number of
interface pins consistent with feasible intermodule data transmission
rates. Thus, if we can achieve an intermodule signal rate of 15x10 6
bits per second, then this suggests the total number of signal lines at
the processor/memory interface can be on tie order of
8. 69.45x10 --- 15x10 = 63. This is approximately one-sixth the total of
the processor/memory input and output signals 3x(68+44) = 336. This
suggests that the signal lines can be time multiplexed. For example,
the processor output lines could perhaps be limited to 12 in which a
single memory data request would require approximately six 12-bit
transmissions while a response from memory might utilize 6 8-bit
byte transmissions.
All of these computations are very coarse, of course. For example,
as a second order refinement, requests for instructions need not be
accompanied by a processor output data word. This fact alone could
reduce the total data flow by about 15%. Conversely, if a simultaneous
TMR, two simplex processor interface is required with full two-way
voti ng in the TMR case, the number of simultaneous paths increases
to 5 from the assumed 3. Also, the baseline requirement of 107 bits
per second of I/O data has not been included (although this repae sents
less than 10% additional data flow in the system). At least one other
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design decision will have a major impact on the total memory/processor
data flow, and that is the speed of the processor. The capability of
1. 8 MIPS (itself a coarse number) represents a probable maximum, but
this number could decrease toward the present SUMC processor capability.
However, the case presented is stringent enough to allow the following
conclusions to be drawn:
I. A bit transmission rate of 15 MHz is a reasonable upper limit of
the memory/processor signal interfaces.
2. An interface design can be achieved which requires less than
30 pins per processor/memory path, with 20 as a potentially
reasonable design goal. The total number of. pins per module
to support this interface would be a multiple of this number.
That multiple will be the maximum number of memory/processor
busses which will be a minimum of two and a maximum of
perhaps five.
2. BOSS/Module Interface Composition and Speed
The overall functional requirements of BOSS will be a subject of continuing
study over the next nine months. However, as a minimum, BOSS will
control system configuration and status monitoring. Thus it must be able
to sample status of all system modules and to connect or disconnect any
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module either by power switching or other means. Whatever approach
to system synchronization is adopted will also almost certainly
be a BOSS function.
As discussed elsewhere, the preliminary baseline design approach to
BOSS is to minimize the functions assigned to it and to minimize its internal
complexity. One key means to this end is to allow BOSS to have direct
access to main memory via the processor/memory busses. That is, BOSS
will be connected to main memory in exactly the same fashion as is a
processor, thus eliminating the requirement for a large amount of internal
BOSS storage no matter what functions are ultimately assigned to BOSS.
As with the other module classes, pin minimization appears to be a key
requirement for BOSS. Thus, a time-multiplexed control and response bus
is incorporated in Baseline 1. The normal operation of this bus would be
in polled fashion with each module (including voting networks) interrogated
sequentially with each being required to reply concerning its internal status.
The number of messages per polling cycle would ordinarily be the sum of
the number of processors, I/O units, memory modules, and voting networks.
A safe upper limit for this number appears to be 64. The bus width and
speed is determined by this number together with an acceptable system
sampling interval:. For example, if 2 milliseconds is an acceptable
interval, then the module sampling interval could be about 30 microseconds.
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In a normal (i. e. non-failed) environment, BOSS would output a
module address followed by an interrogate status command word.
The addressed module would then respond with a verification of its
address followed by its internal status data, which normally could be
as simple as an "all-is-well" signal. Failure to respond would of course
be a failure indication to BOSS. Thus, the normal message flow in the
30 usec interval could be as little as about 30 bits of information.
Thus, this. bus can be very narrow in data width or very slow (i. e. 106
bits per second), or both.
This bus can also provide several other important functions. For example
it provides the means for BOSS to control mode changes, by allowing it
to command a processor to suspend activity at the end of its current task
for reassignment to a TMR role. Further, it is the mechanism for con-
trolling reconfiguration of spare memory bit planes if they are included
and control of other module-oriented fault control features. Also, it provides
a direct BOSS to I/O data path to allow, for example, BOSS to communicate
its own internal status to the ground via telemetry or for control of disaster
restart from the ground. Also, the BOSS control bus would be used to
transmit system-wide commands to all modules or to all modules of a
given class.
This concept impacts the design of the other modules. One notable case
is that if a module detects an internal fault it should ordinarily suspend
activity until BOSS interrogates it and issues further commands (such as
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power off or retry or roll-back to a specified location).
Two other observations concerning the control and response bus are
that 1) the data rates are low enough that the use of bidirectional lines
can be considered and 2) the bus itself requires replication for reliability
reasons.
3. Memory Data to I/O
As noted earlier, the purpose of including a dedicated memory to I/O
data interface at this time is to allow more detailed exploration of voter
placement and its implications. An important objective would be to
minimize the number of voters required by time multiplexing the data flow
to the I/O units. Thus if a peak I/O transfer rate in the redundant mode
is 2.5 x 106 bits per second, and if a single line can accommodate 15 x 106
bits per second, then all I/O data could be transmitted to the I/O units in
bit serial fashion, using only three voting networks.
Overall, the interface might require the following functions:
Memory output data to I/O:
32 bit data word,
12 status, error codes, etc.
I/O to Memory
20 address
16 control, memory protect, error codes, etc.
Assuming signals in both directions are heavily time-multiplexed, a
total of 10 pins per interface may be a reasonable goal.
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4. Processor to I/O Control and Data
The comments concerning minimization of voters by time multi-
plexing of data mode above are equally applicable to the path from
processor to I/O. The speed required for this interface can be
very low because of the infrequency of execution of I/O instructions
and direct processor to I/O data. The information crossing this
interface will include the following:
Processr to I/O Unit
32 bit data words
32 bit command words
12 status, error code, etc.
I/O to Processor
4 status, acknowledge, etc.
A total of 6 pins per interface is a reasonable goal.
5. Preliminary Module Pin Count Estimate
Based on the preceding discussion, we can tabulate an estimate of
the total interconnecting pins which will be required at the module
interfaces. These estimates depend on the number of pins per
interface type and the number of interface types per module implemented
for reliability purposes. Although the entries in Table 2 are little
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MODULE TYPE
IN TERFACE PROCESSOR BOSS I/O UNIT MEMORY
Pins/Bus Busses Total Pins/Bus Busses Total Pins/Bus Busses Total Pins/Bus Busses Total
Memory Data to
Processor & BOSS 10 3 30 10 3 30 10 3 30
BOSS, Processor, &
I/O Data to Memory 20 5 100 20 5 100 20 3 100 20 5 100
Processor to I/O
Control & Data 6 4 24 6 4 24
Memory Data
to I/O 10 4 40 10 4 40
BOSS Control &
Response 10 2 20 10 2 20 10 2 20 10 2 20
I/O to External 10 4 40
TOTAL PINS PER MODULE 174 150 224 190
TABLE II. Module Pin Count Estimate
better than assumptions at this time, they do serve as a starting
point from which the design may evolve. As shown in the table, the
estimates of number of pins per module range from 150 to 224. These
estimates do not include certain functions including power, power
switching, clock inputs, and ground. Although these pin estimates
are not small, they are within the bounds allowed by the sample module
package shown on page 2-11 of Hughes FP 71-11-212. However, an
increase by a factor of 2 over these estimates will potentially limit
the package size which can be achieved.
Another preliminary estimate of interest which may be made is the
number of voting networks required (exclusive of those internal to BOSS).
As an initial basis, assume there is one voting network per pin in those
paths in which voting can occur, as shown below.
Data Path Number of Voters
BOSS Processor and I/O 100
Data to Memory
Processor to I/O Control 24
and Data
Memory Data to I/O 40
I/O to External 40
Total 204
Whether or not this is a manageable number depends on the design of
the voter as it emerges over the coming months.
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SECTION 3
MISSION ANALYSIS PROFILE
Since ARMMS is intended for multiple mission-types, it is essential
that its design encompass the range of mission performance characteris-
tics which can be identified. To identify such characteristics, more than
thirty sources of historical data and future projections relating to space
computer characteristics were studied. The result is the Mission Analysis
Profile report which follows.
One of the major areas of interest was to estimate the peak computing
capacity which should be sought. The conclusion was made that for a
computer system intended for use in 1978 or later, a capability in excess
of 4 million instructions per second should be a realistic objective. It
should be observed that most missions reviewed project a much lower re-
quirement. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 summarize speed, memory, and I/O
requirements ranges as they were extracted from available sources.
Of perhaps more immediate value to the ARMMS design were the MAP
studies of detailed task profile characteristics which should be anticipated.
Sixteen major tasks were identified, and task timing and criticality para-
meters were established for each (see Tatle 3-5). These parameters
included restart timing sensitivity, interruptability, failure criticality,
memory redundancy, and task duration.
A detailed analysis was made of task characteristics of the boost phase
application modules of the Saturn V flight program. Forty-two tasks were
identified and detailed to the level of number of instructions, iteration rate,
interrupt conditions, task precedence relationships, etc. (see Table 4-1).
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1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Purpose
This report documents the data gathered during Task 1 of Contract
No. 7-104518-R-D7 (Hughes Aircraft Company, Fullerton, California).
This data is to be used to aid in the design of the Automatically Reconfigur-
able Modular Multiprocessor System (ARRMS) under contract to NASA-
MSFC. The data was extrapolated from historical data and future projec-
tions of Spaceborne software.
1. 2 Document Organization
This report has been organized in three principle sections, briefly
discussed below.
1. 2. 1 Spaceborne Software Characteristics
Section 2 of this report briefly describes dominant and pertinent
characteristics of Spaceborne software. Summarized numerical data, ex-
tracted from Section 3, General Mission Analysis Profile, is presented to
support the description where applicable.
1. 2. 2 General Mission Analysis Profile
The heart of this report is Section 3, the General Mission Analysis
Profile. It is this section where the MAP (Mission Analysis Profile) para-
meters defined during this task are documented.
For the sake of clarity, these parameters have been organized into
a number of separate subsections, designed to distinguish between hard-
ware and software dependent parameters, and to distinguish between the
computational requirements of discrete tasks versus those of complete
mission phases.
1. 2. 3 Saturn V - Boost Profile
The data reviewed for the General Mission Analysis Profile is on
such a level that many interesting details underlying the MAP parameters
are left to the imagination of the reader. To highlight such detail, a de-
tailed profile of Saturn V (Boost) operational software is provided in Sec-
tion 4.
This profile may be interpreted as characteristic of most of the
tasks described in Section 3, General Mission Analysis Profile.
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2. SPACEBORNE SOFTWARE CHARACTERISTICS
This section briefly describes those characteristics that may be
pertinent to the ARRMS hardware/software architecture.
It should be realized that most of these characteristics are ex-
tracted from the design normally applied to spaceborne applications. That
is, different (unknown) designs may result in different characteristics. It
should also be pointed out that, although some of these characteristics are
factual (based on current experience), some of the characteristics are
based on currently unimplemented designs and are, therefore, subjective
extrapolations of future requirements.
2. 1 Process Structure
The spaceborne software encompasses, at least, processes with
the activation and execution characteristics described below.
2. 1. 1 Process Types
Synchronous Processes
These are processes that are executed repetitively at a speci-
fied rate, or at specific time intervals, over a period of time. A wide
variety of repetition rates have been noted. The most common ranges fall
between . 1 - 100 per second. However, repetition rates as high as 400 per
second have been proposed for specific mission functions.
Accuracy requirements for the time interval between itera-
tions are not normally available; and where available, they are somewhat
arbitrarily chosen. Generally, the required accuracy is proportional to
the frequency; high for high repetition rates, low for low repetition rates.
It is, of course, standard practice to maintain as high an
accuracy as possible, and verify that transient disturbances have little or
no effect upon the system performance.
Asynchronous Processes
All other processes can be categorized herein. These are,
therefore, processes that are not executed at specific time intervals over
a period of time.
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Some of these processes are considered time-critical. This
means that they have to be executed within a "very short" time interval of
the point at which the need for their execution has been detected. This
time interval may be as short as a few milliseconds. The need for time-
critical processes is generally imposed by the requirements of the appli-
cation. However, it is also sometimes imposed by the (hardware) inter-
face between the application software and the application, rather than the
application. As the existence of time-critical processes significantly af-
fects the performance and complexity of the software, it should be a factor
to be considered for minimization in any system interface design.
2. 1. 2 Activation Conditions
The conditions upon which activation of synchronous and asynchron-
ous processes depend are varied and sometimes complex. Any logical
combination of the following events may form the activation conditions - -
the reasons to start or stop a process:
o Start/Stop of other process(es)
o Value of data item(s) or combinations of data items
o Discrete events - signalling conditions within the environ-
ment
o Values of sensor data
o Elapsed time within mission or phase, etc.
o Elapsed time interval after occurrence of other event
A decision pertinent to the ARRMS design is whether detection of
and reaction to any or all of these events should be an integral part of
ARRMS or should be performed within the application software.
2. 2 Data Base
For the purpose of this discussion, all information items that do
not represent instructions, and are stored in either main storage or in
bulk storage, are considered part of the data base. Data base handling
techniques associated with error detection/recovery are not discussed in
this paragraph but are touched upon in Paragraph 2. 3 - Error Detection/
Recovery.
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2. 2. 1 Data Base Structures
In current implementations and current.designs of aerospace
software, this is a trivial subject. It would be a non-trivial subject,
however, for large Space Stations where many extensive data-inter-
related experiments are performed and other large information bases
are required. Nevertheless it remains a highly application (mission)
related subject. As such it should have no effect on the ARRMS design,
and will not further be considered in this study. Note that there is no
reason to believe that the pertinent structures of large data bases will
look any different from ground-based systems.
2. 2. 2 Data Base Sizes
The analyzed mission profiles indicate the following requirements
for Data Bases:
Main Storage Bulk Storage
(words) (words)
Min Max Min Max
Tasks not including
experiments 4K 44K OK 16K
Experiments 12K 45K 22K 10M
2. 2. 3 Other Characteristics
The Data Base for spaceborne software contains more than just
those data items that are global to the processes. Data items global with-
in the processes are generally also found in the Data Base. In fact, there
is a strong tendency to retain all data items within the Data Base, regard-
less of their scope. The Data Base then is that part of storage that con-
tains all data items that are used during a mission and are accessible to all
processes.
The reasons for this approach are many. The most significant
reasons are discussed below.
(1) Initialization - This should be a centrally performed (and
controlled) function to, first of all, have a positive con-
trol that all data is indeed initialized and is initialized to
the proper value.
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Secondly, many of the data values are mission and/or
phase dependent and, therefore, unknown to the soft-
ware designer at the time the software is designed.
Lastly, it aids in the ease of restarting the processes
from the start of mission or start of phase.
(2) Parameter communication - Direct transmission of
parameters between processes is not always practical
because of the following reasons:
o Activation conditions of other processes are fre-
quently not known to a process
o The processes requiring or generating the para-
meters may change with mission or time within
mission
o Multiple processes may affect or use the para-
meters
It is, therefore, often necessary for a process to access/
write its parameters without any knowledge of which pro-
cesses it actually communicates with.
(3) Data Protection - Retaining all data items within a cen-
trally available block of storage significantly simplifies
protection of the integrity of the data. In fact, reasonable
data protection methods are practical only on that basis.
o Erroneous access to non-data
Errors within the processes that may result in er-
roneous modification to stored instructions can be
prevented because it is known which areas of stor-
age do not contain data and therefore should not be
accessed.
o Erroneous access to data
By centrally assigning and controlling access rights
to the data items, unauthorized access to data items
by the software modules can be, reliably, prevented.
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o Prevention of read/write conflicts
Any system, in which proces.ses (accessing common
data) progress concurrently, contains potential read/
write conflicts. Any practical method to fully pre-
vent this requires that the data allocations are cen-
trally known.
2. 3 Redundancy and Recovery
2. 3. 1 Tasks
The Mission Analysis Profile (Section 3) does not directly relate
the tasks to redundancy modes. It does not do so for the simple reason
that redundant execution is not a requirement inherent to a task. It
does, however, indicate for which tasks erroneous outputs must be de-
tected (D) prior to propagation and for which tasks this is unnecessary (N).
Note that this only identifies a predominant requirement, not a universal
one. A finer breakdown into subtasks and/or subphases is likely to show
some variety within a task. It is, of course, generally true that D-clas-
sified tasks require redundant execution or redundant hardware, simply
because no other satisfactory method has been found.
A second, pertinent, parameter identified in Section 3 is the
restart timing sensitivity of the tasks. It again only indicates a predom-
inant requirement. It also assumes that the task must be restarted and
indeed can be restarted.
If, for example, a vehicle has a "safing mode" and does not have
to perform any critical maneuvers, the resumption of the various tasks
could be allowed to take a considerable amount of time. This has, also,
a direct bearing on the restart techniques that could be utilized. System
checkpoint/restart may be perfectly acceptable for some applications
where a long period of time is allowed for recovery. However, for other
applications, it may be necessary to restart an individual task or subtask
rather than the whole system. The latter would put a restriction on the
systems design in that inputs to a task must be preserved and outputs must
not affect anything until a task has been successfully completed.
2.4 Data Bases
There is in theory no data that cannot be recreated by reload from
the ground, recalculation, reinitialization, or other backups. Whether a
Data Base (or a part of it) should be maintained redundantly is primarily
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dependent upon the restart timing sensitivity of the tasks using it.
Where the tasks do not place any critical requirement upon the data
base recovery, it becomes significant which means of recovery are
are indeed available during the mission. Redundancy and recovery of
data bases is thus directly dependent on the systems design and, there-
fore, highly mission dependent. The dominant requirement is, how-
ever, that it must be possible to maintain complete integrity of a large
data base. This not only means that the data has to be stored redun-
dantly, but also that failures occurring during task execution do not
affect the data base.
2. 5 Processor Loading
To establish whether there is a need for the use of multiple pro-
cessors for the parallel execution of mission tasks, the "Processor
Requirements Summary" (Paragraph 3. 1) is used. The summary indi-
cates a maximum requirement of 1. 732 MOPS. It is not unreasonable to
assume that the available MIPS should exceed the computed MOPS by 40
percent of the total capacity. This allows for growth and unanticipated
inefficiencies in the currently planned missions. Thus, for planned mis-
sions a capacity of 100x 1. 732 2. 9 MIPS is required.
It is not unrealistic to assume that the requirements for missions
not currently analyzed could exceed this by fifty percent. Therefore, for
a computer system meant to be used over at least the next ten years, 4.4
MIPS should be a realistic objective.
We can roughly calculate the minimum single computer capacity
required within a multiprocessor system based on the following assump-
tions:
(1) It is impractical to assume that more than three proces-
sors can be effectively used to perform parallel proces-
sing of interrelated processes.
(2) Adding a computer to a configuration only adds 80 percent
of the apparent single processor capacity.
This results in a three computer configuration having a maximum capa-
city of 2. 52 times the capacity of a single computer. One computer
should, therefore, have a processing power of 4.4 1. 8 MIPS. This
is realizable within a single computer, but about ten times the power
necessary for the smaller mission requirements reviewed.
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2. 6 Adaptability to Multiprocessing
Anytime the use of multiple processors for an application is pro-
posed, there is an immediate and real concern of how effective this really
is. It is nearly impossible to answer that question in general terms. It
is easier to describe under what conditions the use of multiple processors
becomes ineffective.
First of all and most obvious, is the fact that if an application con-
sists of one process module, it cannot be multiprocessed. In other words,
an application must be divided in modules.
Secondly, if all modules are linked together in a sequential rela-
tionship such that each module has not more than one successor, the ap-
plication cannot be multiprocessed.
The point that we are leading up to by these obvious statements is
that, to obtain reasonable effectiveness of the multiprocessor system,
the application has to be designed to run on a multiprocessor system.
This design frequently results in a significantly different modularization
than that designed for a single processor. Sequential relations should be
minimized; cooperative (parallel) relationships should be emphasized.
Fortunately the structure of the spaceborne software (multiple synchron-
ous processes executing at different repetition rates) is such that it is
naturally amenable to the modularization design indicated above.
The next obvious problem is that n processors will never execute
an application n times as fast as a single computer. In other words, it
is generally impossible to design the module such that the loading of the
n computers is nearly equal. How bad the difference in loading really is,
is purely dependent on the particular application, and the cleverness of
the application software designer.
The last point to be described, and the only point that may not be
obvious, is the effect of "Richard's Anomalies". We will not completely
describe these anomalies here, but only describe one practical implica-
tion.
It is natural that the execution time of the individual software
modules may differ between repetitive executions. The effect of "Rich-
ard's Anomalies" is that the total execution time of a set of modules on
a multiprocessor system varies disproportionally to the variation of
the execution time of individual modules. As a matter of fact, if the
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execution time of a single module is slightly decreased, the total execu-
tion time can significantly increase. The upper bound on the increase on
a three processor system is 67 percent; far too large to be practically
acceptable.
It is significant to note that both the last two problems are minimized
by making the individual modules as small as possible or making the
modules as large as possible.
To summarize, spaceborne applications can usually be divided
into cooperating, parallel, modules. However, the resulting effective-
ness of the multiprocessor system is directly dependent on the clever-
ness of the design of the application program, as well as the design of
the Control Executive.
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3. GENERAL MISSION ANALYSIS PROFILE
The parameters which specify or define the range of computa-
tional capabilities required by an advanced avionics data management
and control system are a function of a number of discrete but interre-
lated mission characteristics. In particular, for space oriented mis-
sions, such as those reviewed during this study and those anticipated
for the ARMMS application, the key parameters which define the level
of computational power required are directly dependent on:
o The individual jobs or tasks to be performed such as
guidance, navigation, redundancy management, etc.
o The mission phases and subphases
o The task timing and criticality requirements
As a result, the parameters presented in this section which con-
stitute the defined MAP have been organized into tables which group
separately those parameters which are task oriented from those which
are phase dependent. In particular, the MAP consists of five specific
tables:
(1) Overall Processor Requirements Summary (Table 3-1)
(2) Phase Hardware Parameters (Table 3-2)
(3) Software Structural Parameters (Table 3-3)
(4) Task Hardware Parameters (Table 3-4)
(5) Task Timing and Criticality Parameters (Table 3-5)
Figure 3-1 defines the interrelationship between the individual
MAP tables which are discussed in detail in the remainder of this sec-
tion.
In order to simplify the MAP from the viewpoint of the casual
reader, the MAP tables are presented in the sequence listed above and
reflected in Figure 3-1 from top to bottom. However, the progression
of definition of the MAP parameters was essentially in the reverse
sequence and the serious investigator may find it more meaningful to
begin at the task level and work backwards through the phase tables to
the overall processor summary.
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MAP COMPONENT STRUCTURE
Overall
Processor MAP Summary
Requirements
Summary
Phase Software
Hardware Structural Phase
Parameters Parameters Parameters
Task Task Timing
Hardware & Criticality Task
Parameters Parameters Parameters
Figure 3-1
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In general, each of the parameters defined in the MAP tables
has associated with it two values, a minimum value and a maximum val-
ue. This defines the range of variation of the quantity being defined as
reflected in the reference mate rial.
For each of the parameters defined in the MAP tables, there is
an associated footnote defining the source of the value defined. The footnotes
are identified by the subscripts in parentheses and are listed in Appen-
dix 1.
3. 1 Processor Requirements Summary
Table 3-1 presents the overall processor requirements summary.
In general, the values presented are condensed or extracted from the
phase summaries of Table 3-2 in the manner specified by the appropriate
footnotes.
In order to clarify the presentation, the overall processor require-
ments have been sub-divided into three (3) categories: Boost/OFF/OPF,
Interplanetary, and Experiments; and two totals: one for mainframe core
only, and one for both mainframe and bulk memory requirements.
While Boost, Orbital Free Flight (OFF), and Orbital Powered
Flight (OPF) are mutually independent phases, there is considerable over-
lap in function between them. Most of the appropriate references review-
ed made a clear distinction between these phases and the interplanetary
phase. It is for this reason that they are presented in Table 3-1 as two
separate categories. The Experiments data was grouped into a separate
category because the parameter data varied over such wide ranges that
they completely mask the requirements of the other categories and ob-
scure the true picture if only the totals are presented.
3.2 Phase Profiles
Table 3-2 presents the phase hardware parameters summaries.
The phase hardware parameters are defined to be those parameters which
are mission phase or subphase dependent and which have a direct influ-
ence on the processor hardware characteristics; i.e., Word Length,
Memory Size, Execution Speed, etc.
Five (5) primary mission phases have been defined in this MAP:
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OVERALL PROCESSOR REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
.rameters Instructions Data (words) Total Words
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1) Boost, OFF, OPF 13460 74526 5530 43748 None 115979 
18990 234253
(43) (43) (43) (43) (45) (43)
2) Interplanetary 7690 47799 4490 22724 None 8000 12180 78523
(44) (44) (44) (44) (25) (44) (44) (44)
3) Experiments 21450 97280 12550 44600 22000 9772000 56000 9893000
(49) (52) (49) (50) (48) (18)
Totals (Mainframe 36800 183564 19185 93938 N/A N/A 55985 233640
core only) (51) (51) (51) (51)
Totals (Worst Case) 36800 183564 19185 93938 22000 9889945 77985 10146559
(51) (51) (51) (51) (51) (51)
N/A = Not Applicable
Table 3-1
OVERALL PROCESSOR REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements(K) Ops/Second (Bits) (o) Bits x 103/sec
Categories Min Max Min Max Add Mult. Min Max
1) Boost, OFF, OPF 74.3 1732.0 16 32 87 11 350 800
(43) (43) (45) (45) (46) (46)
2) Interplanetary 285.454 1307.95 16 32 80 20 NA 1000
(44) (44) (44)
3) Experiments 324 1050 16 40 NA NA 2000 8800
(52) (48) (18) (48) (52)
Totals (Mainframe 324 1732. 0 16 40 85 15 2000 8800
core only) (46) (46) (44) (46) (46)
Totals (Worst Case 324 1732.0 16 40 85 15 2000 8800
Values) (46) (46) (44) (42) (42) (46) (46)
NA = Not Available
Table 3-1
(continued)
PHASE HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements(K) Ops/Secord (;!g) (Bits) (29) (%) (29) Bits x 10 3 /sec (29)
Phases Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
1) Boost
a) Powered Ascent 30. 16 585. 45 16 32 89 11 44.7 330
b) Insertion 28.38 736. 77 16 32 88 12 44.7 330
2) Orbital Free Flight 6.38 1264. 16 16 32 89 11 350 800
3) Orbital Powered Flight 16 32
a) Basic OPF 29.86 994.20 16 32 88 12 44.7 330
b) Rendezvous Targeting/b)Rendezvous ti  56.00 1307.95 16 32 89 11 44. 7 330Docking
4) Interplanetary Flight 285. 454 1307.95 16 32 80 20 NA 1000
(Extremes) (35) (35)
5) Experiments 324 1050 16 40 NA NA 2000 8800
(52) (48) (18) (48) (52)
NA = Not Available
Table 3-2
PHASE HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (29)Instructions (29) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (29)
Phases Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
1) Boost
a) Powered Ascent 9663 40831 3987 21952 None 8000 13650 70783
b) Insertion 9857 47799 4058 21352 None 8000 13915 77151
2) Orbital Free Flight 6795 56162 2928 32748 None 87400 9723 176310
3) Orbital Powered Flight
a) Basic OPF 10154 47799 4168 21352 None 8000 14322 77151
b) Rendezvous Targeting 9597 40107 3960 22724 None 8000 13557 70831
4) Interplanetary Flight 7690 47799 4490 22724 None 8000 12180 78523
(Extremes) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35)
5) Experiments 21450 97280 12550 44600 22000 9772000 56000 9893000
(49) (50) (49) (50) (48) (18)
Table 3-2
(continued)
o Boost
o Orbital Free Flight (OFF)
o Orbital Powered Flight (OPF)
o Interplanetary Flight
o Experiments
While Experiments would not normally be considered as an
entirely independent mission phase, it is classified as such here in order
to prevent the Experiments parameter estimates from obscuring the other
phase estimates.
Both the Boost phase and the Orbital Powered Flight phase have
been further partitioned into subphases. The Boost subphases are Pow-
ered Ascent and Insertion, and the Orbital Powered Flight subphases are
Basic OPF and Rendezvous Targeting/Docking. Each of these phases and
subphases are discussed, briefly, later in this report.
3. 2. 1 Phase Hardware Parameters
The Phase Hardware parameters summarized in Table 3-2 are
documented in considerably more detail in Tables 3-2a through 3-2f in
this subsection. Each defined phase or subphase, except for Experiments,
has been documented separately.
The Experiments phase could not be further broken down since
insufficient information was available in the reference material reviewed.
While substantial information was available defining Experiment types,
little data was available defining onboard processor participation require-
ments in experiment activity.
In order to establish a common baseline for evaluating phase pro-
cessor requirements, phases were standardized as consisting of eight
tasks:
o Guidance
o Navigation
o Control
3-18
o Executive
o Display and Communication
o Fault Isolation and Redundancy Management
o Subsystem Processing
o Utilities
Fluctuations in task sizing estimates due to mission phase re-
requirements, which resulted in significant variations in the parameter
estimates, were isolated by defining multiple tasks with the same stan-
dardized name; i. e., Guidance A, Guidance B, etc.
The Interplanetary phase was not broken down into the above de-
fined standardized tasks since the associated reference material did not
treat Interplanetary Flight from a task viewpoint. The Interplanetary
Flight phase MAP is discussed in detail in Section 3. 2. 1.4.
3. 2. 1. 1 Boost Phase
Boost is that mission phase during which the vehicle payload is
transferred from the launch site to earth orbit. It consists of two prin-
ciple subphases: Powered Ascent and Insertion. Insertion differs from
Powered Ascent only in that the final control parameters, including the
exact cutoff time, must be precisely calculated.
Tables 3-2a and 3-2b define the phase hardware parameters for
Powered Ascent and Insertion respectively.
3. 2. 1. 2 Orbital Free Flight Phase
Orbital Free Flight (OFF) is that mission phase during which
the vehicle is operational in a preachieved orbit. During this phase
navigation and attitude control are normally performed, but guidance
and propulsion control are minimal.
The Orbital Free Flight phase hardware parameters are defined
in Table 3-2c.
3. 2. 1. 3 Orbital Powered Flight Phase
Orbital Powered Flight (OPF) is that mission phase during which
the vehicle changes or corrects its orbit. This type of phase would
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POWERED ASCENT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Second 27) (bits) (26) (%) (28) Bits x 10 3/sec
Tasks Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
Guidance A 1.04 11.00 16 32 80 20 3. 8 NB
(36)
Navigation A .52 19. 10 16 32 80 20 3. 8 NB
(36)
Control A 16.63 148.95 16 32 80 20 14.8 NB
(37)
W Executive 10.20 25.50 N/A N/A 100 0 0 0
wj (38) (38)
0
Display & Communication i .77 96.00 16 32 100 0 10 NB
(37)
Fault Isolation & Redun- .07 32.25 16 32 100 0 .08 NB
dancy Management (39)
Subsystem Processing .63 212.50 16 32 90 10 11.5 NB
(37)
Utilities .30 40. 15 16 32 80 20 NA NB
Totals 30. 16 585.45 16 32 89. 16 10.84 44.7 330
(42) (42) (18)
NA = Not Available NB = No Breakdown N/A = Not Applicable
Table 3-2a
POWERED ASCENT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (28)
Instructions (28) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (28)Mainframe Bulk
Tasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance A 520 879 192 325 None None 712 1204
Navigation A 1036 3820 382 680 None None 1418 4500
Control A 3263 5958 1205 3480 None None 4468 9438
Executive 1020 5844 180 647 None 8000 1200 14491
Display & Communication 765 4800 135 1600 None None 900 6400
Fault Isolation & Redun- 1497 6450 877 9300 None None 2374 15750
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000
Totals 9663 40831 3987 21952 None 8000 13650 70783
Table 3-2a
(continued)
INSERTION HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Second (27) (Bits) (26) (o%) (28) Bits x 10 3 /sec
Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
Guidance B 4. 02 33.87 16 32 80 20 3.8 NB
(36)
Navigation A .52 19. 10 16 32 80 20 3.8 NB(36)
Control B 11.87 277.40 16 32 80 20 14.8 NB(37)
Executive 10. 20 25. 50 N/A N/A 100 0 0 0
W3 (38) (38)
Display & Communication .77 96. 00 16 32 100 0 10 NB(37)
Fault Isolation & Redun- .07 32. 25 16 32 100 0 .08 NB
dancy Management (39)
Subsystem Processing .63 212. 50 16 32 90 10 11.5 NB(37)
Utilities .30 40. 15 16 32 80 20 NA NB
Totals 28.38 736. 77 16 32 88.04 11.96 44.7 330
(42) (42) (18)
NA = Not Available NB = No Breakdown N-/A = Not Applicable
Table 3-2b
INSERTION HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (28)
Instructions (28) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (28)
Tasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance B 1604 2710 592 1000 None None 2196 3710
Navigation A 1036 3820 382 680 None None 1418 4500
Control B 2373 11095 876 2205 None None 3249 13300
Executive 1020 5844 180 647 None 8000 1200 14491
Display & Communication 765 4800 135 1600 None None 900 6400
Fault Isolation & Redun- 1497 6450 877 9300 None None 2374 15750
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000
Totals 9857 47799 4058 21352 None 8000 13915 77151
Table 3-2b
(continued)
ORBITAL FREE FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements(K) Ops/Second (27) (Bits) (26) (%) (28) Bits x 10 3 /sec
Tasks Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min 
Max
Guidance D .00 .87 16 32 80 20 NB 
NB
Navigation B .95 175. 00 16 32 80 20 
NB NB
Control E 3.76 554.80 16 32 80 20 NB NB
Executive .05 58.44 N/A N/A 100 0 NB 
NB
Display & Communication . 77 312.00 16 32 100 
0 NB NB
Fault Isolation & Redun- . 07 32. 25 16 32 100 0 NB 
NB
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing . 63 42. 50 16 32 90 10 
NB NB
Utilities .15 88.30 16 32 80 20 NB 
NB
Totals 6.38 1264. 16 16 32 89.0 11.0 350 800(42) (42) (9) (40)
NB = No Breakdown N/A = Not Applicable
Table 3-2c
ORBITAL FREE FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (28)
Instructions (28) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (28)
Tasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance D 252 433 93 592 None 3800 345 4825
Navigation B 947 3500 349 2368 None 15200 1296 21068
Control E 752 11095 278 2960 None 19000 1030 33055
Executive 1020 5844 180 2368 None 8000 1200 16212
Display & Communication 765 15760 135 9240 None 30000 900 55000
Fault Isolation & Redun- 1497 6450 877 9300 None 11400 2374 27150
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000
Totals 6795 56162 2928 32748 None 87400 9723 176310
Table 3-2c
(continued)
normally be utilized by a taxi or tug vehicle in earth orbit or by a
space station making major orbital corrections in order to prevent
orbital decay. OPF as defined for this MAP consists of two sub-
phases, Basic OPF and Rendezvous Targeting/Docking.
Basic OPF consists of the primary guidance, navigation, and
control operations necessary to change orbits in a controlled manner.
Rendezvous Targeting/Docking consists of those additional guidance and
control operations required to intercept and/or mate with a target vehi-
cle.
The Basic OPF and Rendezvous Targeting/Docking subphase
hardware parameters are defined in Tables 3-2d and 3-2e.
3. 2. 1. 4 Interplanetary Flight Phase
Interplanetary Flight is that mission phase during which the
vehicle is transferred from planetary orbit about one planet to plane-
tary orbit about another planet.
The reference material reviewed during this study associated
with Interplanetary Flight was relatively sketchy. It was not defined in
a manner which permitted it to be broken down into the standardized
tasks used to describe the previously discussed mission phases. There-
fore, the Interplanetary Flight phase hardware parameters defined in
Table 3-2f detail Interplanetary Flight subphases rather than Interplane-
tary Flight tasks.
3. 2. 2 Software Structural Parameters
The Software Structural Parameters are defined to be those para-
meters which are mission phase or subphase dependent and which are
directly influenced by the mission software structural requirements.
During this study two software structural parameters were de-
fined: Task Iteration Rate and Relative Priority.
The Task Iteration Rate defines the number of task executions,
required per second, for each phase. The Relative Priority provides a
qualitative measurement of task importance with respect to successful
mission phase completion.
Table 3-3 defines the software structural parameters for each
task of each phase.
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BASIC ORBITAL POWERED FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length 
Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Second (27) (Bits) (26) (%) (28) Bits x 10 3 /sec
Tasks Min Max Min 
Max Add Mult Min Max
Guidance B 4.02 33.87 16 
32 80 20 3.8 NB(36)
Navigation A .52 191.00 16 32 80 20 
3.8 NB(36)
Control C 13.35 194.18 16 32 
80 20 14.8 NB(37)
Executive 10. 20 146. 10 N/A N/A 
100 0 N/A N/A
Display & Communication .77 96.00 16 32 
100 0 10 NB
Fault Isolation & Redun- .07 32.25 16 32 100 0 .08 NB
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing .63 212.50 16 
32 90 10 11.5 NB(37)
Utilities .30 88.30 16 32 
80 20 NA NB
Totals 29.86 994.20 16 
32 88.0 12. 0 44.7 330
(42) (42) (18)
NB = No Breakdown NA = Not Available N/A 
= Not Applicable
Table 3-2d
BASIC ORBITAL POWERED FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (28)
Instructions (28) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (28)
Tasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance B 1604 2710 592 1000 None None 2196 3710
Navigation A 1036 3820 382 680 None None 1418 4500
Control C 2670 11095 986 2205 None None 3656 13300
Executive 1020 5844 180 647 None 8000 1200 14491
t3 Display & Communication 765 4800 135 1600 None None 900 6400
Fault Isolation & Redun- 1497 6450 877 9300 None None 2374 15750
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000
Totals 10154 47799 4168 21352 None 8000 14322 77151
Table 3-2d
RENDEZVOUS TARGETING/DOCKING HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements(K) Ops/Second (27) (Bits) (26) (%) (28) Bits x 10 3 /sec
Tasks Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
Guidance C .03 3.00 16 32 80 20 3.8 NB
(36)
Navigation B .95 175.00 16 32 80 20 3.8 NB
(36)
Control D 43.05 554.80 16 32 80 20 14.8 NB
(37)
Executive 10.20 146. 10 N/A N/A 100 0 0 0
(38) (38)
Display & Communication .77 96.00 16 32 100 0 10 NB
(37)
Fault Isolation & Redun- .07 32.25 16 32 100 0 .08 NB
dancy Management (39)
Subsystem Processing .63 212. 50 16 32 90 10 11.5 NB
(37)
Utilities .30 88.30 16 32 80 20 NA NB
Totals 56.00 1307.95 16 32 89.13 10.87 44.7 330
(42) . (42) (18)
NA = Not Available NB = No Breakdown N/A = Not Available
Table 3-2e
RENDEZVOUS TARGETING/DOCKING HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words) (28)
Instructions (28) Mainframe Bulk Total Words (28)
Tasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance C 3554 6000 1310 3500 None None 4864 9500
Navigation B 947 3500 349 1600 None None 1296 5100
Control D 252 433 93 157 None None 345 590
Executive 1020 5844 180 647 None 8000 1200 14491
C Display & Communication 765 4800 135 1600 None None 900 6400
O
Fault Isolation & Redun- 1497 6450 877 9300 None None 2374 15750
dancy Management
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000
Totals '9597 40107 3960 22724 None 8000 13557 70831
Table 3-Ze
(continued)
INTERPLANETARY FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Second (Bits) (%) (25) Bits x 10 3 /sec
Subphases Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
Transplanetary Injection 301.254 736.77 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (30)
Transplanetary Coast 314. 860 1048. 16 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (31)
Trajectory Correction 379.454 ;',1307.95 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (32)
Spin-Up I 308. 550 NE 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4)
Spin-Cruise I 318. 660 1048. 16 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (31)
Despin 308.550 NE 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4)
Planetary Approach 379.454 1307.95 16 32 80 20 NB NB
Correction (4) (32)
Aero Braking 287. 550 585.45 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (33)
Planetary Orbital Injection ':285. 454 736.77 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(4) (30)
Planetary Orbital 1048. 16 *1449.402 16 32 80 20 NB NB
(31) (4)
*Interplanetary Extremes 285.454 1449.402 16 32 80 20 NA 1000
(41)
NE = No Equivalents NB = No Breakdown
Table 3-2f
INTERPLANETARY FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Parameters Data (words)Paramete Instructions Mainframe Data (words) Bulk Total Words
Tasks/Subphases Min (14) Max Min (14) Max Min (4) Max Min (4) Max
Transplanetary Injection 8129 47799* 4740 21352 None 8000* 12869 77151
(30) (30) (30) (30)
Transplanetary Coast 11286 45202 6600 21429 None 8000 17886 74631
(31) (31) (31) (31)
Trajectory Correction 8074 40107 4725 22724*:. None 8000 12799 70831
(32) (32) (32) (32)
Spin-Up 7690* NE 4490* NE None NE 12180 NE
Spin Cruise 11656 45202 6820 21429 None 8000 18476 74631
(31) (31) (31) (31)
Despin 7690 NE 4490 NE None NE 12180 NE
Planetary Approach 8779 40107 5140 22724 None 8000 13919 70831
Correction (32) (32) (32) (32)
Aero Braking 9160 40831 5360 21952 None 8000 14520 70783
(33) (33) (33) (33)
Planetary Orbital Injection 7859 47799 4590 21352 None 8000 12449 77151
(30) (30) (30) (30)
Planetary Orbital 15513 45202 9120 21429 None 8000 24633 74631
(31) (31) (31) (31)
*Interplanetary Extremes 7690 47799 4490 22724 None 8000 12180 78523
(34)
NE = No Equivalent
Table 3-2f
(continued)
BOOST-POWERED ASCENT
SOFTWARE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Iteration Rate Relative
(executions /sec) Priority(25 )
Tasks 1 = High
Min Max 2 = Medium
3 = Low
Guidance A 4 25 1
(20) (21)
Navigation A 1 10 1
(21) (20)
Control A 10 50 1
(22) (22)
Executive 20 50 1
(20) (21)
Display & Communication 2 40 3(22) (20)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy . 1 10 2
Management (19) (20)
Subsystem Processing 1 100 2
(21) (22)
Utilities 2 10 2
(23) (22)
Table 3-3
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BOOST - INSERTION
SOFTWARE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Iteration Rate Relative
(executions /sec) Priority (25)
1 = High
Tasks Min Max 2 = Med.
3 = Low
Guidance B 5 25 1
(20) (21)
Navigation A 1 10 1
(21) (20)
Control B 10 50 1
(22) (22)
Executive 20 50 1
(20) (21)
Display & Communication 2 40 3
(22) (20)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy .1 10 2
Management (19) (20)
Subsystem Processing 1 100 2
(21) (22)
Utilities 2 10 2
(23) (22)
Table 3-3
(continued)
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ORBITAL FREE FLIGHT
SOFTWARE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Iteration Rate Relative
(executions /sec) Priority (25)
1 = High
Tasks Min Max 2 = Med.
3 = Low
Guidance D .0166 4 3
(23) (20)
Navigation B 2 100 2
(20) (9)
Control E 10 100 1
(9) (20)
Exe c utive . 1 20 1
(19) (20)
Display & Communication 2 40 2(22) (20)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy . 1 10 2
Management (19) (20)
Subsystem Processing 1.0 20 2
(19) (9)
Utilities 1 20 2
(19) (9)
Table 3-3
(continued)
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ORBITAL POWERED FLIGHT - BASIC
SOFTWARE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Iteration Rate Relative
(executions /sec) Priority (25)
1 = High
Tasks Min Max 2 = Med.
3 = Low
Guidance B 5 25 1
(20) (21)
Navigation A 1 100 1
(21) (9)
Control C 10 35 1
(22) (20)
Executive 20 50 1
(20) (21)
Display & Communication 2 40 3
(22) (20)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy . 1 10 2
Management (19) (20)
Subsystem Processing 1 100 2
(21) (22)
Utilities 2 20 2
(23) (9)
Table 3-3
(continued)
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ORBITAL POWERED FLIGHT - RENDEZVOUS TARGETING/DOCKING
SOFTWARE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameters Iteration Rate Relative
(executions /sec) Priority (25)
1 = High
Tasks Min Max 2 = Med.
3 = Low
Guidance C .0166 1.0 1
(23) (20)
Navigation B 2 100 1
(20) (9)
Control D 25 100 1
(20) (9)
Exe c utive 20 50 1
(20) (21)
Display & Communication 2 40 3
(22) (20)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy . 1 10 2
Management (19) (20)
Subsystem Processing 1 100 2
(21) (22)
Utilities 2 20 2
(23) (9)
Table 3-3
(continued)
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3.3 Task Profiles
The Task Profiles consist of the Task Hardware parameters and
the Task Timing and Criticality parameters defined in this section.
The Task Hardware parameters are defined to be those parameters
which are task dependent and which have a direct influence on the proces-
sor hardware characteristics; i.e., Word Length, Memory Size, Execu-
tion Speed, etc. These parameters are presented in Section 3. 3. 1.
The Task Timing and Criticality parameters are defined to be
those parameters which for each task define its operating criteria and
constraints. These parameters are presented in Section 3.3.2.
Sixteen (16) distinct tasks were identified during this study. Each
of these tasks, along with its associated parameter values, is listed in
the tables of this section.
3. 3. 1 Task Hardware Parameters
Table 3-4 presents the Task Hardware parameters for each of the
sixteen (16) principal tasks identified during this study. In general, the
range of variation, as defined in the reference material, is presented for
each task parameter.
3. 3. 2 Task Timing and Criticality Requirements
Table 3-5 presents the Task Timing and Criticality Requirements
for each of the sixteen (16) defined tasks. Most of these parameters were
established by M&S Computing as indicated by the footnote.
The Criticality parameters, Restart Timing Sensitivity, Inter-
ruptability, Failure Criticality, and Memory Duplicates desired are highly
subjective and no attempt has been made in this MAP to provide anything
other than a gross qualitative indication of criticality.
The Failure Criticality parameters are of special interest to the
ARMMS application and are therefore defined here a little more explicitly
than on the footnotes of Table 3-5.
D The failure must be detected and output from the failing
task prevented. Correct output must be provided within
the time frame indicated by the Restart Timing Sensiti-
vity parameter.
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TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Parameters Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Iteration (24) (Bits) (%) (22) Bits x 10 3 /iteration
Tasks
Name Description Min Max Min (5) Max(1) Add Mult Min Max
Guidance A Ascent & Separation .260 .440 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Guidance B Insertion & OPF .804 1.355 15 3Z 80 20 NB NB
Guidance C Rendezvous Targeting 1. 777 3.000 -15 32 80 20 NB NB
Guidance D Orbital Free Flight . 126 .217 15 32 80 20 NB NB
(OFF)
Navigation A Boost & OPF .518 1.910 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Navigation B Rendezvous Tgt & OFF .474 1. 750 15 3? 80 20 NB NB
Control A Ascent & Separation 1.632 2. 979 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Control B Insertion 1.187 5. 548 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Control C OPF 1. 335 5. 548 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Control D Rendezvous Targeting 1. 722 5. 548 15 32 80 20 NB NB
Control E OFF .376 5. 548 15 32 80 20 NB NB
NB = No Breakdown Available
Table 3-4
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
PROCESSOR CAPABILITY
Word Length Instruction Mix I/O Requirements
(K) Ops/Iteration(24) (Bits) (%) (22) Bits x 10 3 /iteration
Tasks Min Max Min Max Add Mult Min Max
Executive .510 2. 922 N/A N/A 100' 0 0 0
(38) (38)
Display & Communication .383 7. 800 .15 32 100 0 NB NB
S Fault Isolation & Redundancy .749 3. 225 15 32 100 0 NB NB
Management
Subsystem Processing . 631 2. 125 15 32 90 10 NB NB
Utilities .150 4. 415 15 32 80 20 NB NB
(19) (25) (25)
NB = No Breakdown Available N/A = Not Applicable
Table 3-4
(continued)
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Instructions Data (words) Total Words
Tasks Mainframe Bulk
Name Description Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Guidance A Ascent & Separation 520 879 192 325 None None 712 1204
(2) (8) (3) (8)
Guidance B Insertion & OPF 1604 2710 592 1000 None None 2196 3710
(2) (8) (3) (8)
Guidance C Rendezvous Targeting 3554 6000 1310 3500 None None 4864 9500
(2) (7) (3) (7) (6)
Guidance D OFF 252 433 ' 93 592 None 3800 345 4825
(2) (8) (3) (52) (52)
Navigation A Boost & OPF 1036 3820 382 680 None None 1418 4500
(2) (11) (3) (11) (6)
Navigation B Rendezvous Tgt & OFF 947 3500 349 2368 None 15200 
1296 21068
(2) (10) (3) (52) (52) (9)
Control A Ascent & Separation 3263 5958 1205 3480 None None 4468 9438
(2) (14) (3) (14) (12)
Control B Insertion 2373 11095 876 2205 None None 3249 13300
(2) (14) (3) (14) (13)
Control C OPF 2670 11095 986 2205 None None 3656 13300
(2) (14) (3) (14) (13)
Control D Rendezvous Targeting 3444 11095 1272 2205 None None 4716 13300
(2) (14) (3) (14) (13)
Control E OFF 752 11095 278 2960 None 19000 1030 33055
(2) (14) (3) (14) (52) (13)
Table 3-4
(continued)
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
meters Data words)
Instructions Mainframe Bulk Total WordsTasks Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Executive 1020 5844 180 2360 None 8000 120 16212(10) (15) (10) (52) (18) (10)
Display & Communication 765 15760 ,135 9240 None 3000 900 55000(10) (52) (10) (52) (52) (10)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy 1497 6450 877 9300 None 114001 2374 27150Management (14) (17) (14) (17) (52) (12)
Subsystem Processing 1262 4250 816 750 None None 2078 5000(19) (10) (19) (10) (19) (10)
Utilities 300 8830 200 5170 None None 500 14000(19) (14) (19) (14) (19) (6)
Table 3-4
(continued)
TASK TIMING AND CRITICALITY PARAMETERS
arameters Task Duration (ms)
Restart Interrupt Failure Memory (assumes 2Zs add)c***
Tasks Timing Ability Criticality Duplicates Min per Max per
Sensitivity': ' =:: Desirable Pass Pass
Guidance A M CI D Yes .832 1.406
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Guidance B M CI D Yes 2.566 4.336
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Guidance C M CI D Yes 5.686 9.600
(25) (25) (25) (25)
I Guidance D M CI D Yes .403 .693
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Navigation A M CI D Yes 1.658 6.112
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Navigation B M CI D Yes 1.512 5.600
(25) (25) (25) (25)
* H = High (sensitivity impact within 1 minor cycle), M = medium sensitivity (within 1 major cycle), L = low sensitivity (greater than 1
major cycle)
I = Interruptable, NI = Not interruptable, CI = Conditionally interruptable
***" M = Failures must be masked, D = Failures must be identified, N = None (no failure criteria)
Assumes 50% of instructions executed/iteration with 2 ps add time and instruction mix defined
8 ps mult time
Table 3-5
TASK TIMING AND CRITICALITY PARAMETERS
Parameters Task Duration (ms)
Restart Interrupt Failure Memory (2 ps add, 8 ps mult)
Tasks Timing Ability Criticality Duplicates Min per Max per
Sensitivity':* * * Desired Pass Pass
Control A H NI D Yes 5.221 9.533
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Control B H NI D Yes 3.797 17.752
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Control C H NI D Yes 4.272 17. 752
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Control D H NI D Yes 5.510 17.752
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Control E H NI D Yes 1.203 17.752
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Executive H I D Partial 1.020 5. 844
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Display & Communication L I N No . 765 4. 800
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Fault Isolation & Redundancy L CI D Partial 1.497 6.450
Management (25) (25) (25) (25)
Subsystem Processing M CI D Yes 1.641 5.525
(25) (25) (25) (25)
Utilities H I D Yes .480 14. 128
(25) (25) (25) (25)
H = High (sensitivity impact within 1 minor cycle), M = Medium sensitivity (within 1 major cycle), L = low sensitivity (greater than
major cycle)
I = Interruptable, NI = Not Interruptable, CI = Conditionally Interruptable
M = Failures must be masked, D = Failures must be identified, N = None (no failure criteria)
Table 3-5
(continued)
N Output from this task under failure conditions need not
be prevented, even though failure must be detected.
,.4 Reviewed Mission Summary
This paragraph documents in detail the parameters associated
with the key missions studied. Most of the tabulated data in Section 3
was derived from the following references:
SH-4 Participation in Phase B Space Shuttle Program
Definition; March 2, 1971, IBM.
M-1 Study of Spaceborne Multiprocessing; September,
1968, Autonetics.
SS-5 Reconfigurable G&C Computer Study for Space
Station Use; January 31, 1971, Autonetics.
SH-2 Data Management System Control Study - Tech-
nical Design Notes 1-21; May to September, 1971,
TRW.
SH-8 Phase B Shuttle Review; September, 1970, IBM.
AS-4 Saturn LVDC Statistics; February 8, 1971, MSFC.
The other references in Appendix 2 were used in deriving the
MAP, but the listed references provided the bulk of the data. Tables
3-6 through 3-11 in this paragraph depict the exact data gathered for
each key reference. All blank entries represent data not available
in this reference or not applicable.
These tables are oriented around the standardized tasks defined
during the evaluation. This approach for presentation of the backup
material was chosen as an alternate to presenting the source material
in the format as used by the originators, to simplify the data presented
and to establish a baseline format conducive to cross comparison. No
attempt has been made in this section to interpret or explain the source
data. Readers interested in this type of information should reference
the source material.
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SOURCE SH-4
OVERALL PHASE HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
(K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Phases
1) Boost
a) Powered Ascent 156.36 32 24342
b) Insertion 168. 10 32 24536
2) Orbital Free Flight 148. 15 32 21474
3) Orbital Powered Flight
a) Basic Orbital Pwr Fit 165. 70 32 24833
b) Rendezvous Tgt 152. 25 32 27468
Table 3-6
SOURCE SH-4
POWERED ASCENT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements 
I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input 
Output
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) 
(bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance A 1.06 32 520 520
Navigation A 4. 9 32 1036 
1036
Control A 41.2 32 3263 3263
Executive 21.9 32 2420 2420
Displays & Data Mgt 58. 2 32 2980 
2980
Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082 4082
Subsystem Processing 4.0 32 2100 
2100
System Tables 
7941 7941
Total 156.36 32 16406 
7941 24342
Table 3-6a
SOURCE SH-4
INSERTION HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input OutputTasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance B 5.0 32 1604 1604
Navigation A 4.9 32 1036 1036
Control B 48.9 32 2373 2373
Executive 21.9 32 2420 2420
Displays & Data Mgt 58.2 32 2980 2980
Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082 4082
Subsystem Processing 4.1 32 2100 2100
System Tables 7941 7941
Totals 168. 1 32 16595 7941 24536
Table 3-6b
SOURCE SH-4
ORBITAL FREE FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance D .53 32 252 252
Navigation B .82 32 947 947
Control E 37.6 32 '752 752
Executive 21.9 32 2420 2420
Displays & Data Mgt 58. 2 32 2980 2980
Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082 4082
Subsystem Processing 4.0 32 2100 2100
System Tables 7941 7941
Totals 148. 15 32 . 3533 7941 21474
Table 3-6c
SOURCE SH-4
BASIC ORBITAL POWERED FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance B 5.0 32 1604 1604
Navigation A 4.9 32 1036 1036
Control C 46.6 32 2670 2670
I
CI. Executive 21.9 32 2420 2420
Displays & Data Mgt 58.2 32 2980 2980
Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082 4082
Subsystem Processing 4.0 32 2100 2100
System Tables 7941 7941
Totals 165.70 32 16892 7941 24833
Table 3-6d
SOURCE SH-4
RENDEZVOUS TARGETING HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance C 1.03 32 3554 3554
Navigation B .82 32 947 947
Control D 41.2 32 3444 3444
01 Executive 21.9 32 2420 2420
Displays & Data Mgt 58.2 32 2980 2980
Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082 4082
Subsystem Processing 4.0 32 2100 2100
System Tables 7941 7941
Totals/Max Ranges 152.25 32 19527 7941 27468
Table 3-6e
SOURCE SH-4
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Tasks Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
N(K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance A Ascent & Separation 1.06 32 520
Guidance B Insertion & OPF 5.0 32 1604
Guidance C Rendezvous Targeting 1.03 32 3554
Guidance D OFF .53 32 Z52
CO
NavigationA Boost & OPF 4. 9 32 1036c1
Navigation B Rendezvous Tgt & OFF .82 32 947
Control A Ascent & Separation 41.2 32 3263
Control B Insertion 48.9 32 2373
Control C OPF 46.6 32 2670
Control D Rendezvous Targeting 41.2 32 3444
Control E OFF 37.6 32 752
Executive 21. 9 32 2420
Displays & 58.2 32 2980
Data Mgt
Table 3-6f
SOURCE SH-4
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Tasks Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
(K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Name Description
Fault Isol.
Red. Mgt 25. 1 32 4082
Subsystem
C Processing 4.0 32 2100
I
CW System
Tables Data 7941 7941
Table 3-6f
(continued)
SOURCE M-1
INTERPLANETARY FLIGHT HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
u ases (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)Subphases
INTP
1. Trans Plan Inj 57554 6161
2. Trans Plan Coast 314860 17886
3. Trajectory Corr 379454 12799
4. Spin-Up 308550 12180
5. Spin Cruise 318660 18476
6. Despin 308550 12180
7. Plan Appr Corr 379454 13919
8. Aero Braking 287550 14520
9. Plan Orbit Inj 285454 12449
10. Plan Orbit 1449402 24633
11. Trans Earth Inj 301254 12869
Totals 4390742 158072
Table 3-7
SOURCE SS-5
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Para- Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements Software Struct.
meters Instructions Data Total Parameters
Ops/Sec Word Length (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output Iteration Relative
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec) Rate Priority
(per sec)
1) Guidance
2) Navigation 170 32 3500 1600 5100 100
3) Control
O a) Maneuver
31 Determination 60.8 32 935 165 1100 20/200
b) CMG Control 64 32 2510 590 3100 20
c) RCS Control 200 32 4650 1050 5700 10/200
d) Attitude Det-
ermination 320 32 3000 400 3400 100
4) Executive 13.2 32 1020 180 1200
5) Display & Com-
munication 12 32 765 135 900
6) Fault Isolation &
Red. Mgt. 12.2 32 1020 180 1200
Table 3-8
SOURCE SS-5
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Para- Processor Capability Memory Requirements 1/O Requirements 
Software Struct.
meters Instructions Data Total 
Parameters
Ops/Sec Word Length (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output Iteration Relative
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec) Rate Priority(per sec)
7) Subsystem Pro-
cessing
a) Exp. Module
Update 32 3400 600 4000
b) Taxi Module
Align 32 850 150 1000 
20
8) Utilities
a) Rendezvous 1800 1200 3000 1
b) Docking 41.8 1700 500 2200 20
c) Balance
Control 18. 2 4200 2300 6500 20
d) Gen. Utilities N. A. 840 360 1200
Totals 917.2 3.0190 9410 39600
Table 3-8
(continued)
SOURCE SH-2
OVERALL PHASE TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Para- Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
meters Instructions Data Total Iteration
Ops/Sec Word Length (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output Rate
Tasks (K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
1) Boost 250000 32 22000 3570 1065
2) Orbital Powered 250000 32 2300 3816 1794
Flight
3) Orbital Free 250000 32 23000 630 714
Flight
Table 3-9
SOURCE SH-2
OVERALL PHASE TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Para- Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
meters Instructions Data Total
IterationExec. Time Word Length (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output Iterat
Tasks 10 - sec (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
Guidance 5. 8 32 1200 1
Attitude .2 225
Navigation 2.5 32 350 1
Control 3.2 32 1350 50IMU & Rate Gyro 2.2 275
Main Engines .8 1750
Executive 2.6 32 700 50
Data Bus Control 1050
Display & Data Mgt 32 5800
Keyboard 2.0
Controls & Disp. 6.0 2
Crew 1.0 12
12
Checkout & Fault
Isolation 4000
Self Test 16 32 1000
Subsystems
Sensor Process. 4.4 32 925 -
Vehicle Subsys. 27 2100 1
Communications 2 200 1
Totals 20700
Table 3-9
(continued)
SOURCE SH-8
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirement Software Struct.
Parameters
Ops/Sec Word Inst. Mix Data Total Iteration
Length Add/Mult Instructions/ Mainframe Bulk Rate Relative
Tasks (K) (Bits) (%O) words (words/bits) (words) (words) (per sec) Priority
1) Guidance 12.0 16/32 80/20 4100/2563 740/32 3303 .2/20
2) Navigation 9.25 16/32 80/20 4000/3125 1800/32 4925 .01/5110
3) Control 118.28 16/32 80/20 3300/2063 1000/16 2563 10/50
4) Executive 4240/16 2120
a) Control 21.2 16/32 100/0 3584/2638 2638 600
b) I/O Control 50.0 16/32 100/0 800/600 600 400
c) Interrupt Processing 27.9 16/32 100/0 360/270 270 370
d) Flt Control 15.0 16/32 100/0 1100/825 250/16 950 150
5) Display & Communi-
cation 8.9 16/32 100/0 4800/4350 1600/16 5150 2/20
6) Fault Isolation & Re-
dundancy Mgt
a) LOFI (checkout &
fault isolation 15.5 16/32 100/0 3950/3400 2300/16 4550 80/100
b) Recovery Mgt N.A. 16/32 2 500/1563 7000/16 5063 N.A.
Table 3-10
SOURCE SH-8
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirement Software Struct.
Parameters
Ops/Sec Word Inst. Mix Data Total Iteration
Length Add/Mult Instructions/ Mainframe Bulk Rate Relative
Tasks (K) (Bits) (%) words (words/bits) (words) (words) (per sec) Priority
7) Subsystem Processing
a) IOCS 20.0 16/32 100/0 600/450 60/16 480 100
b) IMU 45.0 16/32 80/20 456/282 40/16 302 100
8) Utilities
a) Sequencing 2.0 16/32 100/0 1100/688 1200/32 1888 10
Totals 345.03 31644/22817 20230/11985 34802
Table 3-10
(continued)
SOURCE AS-4
TASK HARDWARE PARAMETERS
Parameters Processor Capability Memory Requirements I/O Requirements
Instructions Data Total
Ops/Sec Word Length. (words) Mainframe Bulk (words) Input Output
(K) (Bits) (words) (words) (bytes/sec) (bytes/sec)
1) Guidance 9. 5K
(15%)
2) Navigation 4. 5K
(7%)
3) Control 3K
(5%)
4) Executive 2. 5K
(4%)
5) Display & Communication 8. 5K
(13%)
6) Fault Isolation & Red. Mgt 9K
(14%)
7) Subsystem Processing 2. 5K
(4%)
8) Utilities 14K
(22%)
Prelaunch Checkout 10. 5K
& Inflight Spare (16%)
Total 64
Table 3-11
Table 3-12 and 3-13 present the phase timings for a Mars
mission and for a Jupiter/Saturn/Pluto Flyby mission. While the
phase timing data was not required for the development of the MAP
presented in Section 3, it may be of possible interest. The informa-
tion presented in Table 3-12 was extracted from Source M-1 (Refer-
ence Appendix 2) and the data for Table 3-13 was extracted from
Source M-4.
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MARS MISSION
Mission Phase Time (Hours)
1 - ATM Ascent .2
2 - Earth Orbiter Coast 8.0
3 - Trans Mars Inj. .2
4 - Trans Mars Coast 119.8
5 - Traj. Corr .2
6 - Spin Up 1.2
7 - Spin Cruise 2759.8
8 - De Spin 1.2
9 - Mars Appr. Corr .2
10 - Aero Braking .4
11 - Mars Orbit Inj. .6
12 - Mars Orbital Coast 974.3
13 - Trans Earth Inj. .2
14 - Trans Earth Coast 119.8
15 - Traj. Corr .2
16 - Spin Up 1. 2
17 - Spin Cruise 6119.8
18 - De Spin 1.2
19 - Earth Appr. Corr .2
20 - Earth Re-Entry .2
Table 3-12
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JUPITER/SATURN/PLUTO FLYBY MISSION
Mission Phase Time (Hours)
i - Launch .8
2 - Attitude Stabilization 90. O0
3 - Earth Jupiter Cruise 10,000.0
4 - Near Earth TCM 8.0
5 - Data Dump Mode 4, 000.0
6 - Jupiter Approach Guidance 800.0
7 - Pre-Jupiter TCM 8.0
8 - Jupiter Far Encounter 200.0
9 - Jupiter Near Encounter 175.0
10 - Jupiter Playback 10.0
11 - Post-Jupiter TCM 8.0
12 - Jupiter-Saturn Cruise 10,000.0
13 - Saturn Approach Guidance 90.0
14 - Pre-Saturn TCM 8.0
15 - Saturn Far Encounter 200.0
16 - Saturn Near Encounter 175.0
17 - Saturn Playback 90.0
18 - Post Saturn TCM 8. O0
19 - Saturn Pluto Cruise 40,000 0
20 - Pluto Approach Guidance i, 000. 0
Table 3-13
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JUPITER/SATURN/PLUTO FLYBY MISSION
(continued)
Mission Phase Time (Hours)
21 - Pre-Pluto TCM 8.0
22 - Pluto Far Encounter 200. 0
23 - Pluto Near Encounter 175.0
24 - Pluto Playback 300.0
Table 3-13
(continued)
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4. SATURN V - BOOST PROFILE
Although a great deal of information can be derived from the
MAP described in Section 3, there are several details that cannot be
derived from the functional level used for the MAP.
To illustrate the additional details it was necessary to analyze
an actual, operational, typical spaceborne application. This applica-
tion selected was the Saturn V Flight Program. Specifically, the
application modules involved in the boost phase were analyzed, for
the simple reason that this phase clearly dominates the other mission
phases on Saturn V.
Table 4-1 presents the various sizing, activation etc. para-
meters of the individual tasks. Note that "tasks" within this context
reflect a more detailed breakdown than the "tasks" described in
Section 3.
The Events Sequence Time Line underlying the execution of the
tasks is depicted in Table 4-2.
Note that the tasks that could be performed as part of a
Control Executive are not reflected in this profile,
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SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Execution Time arameter Telem.
(add equiv) Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteration Activate Deactivate Preceding Completion (words Inter.Inhb.
Task Name/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output per equiv) (add equiv.)
Accelerometer 314 343 220 S Major Phase Phase AR Major 21 5 3 None
Processing/AP Loop Start End Loop
Accelerometer 573 576 215 S Major Phase Phase Start Major 13 23 7 41
Read/AR Loop Start End Major Loop
Loop
CHI Computa- 286 286 53 S Major Refer- Refer- IG Major 18 2 3 None
Itions/CC Loop enceIG enceIG Loop
Cutoff Logic 195 195 115 S 25/sec. Refer- Refer- ML Major 9 4 0 Durationof
(CO) ence HS ence HS Loop Execution
Disagreement 31 90 181 A Detection Single ML Reference 7 
6 1 Duration of
Bit Processing of gimbal Execution ML Execution
(DG) disag. bit
by ML
Discrete Input 13 13 #10, #15 S-II/S-IVB Single Major #10, #10, #10,
Processor #10 40 A -- Separation Execution -- Loop #15 #15 #15
(DP) 0 0 0. None
Discrete Input 56 56 #11, #14,#19 A -- S-IC Single -- Major #11, #11, #11, None
Processor #11 137 Inboard Execution Loop #14, #14, #14,
(DP) IEngine out #19 #19 #196 8 1
Table 4-1
SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Execution Time Parameters Telem.
(add equiv) Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteratio Activate Deactivate Preceding Completion Parameters (words Inter. Inhb.
Task Na.ne/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output per equiv) (add equiv.)
Discrete Input 100 100 #13, #21 A -- S-II Single M-- ajor #13, #13, #13, None
Processor #13 136 Inboard Execution Loop #21 #21 #21
(DP) Engine 6 8 1
Out
Discrete Input 80 80 A -- S-IC Single -- Major None
Processor #14 Outboard Execution Loop
(DP) Engine
Out
Discrete Input 13 13 A -- S-IIAFT Single -Major None
Processor #15 Interstage Execution Loop 0 0 0
(DP) Separation
Discrete Input 17 17 A -- S-II Single -- Major 6 8 1 None
Processor #19 Engines Execution Loop
(DP) Out
Discrete Input 112 112 A -- S-II Single -- Major 6 8 1 None
Processor #21 Outboard Execution Loop
I(DP) Engine
Out
'Discrete Input 499 499 1# 2 2 , #28 A -- S-IVB Single -- Major #22, #22, #22, 385
Processor #22 186 Cutoff"B" Execution Loop #28 #28 #28
(DP) Discrete 10 37 1
Table 4-1
(continued)
SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Execution Time Parameter Telem.
(add equiv) Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteration Activate Deactivate Preceding Completion (words Inter. Inhb.
ask Name/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output per equiv) (add equiv.)
Discrete Input 507 507 A S-- -IVB Single -- Major 10 37 1 385
Processor #28 Cutoff"A" Execution Loop
(DP) Interrupt
!F/M 128 130 96 S ML TBI+6 TB3+0 AP Major 10 7 3 None
Calculations TB3+6. 7 TB4+0 Loop
(DV) TB4+12.0 TB5+0
!Minor Loop 70 70 90 S 1.25/ Phase Phase UM 800 8 10 0 None
iError Monitor sec Start End msecs
(EC)
Gravitation 300 300 160 S ML Phase Phase NE Major 7 6 0 None
'Acceleration Start End Loop(GR)
IS-IVB Cutoff 238 353 201 S ML TB5-8If TB5+0 IG Major 24 7 3 28=NOM
Prediction (HS) Velocity Loop 33=MAX
Sufficient
Iterative Guid- 3276 4115 1477 S ML 7B3+40.6 TB5+0 NE Major 45 11 36 None
ance Mode (IG) Loop
Minor Loop 199 522 11678 S 25/sec Phase Phase -- 40msecs 46 33 1 Duration of
(ML) Start End Execution
Minor Loop 458 458 199 S ML Phase Start HS CC or Major 14 10 10 13+30 =
Support (MS) Start TT Loop 43
T5+0 Phase
End
Table 4-1
(continued)
SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Execution Time Parameters Telem.
(add equiv) Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteration Activate Deactivate Preceding Completio (words Inter.Inhb.
Task Name/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output per equiv) (add equiv.)
Boost 689 829 287 S ML Phase Phase lAP Major 1 14 18 16 None
Navigation (NE) Start End Loop
Digital Output 848 848 15 S ML TB5+0 Phase -- Major 282+261+
Multiplexer End Loop 1 1 4 213= 756
Telemetry (OD)
Orbital 582 606 487 S ML TB5+0 Phase NE Major 27 20 2 None
Guidance (OG) End Loop
Time-To-Go To 527 737 242 S ML TB5+0 Phase NE Major 15 8 5 None
Restart, Beta End Loop
;Test (RS)
W Steering Misa- 299 299 77 S 1ML TB3+60.6 TB4+0 IG Major 10 2 2 None
ignment ! TB4+15.0 TB5+0 I Loop
O Correction (SM)
Switch 431 911 853 A : -- Phase Start Phase End __ 100 10 7 2 Duration of
Selector cheduled for executior msecs Execution
Processing (SS) each time an SS com-
mand is issued.
M/F Smoothing 124 124 91 S 'ML TB3+6. 7 TB4+0 DV Major 17 2 2 None
(ST) TB4+ 12.0 TB5+0 i Loop
Time Base 275 314. 28 A -- Start of Single -- Complete 2 6 0 Duration of
Start Routines eachtime Execution <2msec Execution
#00 (TB) ase per TB -after act.
cond
detected
Table 4-1
(continued)
SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Telem.
Execution Time Telem.Parameters
(add equiv) _ Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteratio Activate Deactivate Preceding Completion Parameters (words Inter. Inhb.
Task Name/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output per equiv) 
(add equiv.)
Time Base 393 432 #10, #15 S ML TO+ 17. 5 Liftoff -- Complete 
#10, #10, #10, Duration of
StartRoutines 17 
<2msec #15 #15 #15 Execution
#10 (TB) after act. 8 7 1Cond
detected
Time Base 337 376 A -- Liftoff Single -Same 
8 7 1 Duration of
Start Routines Interrupt Execution 
Execution
#15 (TB)
Time Base 321 360 29 A T 1+134.7 Single Same 3 4 0 Duration of
Start Routines Execution 
Execution
#25 (TB)
Time Base 352 391 #30, #35 A S-IC Single Same #30, #30, #30, Duration of
Start Routines 44 Outboard Execution #35 #35 #35 Execution
#30 (TB) Engine Out 3 
2 2
Inter
Time Base 339 378 A Ref. Single Same 3 2 2 Duration of
Start Routines Table 4-2 Execution Execution
#35 (TB)
Time Base 388 427 #40, #45 A Ref. Single Same 
#40, #40, #40, Duration of
Start Routines I 56 Table 4-2 Execution 
#45 #45 #45 Execution
#40 (TB) 4 5 2
Time Base 375 394 A Ref. Single Same 
4 5 2 Duration of
Start Routines f Table 4-2 Execution Execution
#45 (TB) 1
Table 4-1
(continued)
SATURN V BOOST TASK PROFILE
Execution Time Telem.
(add equiv) Memory Req. Synchr/ Iteratio Activate Deactivate Preceding Completion Parameters Telem InterInhbTask Name/ID Nominal Maximum (# of instr.) Asynchr Rate Upon Upon Task Deadline Input Output perequiv) (add equiv.)
Time Base 64 64 #50, #55, A 
-- ef. Single 
-- Complete #50, #50, #50, Duration ofStart Routines #57 able 4-2 Execution <2 msec #55, #55, #55, Execution#50 (TB) 156 
after act. #57 #57 #57
Cond De- 7 13 3
tected
Time Base 54 54 A -- ef. Single Same 7 13 3 Duration of#55 (TB) Table 4-2 Execution Execution
Time Base 62 62 S ML 4+10.0 T5+0 Same 7 13 3 Duration ofStart R outines E ecution
#57 (TB) Execution
Time Tilt 94 140 211 S ML TB 1+0 TB3+0 Same 5 2 0 NoneGuidance (TT)
Time Update 105 105 11 S 1.25/ hase Phase 800 1 0 0 NoneUM) 
sec tart End msec
Utility Routines 
-- 
-- 534
Table 4-1
(continued)
SATURN V BOOST EVENT SEQUENCE TIME L-INE
Time Time in Time Base (Secs)
Name Base Nom. Min. Max. Start Condition TB Start Routine
(TB)
Guidance Reference Liftoff 0 Interrupt 7
Liftoff 1 17.0 16.0 150.0 Discrete 24 (after TBO+16) or vertical TB15
inertial acceleration<2 m/sec 2 for
4 comp. cycles after 17. 5.
S-IC Inboard Engine Cutoff 2 134.7 TB1 + 134.7 if down range velocity TB25
<500 m/sec.
S-IC Outboard Engine Cutoff 3 29.7 18.4 Interrupt 5 or discrete 18 (neither TB30 (Interrupt)
recognized until after S-IC Outboard TB35 (Discrete)
Engine Cutoff Enable Switch Selector
issued at TB2 + 18.4).
S-II Cutoff 4 391.9 355.0 Interrupt 6 or discrete 19 (neither TB40 (Interrupt)
recognized until after S-II LOX TB45 (Discrete)
Depletion Sensor Cutoff Arm Switch
Selector issued at TB3 + 355.0).
S-IVB First Cutoff 5 500.0 10.0 Any combination of 2 of the following TB50 (Interrupt)
events after TB4 + 10.0. TB55 (Discrete)
1. Interrupt 4
2. Discrete 5
3. S-IVB cutoff command issued by
LVDC.
4. Velocity change less than 1 m/sec
over the last major loop.
Table 4-2
APPENDIX 1
MAP TABLE FOOTNOTES
No. Footnote
1 The majority of the references reviewed assumed a maximum
word length of 32 bits.
2 Reference number SS-4 (Appendix 2).
3 In reference number SS-4 (Appendix 2) there were 7941 data
words while the minimum core total (for orbital free flight)
was 21,474 words. This defined a data/total core ratio of
36. 9%. This ratio was then used to calculate all mainframe
data estimates associated with reference SS-4.
4 Reference number M-1 (Appendix 2).
5 Reference number AS-1 (Appendix 2).
6 Reference number AS-4 (Appendix 2).
7 Using the data/total core ratio defined in footnote (3) a total
core requirement of 9500 words for worst case guidance can
be broken down into 3500 data words and 6000 instructions.
8 For the worst case guidance task (Guidance C) and the estimate
from source AS-4 the maximum/minimum instruction ratio was
1.69 (3554 versus good). This ratio was applied as a multiplier
to the other guidance minimum instruction counts as a multiplier
to estimate the maximum values.
9 Reference number SS-5 (Appendix 2).
10 Reference number SS-5 (Appendix 2). The estimates are further
broken down in the reference material.
11 The percentage breakdowns available in reference SS-5 were also
applied here.
12 Reference number AS-1 (Appendix 2).
3-74
APPENDIX 1
MAP TABLE FOOTNOTES
(continued)
No. Footnote
13 Reference number SS-5 (Appendix 2) was assumed to define
estimates equal to the worst case control operation.
14 The data/total core ratio of footnote (3) equal to 36. 9% was
used to breakdown the total estimate available.
15 Reference number SH-8 (Appendix 2) defined 5844 instructions
to require 4333 words of memory and 250 data quantities to
require a 125 memory words. However, for the purpose of
obtaining worst case estimates this report treats each item
as a full word. In this case the data reference was not used.
16 Reference number M-4 (Appendix 2). Only the data estimate
was used.
17 Reference number SH-8 (Appendix 2). For worst case esti-
mating it was assumed that each data and instruction quantity
required a full memory word.
18 Reference number SS-3 (Appendix 2).
19 Reference number M-4 (Appendix 2).
20 The iteration rates for reference number SH-4 (Appendix 2)
were estimated by dividing one half of the instruction count
into the estimate for operations/second defined. This assumes
that in general about 50% of the instructions of a functional
area are executed per iteration.
21 Reference number SH-2 (Appendix 2).
22 Reference number SH-8 (Appendix 2).
23 Reference number SH-5 and SS-1 (Appendix 2).
24 Calculated by dividing the instruction counts by two. See foot-
note (20).
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MAP TABLE FOOTNOTES
(continued)
No. Footnote
25 An M&S Computing Engineering Judgement.
26 The majority of references reviewed use 16 or 32 bit words.
27 Calculated by multiplying the operations/iteration defined in
the task hardware parameters times the defined iteration rate.
28 Extracted from the Task Hardware parameters.
29 Transferred from the phase task tables.
30 Assumed equivalent to insertion
31 Assumed equivalent to orbital free flight (OFF).
32 Assumed equivalent to Rendezvous Targeting.
33 Assumed equivalent to Powered Ascent.
34 This is the sum of the Interplanetary extremes components.
35 The Interplanetary phase extremes were used.
36 Reference number SH-7 (Appendix 2). The guidance and navi-
gation estimate was split.
37 Reference number SH-7 (Appendix 2).
38 Not applicable.
39 Reference number SS-5 (Appendix 2) was the only reasonable
estimate documented. The estimate of reference number SH-7
obviously included subsystem functions other than just the
G&CC.
40 Reference number SS-2 (Appendix 2).
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MAP TABLE FOOTNOTES
(continued)
No. Footnote
41 Reference number M-1 (Appendix 2). It was assumed that the
video data was not processed by the on-board computer.
42 Calculated by averaging percentage over the core required for
instructions. (The minimum and maximum core estimates
for instruction were added together.)
43 Reference number SH-2 (Appendix 2) indicates that 75.4% of
the programs are common between phases,therefore, the
overall estimate was calculated by multiplying the worst case
estimate/column times 1. 327 to obtain an overall estimate.
44 Used the phase hardware parameter Interplanetary extremes.
45 Calculated by averaging the phase sums.
46 Used the worst case estimate/column.
47 Reference number SH-7 (Appendix 2).
48 Reference number SS-2 (Appendix 2).
49 Used the data/total core ratio of 36.9 (footnote (3)) and the
minimum total of 34, 000 from reference number SS-3 (Appendix
2).
50 Used the data/total core ratio of 36. 9 (footnote 3) and the total
of 121000 from reference SH-7 (Appendix 2).
51 The totals were calculated using the following formula:
Total = (Boost/OFF/OPF) + 24. 6% of Interplanetary + Ex-
periments
The above formula is based on the assumption that 75.4% of the
programs required for the Interplanetary phase are already
included in the Boost/OFF/OPF estimate (see footnote 43).
52 Reference number SS-9 (Appendix 2).
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APPENDIX 2
REVIEWED REFERENCES
SHUTTLE
SH-1 Data Management System - System Architecture Data
Bus Computer Design Software. June 11, 1971, TRW.
SH-2 Data Management System Control Study - Technical
Design Notes 1 - 21. May to September 1971, TRW.
SH-3 Software Presentation Agenda. June 1971, TRW.
SH-4 Participation in Phase B Space Shuttle Program Defini-
tion. March 2, 1971, IBM.
SH-5 On-Board Autonomy Panel Report, February 4, 1970,
MSC, KSC, MSFC.
SH-6 Presentation on Low Cost Shuttle, March 1971, MSFC.
SH-7 System Configuration and Executive Requirements Speci-
fication for Reusable Shuttle and Space Station/Base.
May 1971, Computer Sciences Co.
SH-8 Phase B Shuttle Review. September 1970, IBM.
SPACE STATION
SS-1 On-Board Autonomy Panel Report. February 4, 1970, MSC,
KSC, MSFC.
SS-2 Modular Space Station Phase B Extension Second Quarterly
Review. August 19, 1971, North American Rockwell.
SS-3 Pre-Phase A Study for an Analysis of a Reusable Space
Tug. March 22, 1971, North American Rockwell.
SS-4 Modular Space Station Phase B Extension Third Quarterly
Report. November 4, 1971, North American Rockwell.
SS-5 Reconfigurable G&C Computer Study for Space Station
Use. January 31, 1971, Autonetics.
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REVIEWED REFERENCES
(continued)
SS-6 Space Station Program Extension Period Second Per-
formance Review. July 1971, MDAC.
SS-7 An Engineering Study of On-Board Checkout Techniques.
March 1971, IBM.
SS-8 Final Report Multiprocessor Computer System Study.
March 1970, Intermetrics.
SS-9 Modular Space Station Computer Study. October 1971,
IBM.
III. APOLLO/SA TURN
AS-1 STS Software Development (Study Task 5). July 1970,
MIT, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory.
AS-2 Guidance, Navigation and Control CM Functional
Description and Operation using Flight Program Colossus
2c (Comanche 67). August 1969, MIT Instrumentation
Laboratory.
AS-3 Apollo 14 (January 31, 1971) AS-509/CM-110/LM-8
Preliminary Flight Plan. September 23, 1970, MSC.
AS-4 Saturn LVDC Statistics. February 8, 1971, MSFC.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
M-1 Study of Spaceborne Multiprocessing. September 1968,
Autonetics.
M-2 Reliability in Long-Life Missions. October 1970, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory.
M-3 HEAO Computer Requirements. August 1971, M&S Com-
puting, Inc.
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REVIEWED REFERENCES
(continued)
M-4 Data Subsystems for a 12-Year Missions. September 1970,
JPL.
M-5 Final Report Voyager Spacecraft Phase B, Task D
(Volume IV). October 1967, General Electric.
M-6 Reference Earth Orbital Research & Application Investi-
gations (Blue Book). January 1971, General Dynamics.
M-7 Experiment Requirements Summary for Modular Space
Station and Space Shuttle Orbital Applications and Re-
quirements. April 1971, Martin Marietta.
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SECTION 4
SYNCHRONOUS VERSUS NON-SYNCHRONOUS SCHEDULING CONTROL
The task scheduling and interrupt handling approach selected
has far-reaching effects on the overall design of a computer system
such as ARMMS. The two major alternatives are synchronous and
non-synchronous scheduling. This section discusses these alterna-
tives, and the conclusion is made that non-synchronous scheduling
should be selected for ARMMS. The design is proceeding based on
this conclusion.
ql t
SYNCHRONOUS VS. NON-SYNCHRONOUS
SCHEDULING CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
A controversy currently exists concerning the methods of 
task
scheduling to be used for aerospace systems. This controversy 
exists
due to a revival of synchronous scheduling methods. Synchronous 
sched-
uling methods were revived as an apparent solution 
to prevent subtle
but critical software errors seemingly caused by the use of so-called
interrupt driven-scheduling methods (non- synchronous scheduling).
There is no question that synchronous scheduling methods are
intuitively appealing. However, in the thus generated enthusiasm 
the
shortcomings are likely to be ignored. It is the purpose of this report
to highlight these disadvantages, such that the merit of synchronous
scheduling control is evaluated with the proper perspective.
In the following paragraphs we will first present the aerospace
task scheduling characteristics, then describe the functional design
of synchronous scheduling control and finally discuss 
the pros and cons
of the subject scheduling methods.
II. AEROSPACE SOFTWARE SCHEDULING CHARACTERISTICS
Aerospace software consists first of all of a set of cyclic pro-
cesses, each of which may require a different repetition rate. These
are generally called the synchronous processes. 
The highest repetition
rate required is called the minor loop frequency and the time required
to perform the processes to be executed at this rate 
is called the minor
loop. The time available between consecutive minor 
loop start points
is called a major loop segment. The shortest time span in which the
majority of the synchronous processes can be executed at least once, is
called the major loop.
For example, if there are three task with the following character-
istics:
4-1-a
Task Name Rep. Rate Exec. Time
A 8 per sec. 50 msecs.
B 4 per sec. 75 msecs.
C 2 per sec. 150 msecs.
Then the minor loop frequency is 8 per sec. and the minor loop is 50
msecs. A major loop segment is 1/8 sec. or 125 msecs., and the
major loop is 1/2 sec. or 500 msecs. This is further depicted below:
Major Loop
Major Loop Segment
Minor Loop
Note that there may be (generally non-critical) supporting processes
that, in effect, have a higher repetition rate than the minor loop. An
example of this in the Saturn V flight program is telemetry. A piece
of data can be transmitted every 4. 3 msecs.
Secondly, there is a set of processes that are forced by non-
periodic events such as a specific time, an event signalled by the ex-
ternal environment, or other conditions that could be detected during
execution of another process.
These are called asynchronous processes. Some of these pro-
cesses are time-critical. That is, they have to be completed within
the next two or three major loop segments. Some of these processes
are non-time critical. That is, their execution may be delayed several
major loop cycles if necessary. There is, of course, a range of re-
sponse requirements between the defined time-critical processes and
non-time critical processes. The main point is that some of the asyn-
chronous processes are likely to be time-critical. It is obvious, that
if these can be properly handled, processes with lesser response re-
quirements can certainly be accommodated.
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III. SYNCHRONOUS SCHEDULING CONTROL DESIGN
For Synchronous Scheduling Control, it is necessary to divide
each process into segments such that each segment is completed with-
in a specified time. That is, the primary segmentation criterion is
execution time. This may or may not correspond to the functional
modularization.
The maximum execution time is dependent on several criteria
which will become more apparent further on in this discussion.
During each major loop segment all minor loop processes are
first of all completed. The remainder of the major loop segment is
then assigned to the various process segments such that processes
are executed at the required cyclic rate and the individual process
segments assigned to a major loop segment are completed before the
next minor loop should start.
There is no algorithm available to easily establish maximum
length of time and major loop segment assignment of the various pro-
cess segments. However, the following method provides a simple
start that should allow proper division and assignment of the process
modules to be completed within a minimum number of iterations. It
is an approach that identifies the problems likely to occur with any
approach taken.
1) Compute the time interval available in each major loop
segment for major loop processing (difference between
the major loop segment and the minor loop execution
time).
2) To limit interference in assignment of processes sched-
uled at different repetition rates, it is desirable to be
able to assign one process segment from each repetition
rate in a single major loop segment. Therefore, the
available major loop segment time, determined above,
should be divided by the total number of required repeti-
tion rates (not including minor loop rate). This is the
maximum execution time of a process segment.
3) Schedule each major loop segment such that a single
segment of each process is consecutively scheduled,
starting with the process with the highest execution rate
and so on, until the processing requirements are com-
pleted. Where necessary adjust process segment sizes
to accomplish this.
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4) Rearrange the process segments such that process
segmentation can be minimized if necessary by recom-
bining segments. Note, however, that this makes the
process segment assignment less flexible and there-
fore less adaptable to modifications.
A simple example:
Assume the same task mix that was used before
Task Name Rep. Rate Exec. Time
A (minor loop) 8 per sec. 50 msecs.
B 4 per sec. 75 msecs.
C 2 per sec. 150 msecs.
As computed before, the major loop segment is 75 msecs., and the
minor loop segment is 50 msecs. Therefore, maximum module execu-
tion time = 175 - 50 = 37. 5 msecs.
2
Assigning the process segmnents to consecutive time slots re-
sults in the following major cycle assignment:
Minor Loop
S / B C2 B1 C3 B 2 C 4
Note that this is not a unique solution. The following assign-
ment is entirely feasible, but not always immediately obvious.
BBl B2 §, Cl IC2Bl B2 C3 I 4]
Note that several segments can now be recombined.
The above described the major cycle scheduling for cyclic
processes. Our next concern is how to accommodate asynchronous
processes.
A possible method is to consider an asynchronous process
as a cyclic process that is not always executed. The (imaginary)
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repetition rate is assigned by considering the response time con-
straints and assigning it such that the process can always be comple-
ted within these constraints. For example, if the maximum response
time is two major cycle segments, the repetition rate should be con-
sidered equal to once per two major cycle segments. If the response
time is any less than two major cycle segments, it should be consider-
ed a minor loop process. Note that multiple, mutually exclusive,
asynchronous process may be assigned to the same subsegment of the
major loop segment.
Other simpler assignments of asynchronous processes are,
of course,possible. For example, depending on maximum response
requirements every other, or third, or fourth major loop segment may
be assigned solely to asynchronous processes. This puts a constraint,
however, on the repetition rates that can be accommodated.
In summary, the steps to be performed to establish the process
module scheduling are as follows:
1) Compute minor cycle, major cycle.
2) Compute maximum execution time allowed for process
segments.
3) Transform asynchronous processes to apparent synchron-
ous processes.
4) Apply scheduling assignment discussed.
5) Rearrange assignment to minimize number of process
segments (optional).
IV. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF SYNCHRONOUS SCHEDULING
CONTROL
4. 1 Advantages
There are some distinct advantages of synchronous scheduling
control (as opposed to non-synchronous scheduling) that should be high-
lighted first.
1) Program "break points" are controllable and therefore
more likely to be free of errors.
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The requirements to "interrupt" execution of a process
in favor of execution of another process is not removed.
However, these "interrupts" are break points provided
in a preplanned and controlled manner by segmenting
the processes. Common data read/write conflicts etc.,
still exist. However, they can be predicted and may be
controlled by design.
2) The relationship between process segments in space and
time is largely fixed and is, therefore, likely to cause
less errors. With the exception of the asynchronous pro-
cesses, all process segments are permanently assigned
to specific major loop segments in a specific sequence.
The interaction between program segments is almost
fully predictable and repeatable.
Potential errors can, therefore, be more easily found,
and verification of the proper behavior of the processes
under various conditions is more easily established.
3) Accuracy of repetition rates can be controlled within
very narrow limits.
Synchronous scheduling is the only known (practical)
method available that allows all repetition rates to be
very accurate.
Non-synchronous scheduling schemes are usually accurate
for the two highest repetition rates, but become expon-
entially less accurate for lower repetition rates.
This accuracy is not always a true advantage, as accuracy
for the lower repetition rates is usually not significant.
However, it is certainly never a disadvantage, and may
be significant for certain applications.
The above then are the advantages that the synchronous sched-
uling method has over non-synchronous scheduling schemes. Whether
these advantages offset the associated disadvantages, is the question
that remains to be answered.
4.2 Disadvantages
The major disadvantages to be discussed center around the pro-
blem of segmenting of the processes and the efficiency of the method.
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4. 2. 1 Efficiency
During actual execution of the major cycles a large amount
of spare processor time must be made available to accommodate asyn-
chronous process and variations of execution time in synchronous pro-
cesses.
The argument put forth by proponents of synchronous scheduling
is that this spare capacity has to be available no matter which sched-
uling method is used. This is true, but only partially so. The differ-
ence is that in synchronous scheduling each major loop segment has to
be able to accommodate the peak load for all modules that may execute
during that segment. This is true because all processing has to be
completed before the start of the next minor loop. If the major loop
segment overruns its allotted time, the system becomes inoperative.
In non-synchronous scheduling, however, the process or
sizing can be performed on the average loading encountered. This is
true because the method.has the inherent capability to recover from
peak load. All that happens during peak load conditions is that the
lower priority cyclic processes get slightly delayed during that period
of time. That is, the periodicity is automatically slightly decreased.
As soon as the peak load disappears, the system automatically returns
to normal.
The difference between average load and peak load sizing is
estimated at least 10% for most applications, but could range as high
as 20% of the available processing power. This is significant and
could become a critical factor.
4.2. 2 Process Segmenting
The major advantage assigned to synchronous scheduling is
that, because of the non-existence of interrupts, correct process
behavior under various conditions is easier to accomplish and verify,
thereby saving a considerable amount of debug time.
The disadvantages listed below tend to indicate that this ad-
vantage could very well be offset by the time required to verify major
loop segment timings and additional coding time forced by the seg-
menting criteria of the processes.
Process Segment Timing
As discussed several times before, this becomes a highly
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critical issue. In non-synchronous scheduling an oversight is a
minor annoyance, in synchronous scheduling it is an irrecoverable
error.
In non-synchronous scheduling it is sufficient to carefully
time the time critical processes under all known conditions but only
check the other processes under most common conditions.
In synchronous scheduling it is necessary to carefully time
each process segment under all possible conditions. This could cost
a significant amount of debug time. Note also that a minor modifica-
tion to a process segment could result in a major difference in execu-
tion time. This in turn could result in resegmenting and reassign-
ment of segments and therefore result in a complete reverification
of the system.
Process Segmenting
For applications of any complexity this is not a trivial matter.
As will be described below, segmenting and resegmenting (and, there-
fore recoding) tends to be an almost continuous process from the in-
itial design until complete verification. In addition, modifications to
the verified system may again result in resegmenting (and,therefore,
recoding) of several processes and reverification of the complete system.
A rational approach to the segmenting goes as follows:
1) Initially design all process segments using functional
modularity.
2) Estimate process segment timings. Redefine process
segmentation where sizing is obviously out of line with
the objectives.
3) Assign process segments to major loop segments. Re-
design segmentation where the initial design does not
fulfill the objectives.
4) Code the process segments and compute times from the
completed coding. This is essentially a repeat of step
two. Several iterations of steps 2, 3, and 4 are norm-
ally necessary as process segments are completed.
Surely it is a normal condition that the timings obtained
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from the coding can significantly differ from the
original estimates.
As process segments are debugged and modified, reestimating
and resegmenting will take place, until sufficient confidence is obtained
in the timing estimates. It is easy to see that this will increase the
coding and verification effort.
Where processes must be segmented beyond their functional
modularity, there is an attendant increase in the process segment
interfaces. These additional interfaces also increase the design and
verification efforts.
The difficulties of process segment assignment to major
cycle segments is hard to appreciate for someone who has never tried
it for an actual application. Some idea may be obtained by consider-
ing the primary parameters that affect the assignment:
1) Process cyclic rate.
2) Process segment.
3) Synchronization required with other processes.
4) Timings of other process segments already assigned to
a major loop segment.
5) Availability of feasible break points at the proper point
in the process.
Note specifically the interaction between. process segment assign-
ments. This is highly iterative process that may result in several
major redesigns. Note also that the real problems do not become
obvious until the application processes are designed in detail, which
is accomplished much later than the detailed design of the Control Execu-
tive and the commitment to its use.
In all fairness it must be noted, however, that the disadvantages
emphasized for segmenting becomes trivial if the processor is always
under utilized (50-60% of available capacity) and the minor loop fre-
quency is low, i. e., the major loop segment is long.
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V. SUMMARY
From the preceding discussion we are forced to draw the
following conclusions:
1) Synchronous scheduling is definitely advantageous if
o The application processes are fairly straight
forward.
o Not more than 3 or 4 different cyclic rates have
to be used.
o It is permissible to underutilize the available
processor capacity.
2) There is a total lack of evidence on which to base the
critical decision that future space vehicles should use
a Synchronous Control Executive. Neither will there
be sufficient evidence until the implementation of the
application processes is well advanced.
3) Sufficient problems have been identified for synchronous
scheduling to indicate that non-synchronous scheduling is
alive and well, and could still be the best approach.
We conclude that the ARRMS effort should be directed towards
a non-synchronous executive based on minimizing (as opposed to deletion)
of process module interrupts.
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SECTION 5
PRELIMINARY ARMMS RELIABILITY FEASIBILITY STUDY
An early effort in Phase I was to make an attempt to evaluate the design
approach necessary to achieve the 5-year reliability objective of 0. 99. Of
particular interest (because of their great impact on the design effort) were
estina tes of degree of subpartitioning of the modules and the number of
replicates of each module class. The steps performed in making the analysis
were these: 1) Four module classes (processor, I/O, main memory, task
memory) were postulated and estimates of the failure rate of each were made.
2) The initial baseline architecture consisting of 6 modules of each class was
used as a point of departure. 3) A model was programmed which allowed
the major parameters (module failure rates, dormant failure rate, number
of replicates per module class, number of subpartitions per module) to be
varied. 4) Probability of survival of at least a simplex system after 5 years
of operation was computed for many test cases.
Perhaps the conclusions of greatest interest are: 1) that the degree of
subpartitioning required for the processor is low even for conservative values
of processor failure rate, and 2) the reliability objective is feasible with
number of replicates per module class on the order of six.
PRELIMINARY ARMMS RELIABILITY FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR MODE 3
Introduction and Summary
The Automatically Reconfigurable Modular Multiprocessor System (ARMMS)
is required to operate in three different modes. Mode 1 requires the capa-
bility of recovery from a fault in real time, such as during launch. Mode
2 requires parallel processing for high computational ability with momentary
disruption of activity. Mode 3 requires the system to be operating at least
as a Simplex system at the end of a five year mission. The reliability
requirement for Mode 3 is .99.
This report shows by means of a reliability math model that the require-
ment is feasible. It also shows various ways it can be achieved.
The Model
The system is visualized as relying heavily on redundancy, having replicate
or duplicate modules of the major units (random access memory, task memory,
processor, and input/output) with probable subpartitioning of the modules,
appropriate switches (again, redundant if necessary , and a master controller
and reconfigurer called the BOSS. The BOSS is responsible for detecting and
isolating failures and performing the necessary switching to redundant
operational modules or subpartitions.
For this study, the reliabilities of the BOSS and the switching hardware
were assumed to be 1.0. Consequently, the present results establish upper
limits on the ARMMS Mode 3 reliability. This assumption was made for two
reasons. One, the design of the BOSS (with respect to redundancy) will
be based on the results of studies such as this one. Two, the consideration
of all the combinations of redundant modules and redundant switches complicate
the model unduly for a preliminary study of this nature.
A reliability math model for the system as described herein has been
derived in [1]. If the reliability of a single module for a time T is
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-XTR(T) = e
where X = the failure rate of the module,
then the reliability of a unit composed of the n operating modules,
R(T) = eT [1 + (1-e'T).
j=l
If in addition, the system is required to operate only a fraction of the time f,
the failure rate of a module when turned off is a fraction c of the failure rate
X (when on), and each replicate has p partitions, then the reliability of the
it h unit is
P.
Xi T-cT
l-e -P j - 1 i
R.(T) = e 1 1 + 
_ (1-e _ _ k (K +j--
j=1 k
where i = the average failure rate (of the ith unit) which is on
a fraction f of the time
= f. + (1-f)cx
1 1
The reliability of the system is then
n Ri(T).
i=l
This reliability function has been programmed for use on the 265 time-sharing
computer, so that one can vary the parameter values on-line. Thus, it is easy
to determine the effect of each parameter on the overall reliability of the system.
This is equivalent to the more familiar expression RSyS = l-(l-R)n, in which
one unit out of n must operate for system success.
5-2
Results
The programmed math model was used to (1) determine various feasible
designs which would meet the reliability requirement, and (2) study the effect
of the various parameters (failure rates, number of replicates, etc.). First,
a baseline design and baseline set of parameter values were defined; then the
parameters were varied about these values.
The baseline design was defined as consisting of six replicates of each
unit and no subpartitioning (p = 1 for all units). The remaining parameters,
which will be difficult to control, or not accurately known, or both, were
given the following values:
c = .1
f = 1.0
kl(RAM) = 60/106 hr.
X2(JM) = 44/106 hr.
x3(CPE) = 41/10 hr.
4(IOC) = 5.5/10
6 hr.
In addition, the mission time T was held fixed at 5 years (43,800 hr.) throughout
the study.
The reliability of the baseline design with the above parameter values was
only .62. This suggested the need for subpartitioning in at least some of the
unit modules. Several more cases were investigated in order to find what
combination of design and use parameters would yield the required reliability.
Three cases which do meet the requirement are shown in Table I. Thus, the
requirement appears to be achievable with a reasonable design under rather
conservative assumptions.
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The effect of the various parameters was studied by varying one parameter
at a time about the baseline value. The parameter ranges used were as follows:
1. The number of replicates (n) was varied from 4 to 10.
2. The number of subpartitions per module (p) was varied from 1 to 4.
3. The off (dormant) failure rate to on failure rate ratio was varied
from .001 to 1.0.
4. The fraction of time the system is on (f) was varied from .2 to 1.0.
5. The predicted unit failure rates were varied from 1/2 to twice the
baseline value (k).
The results of these parametric studies are shown graphically in Figures 1
through 5. Figures 1 and 2 concerning failure rate and failure rate ratio
are of special concern, because of the difficulty in estimating these
values accurately. The baseline values are the best estimates at present,
and they will be improved upon as the program continues.
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TABLE I: CASES WHICH SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF .99
OFF-ON . UNIT
FRACTION FAILURE RAM TM CPE I/0 SYSTEM
CASE OF TIME RATE n p n p n p n p RELIABILITY
ON RATIO
1 1.0 .1 6 4 6 2 6 2 4 1 .9941
2 1.0 .3 7 4 7 2 7 2 4 1 .9922
3 .5 .3 6 4 6 2 6 2 4 1 .9931
RAM = Random Access Memory
TM = Task Memory
CPE = Central Processing Equipment
I/O = Input/Output
n = Number of Replicate Modules
p = Number of Subpartitions Per Module
FIGURE 1
SYSTEM RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF FAILURE RATE
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FIGURE 2
SYSTEM RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF FAILURE RATE RATIO
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FIGURE 3
SYSTEM RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF NUMBER OF REPLICATES PER UNIT
R
1.O
(16,0.93)
0.9
0.8
(7,0.74)
0.7
(6,0.62)
0.6
0.5 (5,0.46)
0.4
0.3 (4,0.28)
0.2 2
(3,0 )
0.1
(1,0.001)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5-8
FIGRE 4
SYSTEM RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF SUBPARTITIONS PER UNIT
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FIGURE 5
SYSTEM RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF FRACTION OF TIME
R SYSTEM IS ON
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.SECTION 6
ARMMS RELIABILITY DATA BASE
Following the initial feasibility model described in the previous section,
a more thorough effort was concentrated on determining failure rates for
use in subsequent modeling and design efforts. The culmination is the
Failure Rate Data Base presented in Table I.
Two significant results of this report are exerting a major impact on
the design. First, the microcircuit failure rates are significantly lower
than those used in the initial feasibility study. Thus, processor and I/O
modules require less subpartitioning to achieve a given reliability objective.
Second, the ratio of dormant to active failure rate for microcircuits which
appears most credible is on the order of 0. 8 rather than the much lower
values (typically 0. 1) which have often been used. With this conclusion, the
system reliability improvement provided by dormant standby units is
significantly reduced.
ARMMS RELIABILITY DATA BASE
I. Introduction
A major consideration in the Automatically Reconfigurable Modular
Multiprocessor System (ARMMS) program is ultra-high reliability. This
will be achieved by the use of massive redundancy and by high-relia-
bility components. This report establishes tentative component reli-
ability data and models which will be used in subsequent reliability
analyses and predictions.
The reliability parameters which this report covers are failure
rates which reflect the following conditions:
1. High quality electronic piece parts for a space environment
at low levels of electrical and thermal stress.
2. The above, except for power-off. This will be used for
periods of dormancy and for units in a standby condition.
3. Projected 1973 technology. This is the year in which
production is scheduled to begin. Most important are the pro-
jected large scale integration (LSI) microcircuit value rates,
4. The possibility of non-constant failure rates. Semi-
conductors and even systems often exhibit decreasing failure
rates.
Each of these topics is discussed in the following material.
A failure rate table is also presented.
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II. Conclusions
The conclusions of the report are summarized below.
1. The failure rates to be used for ARMMS reliability analyses
are handbook predictions modified by Hughes experience with
space programs. These appear in Table I.
2. Failure rates for dormant units are 80% of the corresponding
active failure rates.
3. The effect of power cycling on ARMMS units will be negligible.
4. SII microcircuit failure rates are taken as 30% of the present
failure rates to account for the present and anticipated rapid
improvement in LSI reliability.
5. The phenomenon of decreasing failure rates in space systems
should be investigated, and if substantiated, should be
accounted for in subsequent reliability analyses.
. Basic Failure Rates
Originally, the basic intent of this report was to accumulate and
analyze part failure data from many space programs, and use the resulting
best estimates for the ARMMS data base. This proved to be infeasible
for the following reason: although there exists millions of system
hours and literally billions of part hours from space programs, the
data is still too scanty (as well as too uncertain) to accurately
assess the failure rate of an individual part type, such as a power
wirewound resistor. For instance, on the Orbiting Geophysical Obser-
vatories (OGO's), zero failures were reported on 60,000 resistors with
934,000,000 hours of operating time. The overall 50% confidence limit
in this case is .0007 f./106 hr.
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A value derived in this way has several shortcomings. One, the
true resistor failure rate could easily be much higher, percentage-
wise (such as .0025 f/106 hr.), or much lower (such as .0001 f/106 hr.).
The amount of data, although large, is not large enough to accurately
estimate such small failure rates. Two, failure rate estimates of
individual resistor types, which are really what is needed, would in
some cases be very high, due to the even smaller amount of data
on individuals. Failure rate estimates in the zero-failure case de-
pend heavily on the amount of time accumulated. Three, isolation of
failures in an orbiting spacecraft to a piece part is often very diffi-
cult, so that many part failures do not get charged against a part,
and the data is therefore questionable. Four, much of the data is
several years old, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to extra-
polate the figures to say, 1973.
Therefore, a different technique was used, whereby part failure
rates were estimated using a combination of observed and predicted
values. This was based on the two ideas: 1) that a handbook pre-
dicted value (which is partly theoretical) is better than an observed
value if the data for the observed value is scanty; and 2) an estimate
based on a prediction and an observation is better than one based only
on observation. Furthermore, Hughes Aircraft Company has logged many
hours in space with its various satellite programs, yielding useful
data for reliability predictions of space systems. The expected number
of failures was predicted for all satellites to date, and actual failures
were then monitored, although not always classified. Thus, it was possible
to compare predicted and observed failure rates at the system level, and
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determine the proper modifying factor for predicted failure rates.
In this case, the predictions were based on the Hughes Designer's
Reliability Handbook R-67-3 l l, and the observed number of failures
so far has been 47% of the predicted number of failures. Assuming
this same relation holds for the ARMMS, a failure rate data base
has been derived and appears in Table I. These failure rates re-
flect the following general conditions:
1. Quality: A level. This is the highest level available,
requiring extensive process control, screening, and
testing.
2. Electrical stress: 20%.
3. Temperature: 25°C.
4. Environment: Space flight with nearly ideal conditions
and no maintenance.
In addition, various other assumpLions are made for each individual
component having to do with type, rating, etc.
Failure rates for plated wire memory units were taken from data
published by North American Rockwell, Autonetics Division [2 , and
Motorola, Government Electronic Division . The two sets of data
agree closely.
Y. Dormant Failure Rates
Surprisingly, little is known about the failure rates of parts
and systems when unenergized, or dormant. Martin Marietta's study
on dormant failure rates is of little use because it gives no comparison
between dormant and operating failure rates. The dormant failure rates
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given in are typically worse than the values appearing in Table I,
which are for power-on. Planning Research Corporation has reviewed
several other reports on dormant failure rates in addition to and
concluded that a theoretical dormant-to-operating ratio as given in
[5] is best. The quoted ratios in [5] come from an Aerospace Corpora-
tion report . The ratios go from 0.1 for Mil-Std parts to 0.8 for
Hi-Rel parts with "rigorous specifications, stringent manufacturing
controls, and extensive screening."
Using this approach and assuming that ARMMS parts will be Hi-Rel
as defined above, the best available dormant-to-operating failure rate
ratio is 0.8. Thus, rather than include an additional column in Table
I, it suffices to say that the dormant failure rate for each part type
will be 80% of the operating failure rate.
V. The REfect of Power Cycling
In addition to being affected by dormancy, electronic equipment
reliability is also affected by power cycling. This subject is dealt
with in detail in 15] and [8]. The general conclusion is that high
rates of cycling are detrimental, but that very low rates such as
1 cy./1000 hr. have a negligible effect. However, such conclusions
are not firm, because of the difficulty of measuring such a thing.
For example, it is usually difficult to distinguish between a failure
occurring during dormancy and one occurring at turn-on because dormant
equipment is not monitored.
In view of the above, low to moderate cycling rates will be
assumed to cause no failures.
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VI. Projected 1973 Failure Rates
Since fabrication of the ARMMS computer is not scheduled to
begin until 1973, the failure rates in this report should be somewhat
lower than ones based on the recent past. Almost no good information
exists on this subject, however. The approach used here is to multiply
microcircuit failure rates by an additional factor of .3, and leave all
others unchanged. The microcircuit failure rates in Table I include
this factor.
This subject is discussed by Autonetics which in early 1970
anticipated a reduction in MOS-device failure rates by a factor of
500 from 1967 to 1972, and little improvement after that. If this
is so, 30% (an improvement of 3-1/3) seems reasonable (i.e., conserva-
tive) for extrapolating failure rates in 1970 (the time of the writing
of the Hughes R-67-3) to 1973.
VII. Future Study Effort: Decreasing Failure Rates
So far, all the results of this report lead to fairly straight-
forward analytical results. Each conclusion is compatible with the
ARMMS reliability models developed in [9] by J. L. Bricker. However,
one aspect of long term reliability has not been discussed, and that
is the possibility of decreasing failure rates (also called hazard
rates). There is evidence in the reliability literature that failure
rates of semiconductors and of systems continue to decrease for many
thousands of hours past what we usually refer to as the "infant mortality"
period (For instance, see L10,[ll] and [12].) Additional work is planned
in order to further substantiate this. If this is so, then it is worth-
while to derive decreasing failure rate reliability models corresponding
to those in [9], which are based on constant failure rates.
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Although this has not yet been done, preliminary work in this area
shows that a great deal of additional complexity would be introduced.
The crux of the problem lies in the fact that a history of turn-ons
and turn-offs must be kept on every unit in the system. With a con-
stant failure rate model one needs to know only the total previous time
in each of the states (on and off). In a decreasing failure rate model,
on the other hand, it makes a difference whether a unit is on for one
hour early in its life or one hour late in its life, since its failure
rate is higher at the earlier time. This problem is not too difficult
in the case where all cycling is done in accordance with prescribed
changes from one mission phase to another. The difficulty lies in
accounting for turn-ons necessitated by units which fail at random times
and must be replaced by standbys. In this case, an analysis has to
account for all possible cycling histories, and the problem could quickly
get out of hand. The problem may be intractable by analysis and even by
simulation.
If it is felt that the aspect of decreasing failure rates is indeed
worth including in the models, there is another alternative. If the
difficulty lies in accounting for decreasing failure rates and on-off
cycling simultaneously, then one possible approach is to omit cycling
and include only the decreasing failure rate aspect. To omit cycling
would be to assume that a unit has the same time-to-failure distribution
regardless of whether it is on or off. For the constant failure rate
case, this is equivalent to the case p=k in [9]. Although this assump-
tion is probably not true, it may introduce less of an error than the
assumption that the failure rates remain constant over long
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periods. Also, according to the figures quoted in Section IV of
this report, the case p=k might not be too far from the truth.
Such a model would yield a second answer or approximation to
the problem of ARMMS mission reliability. The computed reliability
would suffer from our assuming the same time-to-failure distribution
for both cases, but would be enhanced by the decreasing failure rates.
Also, the models would be very simple. For example, N-tuple
modular redundancy with S spares, which is treated in [9] (p.4), has
the reliability expression
S+n
R(N,S)[T] = r S [R(T)]N+S-i [1-R(T)]i ,
i=0
where n = (N is odd), and
R(T) = rel. function for one unit,
using the same notation as in [91. For the degraded case (pp. 7-11 in
L91), where failures can occur even after all the spares are used up un-
til only D(< n+l) units are operating (but in a degraded mode), we would
have
R(NS,D)[t] = Si S[R(t)]J[I R(t)]N+S-j
That is, ARMMS reliability is expressible in terms of a simple binomial
random variable.
The most popular decreasing failure rate model for reliability is
the Weibull distribution, with reliability function
R(t) = e ; t - O, > 0, 1 > B > 0,
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and hazard rate
h(t) = atB - .
(B is restricted to values less than one in the decreasing failure rate
case).
This would probably suffice for our analyses. Other models are
available, however, and in particular, the Pareto distribution would
probably be suitable also. This was presented in a paper by this
writer at the 1971 Annual Symposium on Reliability [10]. The relia-
bility function is of the form
R(t)= at)b t O, a,b > O,
and the hazard rate is
h(t) - b
If this area is pursued, Hughes would
1. further substantiate the phenomenon of decreasing part and
system failure rates, as mentioned earlier;
2. choose the most suitable time-to-failure distribution;
3. determine suitable estimates of the parameter values (e.g.,
a and b in the Pareto distribution) for the various parts
and units in the ARMMS.
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TABLE I: Failure Rate Data Base
FAILURE RATE IN
PART F./106 HR.
FOR POWER ON
MICROCIRCUITS (Digital)
100 Gate Equiv. 
.012
200 Gate Equiv. 
.016
300 Gate Equiv. 
.020
400 Gate Equiv. 
.023
LT .- T- -r MEMORY
12K Bit 56( Bits
100K Bit .14/K Bits
CAPACITORS
Air Tr. or Gl.Q. Var. 
.0006
Ceramic G.P. 
.00004
Ceramic T.C. 
.0007
Glass/Glass Pore. 
.00008
Mica Button 
.0043
Mica-Paper/Paper 
.00002
Paper or Plas. Film
Metalized Paper/Poly .00004
Solid Tantalum 
.00004
Non-Solid Tantalum 
.0011
DIODES
FET Current Reg. 
.013
Mixer 
.21
Step Recovery 
.035
Tunnel 
.035
Varactor 
.035
Pwr. Rect. 
.0004
For. Rect., Cont. 
.0003
Rect. Bridge 
.0011
Signal (Fast Recov.) 
.0004
Signal, GP 
.0003
Switching 
.0003
Photo Transistor (switch) 
.0007
Zener Volt. Reg. 
.0008
Zener T.C. Ref. 
.0009
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TABLE I: Failure Rate Data Base (Cont'd)
FAILURE RATE IN
PART F./106 HR.
FOR POWER ON
RESISTORS
Carbon Comp.(RC42) .0009
Carbon Comp.(RCRO7) .000005
Carbon Comp.(RCR 20,32,05) .000013
Fixed Film .00002
Thick Film .0003
Fixed Shunt .0021
Power WW .0021
Power WW(Ch. Mount) .0021
Prec. WW/Th. Plat. .0009
TRANSISTORS
NPN
Low Noise (Audio) .0015
Power G.P. Ampl. .0019
RF (Power) .0041
Switching .0007
DC Linear .0019
PNP
Low Noise (Audio) .0020
Power .0025
Switching .0008
DC Linear .0025
FET
Low Pwr. Sw. .0061
Low Pwr. Ampl. .0084
Low Noise (Audio Amp.) .0107
SWITCHES 1.5
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SECTION 7
RESULTS OF THE INITIAL PARTITIONING STUDY
OF THE SUMC PROCESSOR
At the inception of the program, Hughes was provided with de-
tailed design documentation of the MSFC in-house processor. The
purpose was to explore various approaches to subpartitioning the
processor as needed to achieve the reliability objectives. The results
of the partitioning study are summarized in the first section of the
report. At present, the design is proceeding under the guideline that
no subpartitioning of the processor will be necessary.
Results of the Initial Partitioning Study of the SUMC Processor
SUMMARY
An initial partitioning study of the SUMC processor has been made in order
to identify the approaches which might ultimately be used in partitioning to
achieve high system reliability. Preliminary reliability analysis concluded
that the number of switchable partitions of the processor need not be greater
than 2 to 4, and thi s was considered as a design guideline. A second major
objective is to use as much of the existing SUMC processor design as
possible.
Before attempting to partition the SUMC Processor, several existing processor
partitions were examined. This was done to identify approaches which have
been considered viable by practitioners in this field and to determine if any
of these approaches are applicable to SUMC. The partitioning levels being
sought to attain ultrareliability can also be used as a basis for comparison
with SUMC.
The three processors examined were the IBM-VMARCS, NASA-MCB, and JPL-STAR,
all of which took the functional approach to partitioning. Therefore, vertical
partitioning and internal redundancy were examined to determine what the draw-
backs were which eliminated them from consideration as partitioning approaches
for the processors reviewed. The investigation was also intended to uncover
any advantages these approaches may afford which would be relevant to SUMC.
Both of these alternatives, it was found, have the disadvantage of increasing
the total processor gate count due to the internal functional replication necessary.
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The first attempt at partitioning the SUMC processor therefore was the
standard functional approach of separating the control function from the
arithmetic unit. A second partition was made because there was an apparent
size, and therefore reliability, inbalance. Total switchable interconnections
mushroomed to 431 and 526 respectively from 109 for the unpartitioned
processor and compared very unfavorably in this regard with the processors
examined.
Several recommendations have been made to reduce the number of switchable
interconnections. These recommendations can be implemented individually
or in combination, and would reduce the pin count to as low as 29, with
penalties incurred in speed and gate count. The recommendations are:
1) No more than two sub-partitions should be attempted;
2) Use byte interface for data crossing switchable interfaces,
rather than full-word.
3) Use internally redundant control and arithmetic units to
to reduce switching required;
4) Redesign to reduce control signals and
5) Eliminate the I/O interface from the CPE.
A final configuration cannot be determined until several suggestions received
from MSFC have been examined, a clearer definition of the system architecture
is developed and a reliability analysis of the alternatives is made. This effort
will be undertaken in Phase II of the program.
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SURVEY OF EXISTING PROCESSOR PARTITIONS
The three processors which were examined must first be put into
perspective as to the purpose of each design, the state of the design, and
the documentation available in order to establish a true basis for comparison
with a partitioned SUMC.
The IBM-MARCS computer is a paper design which was used as a research
vehicle to examine design concepts for fault detection. The documentation
consists of something less than a functional specification. The machine was
specified well enough to establish reliability models based on features of the
S/360 and 4 iT series.
The NASA Modular Computer (MCB) has been breadboarded to test its design
concepts and multi-mode capability. Because of its multi-mode capability
it is closest in configuration to the ARMMS and the available documentation
is more complete than for either of the other computers examined.
The JPL-Self Test and Repair (STAR) computer has been in development for
several years and has an operational prototype which has undergone modifica-
tions geared to improving its reliability and producibility. It also has been
designed for a specific mission. The STAR would then be expected to represent
a more realistic approach than research projects. This attitude must be
tempered however by its low computing capacity and the state of the technology
it. was designed to. The documentation available consists of published papers
which are rich in architectural discussion but lacking in implementation details.
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ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES OF THE IBM-MARCS
The MARCS computer is functionally partitioned into nine basic units
which are interconnected by a system of four common busses as shown
in Figure 1. Stand-by spares are connected to the same busses and are
switched in to replace failed elements. The processing capability is
limited to that of a uniprocessor and spares are used strictly for reliability
enhancement. The units wh ich comprise an equivalent central processing
element (CPE) in the ARMMS configuration are: the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU),
Program Control Unit (PCU), and Control Store (CS). The ALU and PCU
communicate with the bus system which is under control of the Bus Control Unit
(BCU). The BCU is used for synchronization and race control and as such was
considered as a BOSS function. The CS is controlled by the PCU and communi-
cates directly with the processor partitions as well as the BCU and the IOP.
Control paths were not specified in the documentation and therefore pin counts
used for comparison to SUMC will be lower bounds determined by bus connections.
ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES OF THE NASA-M\4CB
The NASA-MCB computer is functionally partitioned into six units which are
interconnected by configuration control switches as shown in Figure 2. Spares
are added by adding columns to the matrix as shown in Figure 3. A working
computer can be configured as long as one copy from, each row can be inter-
connected. The switches have the capacity for simultaneous interconnections
in order that the spares, required for long term reliability, can be utilized
in a multiprocessing mode to satisfy varying computational requirements.
Because of this multi-mode capability the MCB most closely resembles the
ARMMS configuration. It is, nevertheless, still quite different from ARMMS.
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The breadboard of the modular computer consists of two parallel
processors and a CAU; it therefore did not address itself to a voting
configuration although an expanded version could be adapted for voting.
It also did not consider replication of the CAU which grows linearly
(at least in pins) with the number of processors controlled.
The Control Unit (CU) and Arithmetic Unit (AU) of the MCB would comprise
the equivalent of a CPE in the ARMMS configuration. The partitioning of
these two units is very inbalanced. The CU performs all control operations,
logic operations and branching operations. The AU performs only the
arithmetic operations, including floating point operations, under the control
of the CU. The Configuration Assignment Unit (CAU) controls the inter-
partition switches and establishes cross communication between parallel
processors. The CAU is not the executive, however, but assigns one of the
active processors (CU's) as executive.
ARCHITECTURAL FEATURES OF THE JPL-STAR
The JPL-STAR is functionally partitioned into eight units which are inter-
connected by a system of common busses as shown in Figure 4. Stand-by
spares are connected to the same busses and are switched in to replace
failed elements. Its overall architecture is therefore very similar to the
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to the MARCS computer and like the MARCS it is limited in capacity
to a uniprocessor. It differs from the MARCS in the width of the busses,
level of partitioning and interconnection of control memory.
The CPE consists of the Control Processor (COP), Logic Processor (LOP),
Main Arithmetic Processor (MAP), and the Read Only Memory (ROM). The
LOP's shown in the block diagram are actually dual units with disagreement
detection since logic operations do not preserve arithmetic error codes which
are used throughout the rest of the machine. Partitioning schemes which split
logic and arithmetic operations such as the STAR and the MCB are not directly
applicable to the SUMC processor since in the SUMC both types of operation
are performed within one LSI building block, the ALU.
The Test And Repair Processor (TARP) provides timing and synchronization
to the modules and monitors their status after each machine cycle. It also
initiates reconfiguration and controls the power switches. The TARP does
not have any executive functions; normal machine operation is under control
of the COP.
VERTICAL PARTITIONING
Vertical partitioning as it is used here is intended to mean partitioning along
the data path as opposed to partitioning along the control path which is horizontal
or functional partitioning. For this discussion assume that a processor is to
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be partitioned into two modules. The extention to further degrees of
partitioning will be obvious.
The advantage of vertical partitioning is that all sub-partitions are identical.
Thus as long as any two of the modules are operational a working processor
can be configured. If the processor was functionally partitioned into a CU
and an AU a working processor could not be configured if all CU's failed
even if three AU's remained intact. It is also more probable that one
functional type will fail before the other since there is bound to be some
inbalance in the design.
The disadvantage to vertical partitioning is that in order to attain the identical
sub-partitions there must be an undesirable repetition of control functions
to allow the module to assume either half of the word as well as special controls
which identify which half word it is representing at any time, and interface logic
to allow communication between the half words. This also complicates the
switching and consequently the BOSS functions associated with configuration
control. In this configuration the BOSS would have to make twice as many
switching decisions, with the incumbent positional determination, to inter-
connect the processor with the other computer subsystems and the interface
between the processor sub-partitions would have to be two directional,
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doubling its size and the switching decisions at that interface as well.
To consider implementing unique halves, as has been suggested, would
be to sacrifice the main advantage of this approach - identical sub-partitions -
to alleviate but not eliminate many of the disadvantages. The positional
selection and dual switching between processor halves would be eliminated
but functional controls would still be duplicated and two switching decisions
would still be required to connect the processor to the remaining computer
subsystems.
INTERNAL REDUNDANCY
Internal redundancy implies that some or all of the sub-functions within
a module class are replicated as spares within a particular module and are
not commonly switched between sub-partitions of other modules in that class.
The replicated functions effectively enhance the reliability of the module
of which they are a part. A common example of this type of partitioning
is the addition of spare bit planes within a memory to be switched in upon
detection of a failed bit driver. Thus the single failure of a bit driver could
not destroy an entire nme mory module. This technique has also been considered
for control memories where the memory technology does not afford a
reliability equivalent to that of the logic technology.
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This partitioning technique can be used to advantage if one failure mode
overwhelmingly degrades the reliability of the whole module or if complete
switching capability between sub-partitions becomes unwieldy due to the
number of signals or the number of possible combinations (switching
decisions). The penalty for this type of partitioning is an increase in gate
count and the incumbent increase in size and power requirements.
PARTITIONING OF THE SUMC PROCESSOR
The one obvious conclusion to be drawn from the survey of partitioning
techniques is that functional partitioning entails the lease amount of
replication of logic. This is undoubtedly the main ream n that it is so
heavily favored by those engaged in the design of ultrareliable spaceborne
computers. The system block diagram of the SUMC processor shown in
Figure 5 depicts the highly functional organization of SUMC. The LSI
building blocks from which the processor is built are also functional in
nature. The first attempt at partitioning SUMC was therefore the functional
approach.
Figure 5 also shows that the ALU has a high fan-in as does the FPU which
uses an ALU building block as an input multiplexer. These two units also
have several common inputs. It was thus determined as an initial guideline
that these two units should be contained within the same sub-partition. The
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MRU has a large fan-out and interconnects to every other functional
unit and so became the pivotal uri t in the partitioning scheme.
Figure 6 shows the results of the first partitioning in which the control
functions were separated from, the arithmetic functions. The card counts
below each unit correspond to the SUMC breadboard cards, each of which
will be reduced to an LSI part in the final version with the exception of
the Instruction Address Read Only Memory (IAROM) and the Program Read
Only Memory (PROM) which are already in LSI form. Consequently the
partitions are more balanced than is indicated by the gate counts or card
counts given. The number of signals crossing the CU/AU interface was
extremely high for this partition, however.
A second partition was therefore attempted in which the MRU, which contains
the instruction register, was moved into the control unit. The results of
this partition are shown in Figure 7. This appears to be a more balanced
design but tle card and gate counts do not account for the LSI/ROM's.
The figure shows that while the control signals crossing the AU/CU interface
have been reduced somewhat, the data paths through the MRU have created
more interconnections than they have saved. Table 1 points up the glaring
inefficiency of the attempted partitions. Of the three processors surveyed,
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the MARCS had the highest pin count which with control signals added
would approach 200 pins. The MCB which is closest to the ARMMS concept
contained only 153 switchable interconnections. The STAR is probably an
unfair comparitor in this context because of its low capacity.
RE COMM ENDATIONS
Based on these initial attempts at partitioning the SUMC processor, some
preliminary recommendations can be made. First, partitioning to more
than two sub-partitions should not be attempted. Partitioning to lower levels
can reduce unit unreliability and unit pi n counts but will always increase
the total processor pin count and further complicate the switching problem.
Also, the initial reliability analysis indicated that the reliability goal of
. 99 for 5 years could be achieved with two processor sub-partitions.
Several approaches can be taken to reduce the pin counts of the SUMC sub-
partitions. They may be considered individually or in several combinations.
The data paths could be reduced to half-words or bytes at all switchable
interfaces. The merit of this has to be weighed against the speed requirements
as well as the reliability analysis. Table 2 shows the improvement in the pin
counts for the two SUMC partitions with the data paths reduced to 8 bits at
the switchable interfaces. There would actually be a slight increase in gate
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count as well but this is negligible. The pin counts are still quite
high because of the large number of control signals which were not
necked down. It was felt that this would affect the timing and thus
represent a major deviation from the SUMC design, the effects of
which could not be evaluated in a reasonable time.
The only convenient method of dealing with the large number of control
signals which pass betwen the CU and AU short of a major redesign is to
use internal redundancy. As can be seen in Table 2, this effectively
reduces the number of switchable lines to that of the unpartitioned processor.
It also doubles the gate count of the processor. However, this gate count is
not out of line with the gate counts of existing processors and so the approach
is considered viable. A switching interface would not be necessary between the
CU and AU nor would it be necessary to add any logic. The appropriate copies
of CU and AU would be connected by power switching under control of the
BOSS as is done on the STAR and MARCS computers to connect stand-by
spares to the bus system.
If byte interfaces were used with an internally redundant processor the
result would be a manageable number of switchable interconnections and
a processor which was internally as fast as a non-partitioned processor.
Thus if the byte conversion units could be run on a faster clock there would
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be little or no speed degradation. If in addition, as the preliminary
system architecture study suggests, it is not necessary for the processor
to communicate directly with the I/O unit further pin savings can be achieved.
The alternative to these techniques, should reliability analysis or archi-
tectural considerations prove unfavorable, is a major redesign of SUMC
or the incorporation of a different processor into the ARMMS system.
The redesign would be aimed at reducing the number of control signals
which cross the CU/AU interface. In general terms this would be accomplished
by eliminating individual control of all subpartitions in favor of common
controls which can be decoded by all subpartitions simultaneously. To a
certain degree the AU should also have the capability to react to conditional
controls independently. This control philosophy is illustrated in
Figure 8.
During Phase 2, additional partitioning alternatives will be examined which
may make a redesign unnecessary. One such scheme, suggested by MSFC,
would split the PROM vertically and place those bits which communicate
directly with the AU, into the AU. Those which require further decoding
would remain in the CU.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF SUMC PARTITIONS WITH EXISTING PARTITIONS
PARTITION PINS GATES
SUMC (A)
CU 163 752
AU 268 5517
TOTAL 431 6269
SUMC (B)
CU 248 2656
AU 278 3613
TOTAL 526 6269
MCB
CU 130 8100
AU 23 3400
TOTAL 153 11,500
STAR
COD 1 'OT
LOP 14 AVAIL-
MAP 14 ABLE
ROM 14
TOTAL 60
MARCS
PCU 45 750
ALU 54 1000
CS 63 500
TOTAL 162+ 2250
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATE PARTITIONING TECHNIQUES
PARTITION PINS GATES
SUMC (A)
CU 163 752
AU 268 5517
TOTAL 431 6269
SUMC (B)
CU 248 2656
AU 278 3613
TOTAL 526 62
) BYTE
TERFACE
CU 149 752
AU 172 5517
TOTAL 321 6269
(B) BYTE
INTERFACE
CU 1 4 2656
AU 147 3613
TOTAL 301 6269
INTERNAL
REDUNDANT 109 12, 538
I.R. &
BYTE 37 12.538
NO IO 29 12,538
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SECTION 8
DATA TRANSMISSION STUDY
A potentially limiting aspect of the ARMMS architecture is the achieve-
ment of data transmission rates among the modules at a sufficient rate to
allow achievement of the design objectives of both redundant and high computing
capacity modes. Interface design factors which may prove to be formidable
obstacles include pin count, power required by interface circuits, and speed.
In order to gain better preliminary visibility of the electrical problems
involved, a preliminary study of the feasible approaches to implementing the
transmission lines between ARMMS modules was conducted. This included
a survey of presently available driver and receiver circuits, a review of
possible module interconnection approaches, and consideration of the possible
physical constraints (weight, power, etc.) which may be required for ARMMS.
The basic conclusion reached was that 1) transmission speeds of from
15-20 MHz using TTL circuits are feasible within reasonable power levels
and interconnection techniques; 2) differential line receivers are preferred
for noise rejection but impose a penalty in pin count; 3) etched contour cable
is an attractive intermodule connection technique; 4) the upper limit of
number of modules suggested by baseline 1 does not impose basic difficulties
on the design of the transmission system; 5) ECL circuits have significant
disadvantages for use in a bus-oriented transmission system in spite of their
attractive speed-power characteristic.
The implementation of the transmission paths will be considered in more
detail during Phase II, but the initial study has allowed transmission speeds
of more than a few megahertz to be used with confidence in further refining
the design.
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DATA TRANSMISSION
Summary
This report discusses party line data transmission systems with emphasis
on hardware, speed and performance characteristics. For data transmission
at speeds less than 50 Mbps, current source drivers are optimum for line
interfacing. At higher speeds, voltage source drivers are required.
Differential line receivers are preferred over single-ended receivers due
to their common mode rejection capability. Presently available bipolar
integrated circuits can manipulate data at rates up to 15 megabits, with
the exception of the ECL families which can manipulate data at 100 and
200 megabits. With regard to the data link, a transmission line with
uniform characteristic impedance and with short stubs for interconnecting
the modules is recommended.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The maximum usable speed and performance of a party line data transmission system
is a function of several parameters including the noise environment, the driving and
receiving method, the transmission line and its terminatior t~rhnir~ue, the stub
lengths, and the choice of connectors. This report discusses these factors, all of
which affect the fidelity of data transmission, and establishes some performance
bounds.
This report separates the transmission system in two fields. The first is the inter-
face area including the types of drivers and receivers available, and the parameters
essential in the definition of their performance. A summary of the presently
available solid state hardware as a function of type, speed, and power is presented.
The second field investigated is the transmission medium. Various types of trans-
mission lines are discussed from a point of view of performance within the system.
In addition, rules are given for securing maximum EMI protection, and for minimizing
distortions due to stubs, interconnect and terminations.
This report makes use of the data and experience that was acquired in a party-line
data transmission study of an airborne multiplexing system using 300 feet of cable
with 32, 20-foot stubs, and bandwidths extending to 4 MHz. In addition, this report
makes use of experience gained on high-speed processors such as the 15 megabit per
second PCM encoder included in the Multispectral Scanner on board the Earth Resources
Technology Satellite (ERTS*).
2.0 INTERFACE CONSIDERATIONS
Two aspects of the interface problem will be addressed; first the types and performance
of line drivers and line receivers, and second the specific capabilities of presently
available devices:
2.1 Interface Circuit Types and Performance
2.1.1 Line Drivers. Line drivers can be either the high impedance current source
type, or the low impedance voltage source type. Each of the two types has its
advantages and limitations which make selection a function of the application.
2.1.1.1 Current Source Drivers. Current source drivers are high output impedance
devices which divert a fixed amount of current into a load. The current can be
differential as shown in Figure la where current is diverted into each half of the
output load. It can also be single ended as shown in Figure lb where current is pumped
into the load only when the data is in the logical one state. It is shown in
Appendix A4 that the differential driver is electrically equivalent to the single
ended driver.
The high output impedance property of the current source driver allows for three
important features ideal for a party-line system. These include line isolation,
driver fault tolerance, and high common-mode output voltage range. Line isolation
is automatically provided by the high impedance output stage of the line driver, which
in most devices is the collector of a bipolar transistor. Line isolation yields non-
distortion of reflected waves. This characteristic simplifies the modeling of the
transmission line, and in some cases, can allow reflections to occur on the line
without degrading performance. Therefore, settling of the waveform can occur as
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predicted by analysis (this point is further discussed later in this report).
Fault tolerance against the transmission line shorting to a power supply voltage
during system test is a desirable feature. It is automatically provided by a sufficiently
high collector-base breakdown voltage of the output transistor as shown in Figure 2a
(for a voltage higher than the collector base breakdown voltage, there is no protection).
For additional circuit isolation, a current limit resistor can be economically added.
This resistor will not alter the system performance, however it will protect the driver
against a system test accidental short of the data link to a high voltage supply of
either polarity. Besides system test protection, the current limit resistors provide
an economical insurance against a line driver failure affecting the data link, and
thereby the transmission between other modules. The line driver failure can be of
any form such as a short to ground, to power supply, or other, so long as the failure
is passive, (i.e. the driver does not transmit data when not enabled). Due to the
high output impedance of current source drivers, the output voltage developed across
the load is independent of the common-mode voltage at the load. Thus, these drivers
have the characteristic of withstanding high common-mode output voltage range. This
property is important since a common-mode voltage can be applied on the line when data
is present in order to identify presence of data. More on this point will be explained
in Appendix A4.
There are currently available integrated circuits line drivers with current sources
extending from 3 to 12 milliamperes, and capable of accommodating data rates up to
15 Mbps. Higher switching speeds in integrated circuits are expected to be available;
however, discrete types of current source drivers can be designed at present with
switching speeds in the order of 100 to 150 MHz. The limiting factors involved are
the components selection, the circuit layout, and the external capacitance other than
line capacitance, since the line appears resistive with characteristic impedance Zo.
The following example illustrates the effect of capacitance on the maximum operating
frequency.
Example: Given an ideal current source I with switching rise time less
than one nanosecond, find the maximum operating frequency when
the driver is connected to a properly terminated 50 ohm line
through a connector with 50 pf of capacity.
Solution: The setup for problem is as shown in Figure 3a. The equivalent
model for the analysis is shown in Figure 3b.
The solution can easily be derived to be:
Vc (t) = IZ o (1 - e t/ZoC)
Three times constants yield t = 3 X ZoC = 3 X 50 X 50 X 10- 1 2 = 7.5 nsec.
where t = rise time
A bit time of twice the rise time is then 2 X t = 15 nsec, and the maximum bit frequency
is 1/15 X 10-9 = 67 MHz. Therefore, to transmit high frequency data with a current
source, it is very essential to minimize the external capacitance.
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2.1.1.2 Voltage Source Drivers. Voltage source drivers are low output impedance
devices, and in practice, with proper design, can drive capacitive loads at
frequencies up to 250 MHz. Unlike the current source drivers, the voltage source
drivers have three distinct disadvantages which make adaptability to party line
operation difficult. First, the low output impedance of the device restricts the
use of line interface current limit resistors to achieve isolation from the data
link. Second, voltage drivers have low common-mode voltage range since line voltages
affect the driver performance. In most commercially available drivers, diode
clamping to power supply and ground is provided to short out any common-mode voltage.
If the common-mode voltage has a low impedance source, damage to the driver can
occur. A third but not as serious disadvantage is the difficulty of obtaining high
output impedance in the standby mode. Unlike the current source driver, this
is not a natural feature of the voltage driver and requires additional circuitry.
2.1.2 Line Receivers. Line receivers are high impedance devices with either single
ended or differential inputs. Before discussing the difference between the two
types, a discussion of the most important parameters defining line receiver performance
is given. These parameters include the following:
a. Common Mode Rejection Ratio (CMRR) - The CMRR is the ratio of open-loop
(differential) gain to common-mode gain. The CMRR falls off at high
frequencies mainly because of internal capacitance effects. Since the
capacitance of the input stage has more effect with high source impedance,
the rejection ratio is also a function of the source impedance. Figure 4
shows the dependence of CMRR upon frequency and sourde impedance. CMRR
is an important parameter for a line receiver since high frequency common-
mode voltage can be coupled onto the data link from external sources and
can appear as a differential signal if the rejection is poor.
b. Common-Mode Voltage Range CQMVR) - The common-mode voltage range is defined
as that voltage applied simultaneously to both input terminals which, if
exceeded does not allow normal operation of the receiver. Thus, this parameter
is important since the line may purposely operate at a common-mode voltage
other than ground in order to automatically shut off a differential bias.
This last point is explained in detail in Appendix A4.
c. Input Impedance - Input impedance of the receiver defines the coefficient
of reflection (and thereby the voltage attenuation) at every interface with
the line. A simple technique to compute the received voltage at the furthest
receiver is to consider the final-value voltage on the line when the driver
is loaded with all receivers in parallel.
Example: Consider a 6 milliampere current source driver driving a lossless
line with ten receivers, each with an input impedance of 1.8K ohms. The
line is terminated with 100 ohm resistors at each end. The net impedance
is then 10, 1.8K ohm in parallel with two 100 ohms, or 39 ohms. The final
value output voltage on the line is then 6 ma X 39 ohm = 234 mV.
d. Input Sensitivity - The input sensitivity is defined as the differential dc
voltage required at the inputs of the receiver to force the output from one
digital state to the other. This parameter defines the minimum peak-to-peak
signal level required for operation with a signal-to-noise ratio of zero dB.
The input sensitivity of presently available line receivers varies from 2 mV
to 1000 mV.
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e. Offset Voltage - Offset voltage is that voltage which must be applied between
the input terminals through two equal resistors to force the output to its
midpoint (between a logic 0 and a logic 1). The offset voltage is basically
then a bias error on the input, and must be accounted for in determining the
worst case allowable input voltage.
Differential line receivers are generally preferredisingle-ended receivers because of
their high common mode rejection and high common mode range. Single-ended receivers
are simpler in design; however3 for a data link application differential line receivers
are recommended. The described parameters not only define a receiver performance, but
also can be used to calculate the required driver differential output voltage. The
example below illustrates the concept. The example assumes some receiver parameters
and a system environment. The differential receiver parameters are as follows:
- CNRR: 80 db at 1 KHz; 20 db at 10 MHz
- CMVR: + 3 V
- Input impedance: 1.8K ohm
- Input sensitivity: 10 mV
- Offset voltage: 10 mV
The system environment is as follows:
- Transmission line losses: 5 db
- Load losses (due to other receivers): 5 db
- Common-mode noise: 1000 mVrms from 1 KHz to 10 MHz
- Transmission bandwidth: 10 MHz
- Coupled differential noise in band of interest: 10 mV RMS
To maintain a cignal-to-noise ratio of 20 db, the problem is to find the differential
driver output voltage when the line is terminated in its characteristic impedance at
both ends.
Solution:
RMS Signal to overcome the noise (0 dB SNR) = 10 mV RMS
RMS Signal for a SNR 20 db = 100 mV RMS
10 db loss compensation 316.2 mVRMS
(5 dB transmission loss plus 5 dB load loss)
Additional signal for common-mode compensation 100.0 mVRMS
(1000 mVRMS/20 dB = 100 mV)
Total RMS signal 416.2 mVRMS
Peak-to-peak (differential) signal 832.4 mV pp
(twice RMS signal)
Additional signal for sensitivity compensation 10.0 mV
Additional signal for offset voltage
compensation 10.0 mV
Total differential voltage
required 852.4 mV
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2.2 Interface Devices
A list of the presently available bipolar integrated circuits line drivers and line
receivers is given in Tables I and II. These tables show that the TTL compatible
line drivers and receivers can be operated at a maximum frequency of fifteen megabits.
Higher speed operation (15 to 30 MHz) can presently be achieved with discrete line
drivers, and with a combination of discrete and IC components for the line receivers.
At very high speed (100 to 200 MHz), use of ECL logic is strongly recommended. The
ECL family provides IC line drivers and line receivers for operation at these speeds.
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TABLE I SAMPLE DATA OF PRESENTLY AVAILABLE LINE DRIVERS
Max. Power Power
Line Operating Dissipation Delivered to Differential Power Supply
Driver Manufacturer Speed (MH ) Per Driver 50 ohm Line Voltage Dissipation
(non Loaded) Load (MV) with 50 ohm
On Standby (MW) Load (MW)
(MW) (MW)
DM 7830 National 20 60 I - 140 2600 330
00
o SN 55109 Texas 10 70 70 1. 8 300 100
Instruments
SN 55110 10 95 95 3.6 600 155
RAI 245 Radiation 15 MH 25 1 .45 150 25Z
MECL 10000 Motorola 100 35 - 16 900 125
Series Gates
MECL III Motorola 200 70 - 16 900 160
Series Gates
TABLE II SAMPLE DATA OF PRESENTLY AVAILABLE*LINE RECEIVERS
Max Power
Line Operating Dissipation Sensitivity Common Mode
Receiver Manufacturer Speed (MH z )  Per Receiver (mV) Voltage Range Comments
DM 7820A National 20 10 60-1000 +15V Device has excellent CMVR, how-
18 60-500 0 ever the sensitivity specs make
25 60-1000 -15V this device unusable with low
voltage output line drivers.
SN 55107 Texas 10 130 5 +3V Sensitivity limits not specified
Instruments -3V
RAI 248 Radiation 15 20 75 700 MV Sensitivity and CMVR not specified
MC 10115 Motorola 100 25 New product, data sheet not
available.
MC 1692 Motorola 200 55 600 * CMVR not specified.
3.0 TRANSMISSION CONSIDERATIONS
A transmission line is considered here as the transmission medium between modules
instead of fiber optic line or other types of links. The performance of a data link
system is a function of the transmission line noise rejection properties, its losses,
and its loads (including stubs), in addition to the receiver properties with respect
to detection. Optimizing the performance of a data link system means minimizing the
probability of error for a given signal level and environmental noise, and a given
transmitter and receiver configuration. Since the intent of this system is to
maintain simplicity in the design of the receivers (i.e. simple detection), the burden
of proof to minimize phase and amplitude distortions is placed on the data link. In
other words, it is essential to first select a transmission line that has good
rejection to Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI), and second, to connect this line
such that rejections due to the various loading elements are kept to a minimum.
This report discusses the transmission line from these two standpoints, first from
the hardware aspect in due consideration to EMI; and second, from a geometry stand-
point with guidelines to minimize distortions.
3.1 Transmission Lines
Various types of transmission lines are available for the transmission of data. The
selection of a line for an application is a function of the line length, line
characteristics, line loss, impedance, transmission bandwidth, and noise environment.
Line length can be translated to the time domain through the propagation time delay.
That delay ranges from 1.5 to 2.0 nanoseconds per foot of cable. Thus, a four foot
cable is six to eight nanoseconds long. A cable is generally considered "long" if
its length in nanoseconds is of the same order or greater than the signal rise time.
3.1.1 Open Wire and Wire Over Ground Plane. Open wire cables have an uncontrolled
impedance with wide variations in characteristic impedance ranging from 50 to 300 ohms.
Wire over ground plane has a more controlled impedance than open wire. Both of
these wiring techniques have the singular disadvantage of being very susceptible to
EMI coupling. This is because single wire transmission has no shielding to attenuate
either high frequency, high impedance magnetic fields or high impedance electrostatic
fields. (Please refer to Appendix 3 for more details on methods to minimize EMI
coupling.) Single wire transmission can be used provided the signal-to-noise require-
ments are satisfied. This last requirement is a difficult task to accomplish when the
cable is long and the environment is not well defined.
3.1.2 Coax Cable. Coax cable offers many advantages for distributing high frequency
signals. The well defined and uniform characteristic impedance of the line permits
easy matching. The ground shield of the cable minimizes coupling of high impedance
electrostatic interference, and high impedance high frequency magnetic fields. Coaxiable
cable though offers little protection to low impedance, low frequencies (less than
5 KHz) magnetic fields derived for example from a-c power sources. This last dis-
advantage may not be significant, depending upon the application. The low attenuation
at high frequencies makes good coaxial very desirable for the fast rise times (1 to
3 nanoseconds) associated with very high frequency signals (order of 100 MHz). At
these frequencies, skin effect is a primary cause of attenuation and coax cable is
the only choice for data transmission. The choice between cable size and bandwidth
is a compromise that needs to be analyzed at the time of the design.
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3.1.3 Twisted Pair Cable. Twisted pair lines, differentially driven into a
differential type receiver provide maximum noise immunity. This is because any noise
coupled into a twisted pair generally appears equally on both wires (common mode).
Twisted pair wise offer excellent rejection to low frequency magnetic fields (20 db)
because of the equal and opposite self-cancelling currents induced in the cable.
This protection though against magnetic fields coupling is only satisfied when the
length of the twist is much less than the wavelength of the interfering signals.
Twisted pair cables have little protection (other than common mode) against high
impedance electrostatic fields if the line is terminated in an impedance isolated
from ground. If, however, the low impedance terminations are balanced about ground
and the cable length is less than .15 of the shortest wave length (see EMI rejection
in the Appendix), a high degree of electrostatic rejection is accomplished.
3.1.4 Shielded Twisted Pair. Shielded twisted pair combines the electrostatic
shielding advantages of the external shield with the magnetic field rejection
advantages of the twisted pair. This wire is almost the optimum with regard to EMI
rejection (with the exception of double or triple shielded twisted pair cable). The
disadvantages of shielded twisted pair is the greater harness size and difficulty
in handling the cable from a product design standpoint.
3.1.5 Ribbon Cable. Ribbon cable is a flat flexible cable with well defined
characteristic impedance. Crosstalk is minimized because every other wire is grounded
as shown in Figure 5. The advantages of ribbon cable include easy handling of
connectors because of the in-line arrangement of wires. EMI rejection from external
sources is not as optimum as coax cable because a great percentage of the signal
wire is exposed, or non-shielded.
3.1.6 Microstrip Lines. A microstrip line (Figure 6) is a strip conductor (signal
line) separated from a ground plane by a dielectric. If the thickness, width of the
line, and the distance from the ground plane are controlled, the line will exhibit a
predictable characteristic impedance. From an EMI standpoint, the rejection is not
as high as coax cable because there is no shielding around the signal line. Partial
shielding can be accomplished if, on each side of the signal line, a strip dedicated
for grounding is inserted.
3.1.7 Strip Line (Contour Cable). A strip line (Figure 7) consists of a copper
ribbon centered in a dielectric medium between two conducting planes. If the thickness
and width of the line, the dielectric constant of the medium, and the distance
between the ground planes are all controlled, the line will exhibit a characteristic
impedance that can be held constant within 5%. The strip line approaches in performance
a coax cable from an EMI standpoint if ground strips on both sides of the signal
lines are inserted. This is because the signal line has then a surrounding shield.
3.2 System Geometry
The most significant discontinuity in the data links are the stubs used to transfer
information from the modules to the transmission lines. These stubs can cause
severe reflections, and certain ground rules should be followed to minimize the
distortions. Because several stubs are connected to the data link, a detailed
examination of the effects of the stubs is given.
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3.2.1 Effect of One Stub. Consider a transmission line (see Figure 8) with one
stub of length , , one driver directly connected to the line (E), and three receivers
two directly connected to the line on either side of the stub, (B, C) and one at
the end of the stub (D). The coefficient of reflection at the stub is calculated to
be
ZL Zo Z o/2 - o 1
ZL + Z0 Zo/2 + Z°  3
where ZL is two Zo lines in parallel, or ZL = Zo/2. Therefore, as a wave encounters
the stub, one-third of its voltage will be reflected back to the source. Two-thirds
of its voltage will be transmitted to the rest of the line and to the stub line. The
reflected waveforms can be detrimental to the line.
Figure 8 shows the resulting lattice diagram. Figure 9 illustrates the waveforms at
points on either side of the stub. Due to the reflections, the system has become
more susceptible to noise. Figure 10 shows photographs taken from receivers located
on the line on either side of the stub. These photographs agree with the theory.
Figure 11 represents the lattice diagram for the stub. The voltage at the receiver
initially exceeds the final value. Figure 12 is a photograph of the waveform at the
receiver.
3.2.2 Effect of Multiple Stubs. The inclusion of several stubs on the line greatly
disturbs the line due to the multiple reflections. This effect was tested using
300 foot RG108A/U twisted shield pair cable and 28 20-foot stubs connected along
the line as shown in Figure 13. Pseudorandom Manchester coded data was transmitted
on the data link at a rate of 1 megabit/second. The rise time of the transmitted
waveform was limited to 100 nanoseconds. To maintain a good ground, the cable was
laid over an aluminum sheet with the cable shield tied to the aluminum sheet at every
termination (i.e., at every stub connection to the data link).
Figure 14 is a signal waveform and eye pattern observed at a receiver along the line.
This waveform shows the excessive ringing and distortion caused by the discontinuities
on the data link. In this application, discontinuities on the cable, resulting
from unmatched terminations, imposed echo interference on the line. There are two
types of discontinuities which are a source of echoes affecting the high frequency
components of the signals. The first echo contributors are the reflections of the
signals along the stubs connected to the main line. The stubs are tied directly to
the main transmission line at one end, and to a high impedance termination at the
other end. When a wavefront on the main line intercepts a stub, a portion of its
energy enters the stub, another portion continues its travel on the main line, and a
third portion is reflected back to the source. The energy that entered the stub is
not dissipated by the stub termination because the termination is a high impedance.
It is therefore reflected back to the main line at some later time, thereby introducing
an echo. For the low frequency signals, the time delays are small compared to the
period of the signal and, therefore, the echoes are approximately in phase with 
the
original wavefront. This is not the case, however, for the high frequency signals,
where the echoes are additive at the passage of each stub and can be significantly
shifted in phase from the original signal.
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The second echo contributors are the reflections of the signal on the main line
between line tap terminations. At every tap junction a portion of the wavefront is
reflected back to the source. When this reflected wave reaches another tap it is
reflected again, thereby "trapping" the signal on the line between terminations,
with a fraction of the energy being released at every reflection. Echoing effect
is hereby produced as a result of the time delays of the released energy of the
signal. Again, only the high frequency components are affected because the delayed
signals are significantly shifted in phase from the original signals.
Figure 15 is a lattice diagram demonstrating the accumulation of phase shift as a
result of the mismatched stubs. As can be seen from this diagram, the amount of
phase shift involved is very much a function of the geometry of the system, including
the relative location between the drivers and receivers. Even though this test was
performed at relatively low frequency with rise time limited to 100 nanoseconds,
the length of the line was far greater than the rise time (300 feet or 450 nanoseconds).
In addition, the stub lengths were 20 feet or 30 nanoseconds. In other words, the
line was approximately five times longer than the rise time, and the stub lengths
were one-third the rise time. It was experimentally tested that minimum distortions
will occur if the stub lengths are in the order of thirty times shorter than the
rise time. Thus, for stub lengths less than six inches (approximately one nano-
second), the minimum rise time allowed is 30 nanoseconds.
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4.0 TRANSMISSION LINE TERMINATION TECHNIQUE
To minimize the power dissipation through the transmission line 
terminations, it is
desired to make the terminations as large as possible. However, 
to minimize
reflections it is desired to match the terminations with the 
characteristic impedance
of the line which is in the order of 100 ohms. With this dilemna in mind, 
a compro-
mised solution to the value of the terminations can be reached provided 
the allowed
distortion time and the line lengths are known. Fig-Ure 16 represents 
a lattice
diagram of a data link terminated at both ends with termination 
resistors of value
such that the coefficient of reflection is p. The voltage at any 
time is the sum
of the initial voltage and the reflections up to that time of 
interest. When the
distortion time and the line length are defined, only a particular 
number of
reflections are allowed to reach a desired percentage of the final 
value of the
line voltage. The following example will illustrate the procedure.
Example: Given a transmission line 4 feet in length. 
The data transmisssion is
10 MHz rate. The rise and fall time of the pulses is 15 
nanoseconds.
The condition is such that it is desired to reach 90% of 
the final
voltage within 30 nanoseconds after the arrival of the pulse (i.e. 15
nanoseconds allowed for distortions). (See Figure 17). It is desired
to compute the maximum allowable value for the termination 
resistors.
Solution: The line length is 4 feet or 6 nanoseconds. Within 
15 nanoseconds two
reflections can be allowed. Thus the following equation can 
be written:
V (1 + p + p2) = .90 V; where V = initial voltage
V = final voltage
Assume current drive,
VF Io ZL I (1 + p) ;V IoZL
2 2 l-p 2
Thus,
Zo (1+ p +  )- (.90) (12Z) (1 + p)
2 2
solving for p
(1 - p) (1 + p + p2) = .9 (1 + p
(1 - p3) .9 (1 + p)
since p3 <1, 1 - p l1 and
1. 1 - p .1 - .9 - .1 .11
. .9 .9
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ZL 0  (o  +) Z (1 + .11) - 1.25
1- p 1 - .11
Thus the termination resistor can be one and a quarter times greater than the
characteristic impedance of the line.
5.0 PHYSICAL DESIGN ASPECTS
In an attempt to define the maximum wire length on the data buses, several
assumptions must be made concerning the number of modules and their size. With the
present information it will be assumed that each processor module will be approximately
12 cubic inches in volume and will measure 3 X 4 X 1 inches. This volume will allow
the interconnections of between 27 and 45 high density logic arrays. Exact
component density will be a function of the number of input/output connections per
array. Each memory module is assumed to be 6 X 4 X 1 inch. Allowing four inches
in width for unit wiring, common circuits and power supplies and assuming 16
processor and memory modules, we arrive at a unit size of 16 X 17 X 8 inches.
With the further assumption that the data bus lines must input to each module, we
arrive at a maximum wire length of 42 inches.
Because of the small size of both the processor and memory modules, limitations
do exist on the number of bus lines which may terminate in each module and on how
they may terminate. If a bit orientated data bus scheme is adopted, "tapped" or
"daisy chain" connections must be eliminated because this system will double the
number of input/output lines associated with each module. While this interconnection
method minimizes the discontinuities in each line, the wire bulk in the connector
area of the modules will make this system unworkable. The more acceptable inter-
connection method is the tree fanout system with each branch of the tree limited
to less than one inch. This short stub length should provide no significant
reflection on the line.
The question of how many bus lines must be used to achieve the 200 megabit per second
goal must now be answered. Since power and weight are to be minimized, it does not
appear practical to use high speed TTL or ECL. The significant power consumption
of these devices over CMOS or the series 7400 TTL will cause a significant weight
gain in the final hardware. Figure 1 represents the power dissipation per gate
for various hardware families. From the graph a practical transmission rate from
a power point of view is 25 megabits per second per data line. This speed then
establishes a lower bound of 8 data bus lines. If a bit orientated data bus
scheme is adopted, the upper bound for transmission lines is then 32 lines.
Operating at a data rate of 6.7 megabits per second. With these bounds, we are
limited to basically th ee logic systems, 1) MOS - either P-MOS ion implanted or
C-MOS, 2) Series 7400 T L, or 3) low power Schottky T2L.
Detailed weight tradeoffs will have to be performed to clearly establish the most
efficient logic system from a hardware point of view. At speeds up to 10 megabits
per second, a large question arises as to whether low power TTL or MOS is the most
efficient. The ability to design and produce large scale MOS arrays (those with
active device counts greater than 500) makes the MOS much more attractive than TTL.
It does not seem unreasonable to have the higher power dissipated by the MOS device
completely overshadowed by the significant reduction in interconnection it possesses.
At the higher speeds, those greater than 10 megabits, device complexity and inter-
connection minimization will be the principal items to be traded-off.
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With the above bound on transmission speeds, it is now necessary to discuss the
merits of the various wiring systems. Those which present promise for the data
transfer lines are 1) wire over ground, 2) twisted pair, both shielded and
unshielded, 3) ribbon cable, 4) contour cable with stripline or microstripline
transmission lines, and 5) coaxial .cable.
The wire over ground possesses the unique property of being the fastest (shortest
propagation time) of the commonly employed transmission lines. Several practical
problems exist however, when attempting to employ this concept in high density
microminiature hardward. Proximity of each line to one another can create significant
crosstalk between adjacent lines. Physical support and maintaining proper separation
to ground presents a problem during unit assembly and test. The system may also
be susceptible to failure during fibration and acoustical noise testing. These
problems can be overcome by supporting the wire in a low dielectric foam, but the
problem of crosstalk remains. With high wire density the bulk of wire may make
assembly difficult. For these reasons the wire over ground is not considered
the most practical system for the data bus lines.
Twisted pair and shielded twisted pairs have been used successfully for handling
digital signals up to 15 megabits. Beyond this frequency, line losses are
sufficiently large to prevent transmission of large bandwidths over long distances.
The addition of a shield to a twisted pair significantly reduces the problem of
signal crosstalk to other lines. Assuming that the center-to-center spacing of
one inch is maintained between modules, the actual length of twisted wire would be
reduced to a small fraction of an inch. In a practical sense in this hardware,
the twisted pair degenerates to a wire over ground system. For this reason,
twisted pairs do not appear to be a practical solution to the wiring problem.
Ribbon cable or strip cable is possible the first practical system for data
transmission in this type of hardware. It offers the advantage of being able to be
designed as a transmission line with a large variety of impedances, crosstalk
between adjacent lines can be minimized with proper design, and attenuation can be
eliminated as a problem by the proper choice of ground and signal conductor sizes.
Cables of FEP and FEP-Polyamide have successfully been employed in numerous
spacecraft systems since the origination of United States space programs. Ribbon
cable does, however, have several practical drawbacks. Because of its design it
may be difficault to handle and install. With close spacing, termination could be
a problem and stub length could become excessive. While the problems of
installation and termination make the use of ribbon cable difficult, it is not
without merit and should not be discounted when considering types of transmission
systems.
There does exist however a system which possesses all of the desireable properties
of the ribbon cable with few, if any, of its drawbacks. The use of an etched
contour cable employing either a stripline or microstripline technique appears to be
best suited for data transfer in this system. Either system will exhibit
propagation delays of approximately 2 nanoseconds per foot with crosstalk between
adjacent signal lines of 2% or less. By proper design, characteristic impedances
of 50 to 100 ohms may be designed with DC resistances of less than - ohm (assuming
a 42 inch run). The use of this wiring technique allows the circuit a wide latitude
of drive networks with a minimum hardware implication. One wire or two wire
transmission systems can be employed with equal ease and without major problems of
interconnection to the modules. Stub length can be reduced to fractions of an inch
and thereby reduce line reflections.
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Because of the ease of installation, the ease of controlling characteristic
impedance of the signal conductors, the elimination of crosstalk problems, the
low propagation delays and low DC resistance, the stripline contour cable appears
to be the most efficient wiring system for the data bus transmission lines.
Miniature coaxial cable could be used as a transmission system since it possesses
all the desirable characteristics of speed and isolation needed. It does have
several drawbacks which eliminate it from consideration in this system. The
physical size of the sub-miniature OSSM connector will prevent more than 8 data
lines being terminated in each module without designing new ganged connectors.
Second, the physical separation of the modules (one inch) may make cable
installation impossible without unduly increasing the total wire length. For these
reasons miniature coax is not recommended as the most desirable data bus
transmission system at this time.
In the thermal design of a spacecraft system, electronic component cooling is
accomplished by conduction or radiation of power to a low temperature sink.
Conduction cooling has proven to be the most efficient method of removing small
amounts of power from point sources (electronic components). It is not without
limitation, however. With an individual module, as power increases material
thicknesses must increase proportionally to maintain a fixed T between a component
and its thermal sink. If the thermal control structure thickness for a given
module is 0.06 inches and the power dissipated within the module is 1.3 watts,
doubling the power would require twice the thermal structure thickness to maintain
a given set of boundry conditions. With these conditions in mind, a practical
power limit appears to be 41 to 5 watts in each processor module employing conduction
cooling. Above these levels, thermal control requires more than half of the volume
allocated to the module. (Reference figure 2). At this point more sophisticated
thermal control systems must be employed. The use of a small heat pipe on each of
the printed circuit boards within the module would increase the weight of the module
to approximately 0.7 pounds but would allow the components to operate near the
same temperature as the thermal sink. With this arrangement, power levels as
high as 30 watts could be dissipated within the module and still maintain semi-
conductor junction temperatures below 150oF with a sink temperature of 70oF.
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APPENDIX A
A UNIFIED METHOD FOR ANALYZING MISSION PROFILE RELIABILITY
FOR STANDBY AND MULTIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY COMPUTING
SYSTEMS WHICH ALLOWS FOR DEGRADED PERFORMANCE.
This appendix is the manuscript of a paper written by J. J. Bricker
which describes the second reliability model developed for the ARMMS
program. It is being submitted for publication to the IEEE Transactions
on Reliability Theory.
The purpose of the model is to allow the reliability of various ARMMS
configurations to be predicted allowing for phase changes at deterministic
time points when the number of modules per class may be changed. Each
module of a given class has both an active and a passive failure rate where
it is assumed that negative exponential distributions of active and dormant
failures prevail throughout and the given class may operate either in NMR
(n+l out of 2n+1 = N) or as a standby sparing system.
The analysis proceeds by generalizing the notions of standby and NMR
redundancy, which for N = 3 is TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy), into
a concept called hybrid-degraded redundancy. The probabilistic evaluation
of this unified redundancy concept is then developed, via Laplace Trans-
forms, to yield, for a given modular class, the joint distribution of success
and the number of non-failed modules from that class, at special times.
With this information, a Markov chain analysis gives the reliability of an
entire sequence of phases or mission profile.
The model has been programmed and various sample mission phase
profiles are being explored.
A UNIFIED METHOD FOR ANALYZING MISSION PROFILE RELIABILITY FOR
STANDBY AND MULTIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANT COMPUTING SYSTEMS
WHICH ALLOWS FOR DEGRADED PERFORMANCE
J. L. Bricker*
Hughes Aircraft Company
Fullerton, California
I. Introduction: A. The Main Purposes of the Analysis
A modular computer concept which is responsive to both large computing capacities
and high reliability objectives is being explored by the Marshall Space Flight Center
of NASA. This system, designated ARMMS (Automatically Reconfigurable Modular
Multiprocessor System) is to allow its constituent modules to be utilized as parallel,
simplex computers for high throughput or the system can be reconfigured to employ
some modules in the Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) mode for maximum reliability
in performing critical computations. The reliability of such a computer is dependent
on the sequence of mission phases and the complement of modules which must be
active in each phase. The computer under study is contemplated for use on deep space
scientific missions or in orbital space stations. On a mission to the outer planets a
high level of reliability must be achieved without human intervention in the form of
repair capability or logistic support, hence the need for a general detailed modelling
effort.
A complete analysis of this problem has been developed under the classical assump-
tions of independence of module failures and negative exponential failure laws for each
module, either in the active or standby states. It is also assumed that intra or inter
*This work was sponsored by the Marshall Space Flight Center of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration through Contract NAS8-27926 with the
Hughes Aircraft Company, Fullerton, California.
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modular class switching, failure detection and location and switch-off and switch-on
transients (the so-called factor of coverage) behave perfectly and that the voter
reliability is equal to one.
Thus, for example, although the parameter of coverage, c, (See [2], P. 200) is known
to play an important role in the overall analysis, as far as active-standby redundancy
is concerned, it was considered premature to attempt to incorporate the known
formulas involving c into the modelling effort, without properly considering the
individual effects of failure detection, location, switching and power-on or power off
transients, as they pertain to the ARMMS design.
The analysis unifies the existing treatments of TMR and standby redundancy in the
literature (See [1], [2], [3], [6], [7], [8]) and shows that these two types of redundant
organization have basically the same reliability analysis, if one extends the hybrid
concept of redundancy to include degraded modes of operation.
This task is actually required in order to properly perform the overall mission profile
reliability calculation and is not included for reasons of mathematical elegance. In
addition, it assists in numerical and programming efforts since one set of equations
is derived and not two apparently unrelated ones. (1)
(1)[Compare, e.g., Eq 8, P. 380 of [7] with the equation for cR q (T, X, p) on P. 1308
of [6] or with the equation for RTMR/S on P. 1307 of [6] ].
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B. Some Basic Terminology and Symbols and Pertinent Literature Review
In [1] and [7], Mathur has provided some convenient terminology and symbols which we
shall use.
When discussing differing module classes, the symbols below may be indexed by a
subscript.
X Failure rate of an active module = Power on failure
rate.
/1 Power off failure rate - Failure rate of a dormant
module (we assume j > 0 but the case p=0 can be
treated by taking limits using L'lHospital's Rule).
K 1- ip _K<o is of most interest.
S Total number of standby spare units, S>0.
N = 2n-1 Total number of active redundant units - 3 if the system
is TMR.
n - Degree of active redundancy = 1 in TMR system.
C -= N+S Total number of units in a module class.
T Mission Time, (L0)
t,T Dummy variables for time O0t, 7 TT.
Simplex System A non-redundant module (in a system consisting of
several module classes, a simplex would be a set or
chain of modules with exactly one from each class).
TMR System Triple-modularly redundant system (N=3) - Two-out-
of-three majority logic.
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NMR System N-tuple-modularly redundant system - one in which
majority logic or n-l out of 2n+l=N is used.
Hybrid (N, S) System A hybrid redundant system having a total of N+S units
in which N units are active and majority logic is used
and S spares are standby spares.
H(N, S) An abbreviation for Hybrid (N, S).
A(L, S) The classic active-passive standby system in which L
modules are always active and the system fails after
all possible spares are exhausted and only L-1 active
modules are left (no majority logic employed here,
i. e., no voting).
H(3,S) A TMR system with S spares.
R(N, S) [T] The reliability of an H(N, S) system of duration T.
In [1], Mathur developed the analysis for:
R(3, S) [T] = RTMS/S
Jt S-1 ' S-il 2RK2 S-1 S (-R )
= 31- 17 ) 1 (3K+S-i R(K+S-i) ! (iK+S-i (K+S-i) (3K+S-i)
i=0 1 0 E (S)
(Eq 1)
where
R = e - xT
R =e
s
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Later, in [7], he generalized the result to R(N, S) [T] to obtain
S S-2 n
R(N, S) [T] = RNRS 1 + NKj+S -1 ) (NK+S
j=o i=o
i i (-01 S-2 j+1
K + S ( -11) KJ S 1 (Eq 2)
S0 Ss j=0
The problem of A(L, S) was initially solved by Kletsky, [9], rediscovered by Bouricius,
etal, [2], and there generalized by the latter to include the factor of coverage, c, where:
c = Conditional probability that after a failure in the system (either in any of the
active modules or spares), the system is able to recover and continue infor-
mation processing with no permanent loss of essential information.
= Prob (that fault detection, location and appropriate switching functions are
properly performed in the advent of a failure, for the A(L, S) type of
redundancy).
= Prob (appropriate switching - out of the bad module and in of the good module
in H(N, S) systems), since the other basic functions are presumably hardware
functions of properly designed voter units.
Bouricius, [2], obtains for RA(L, S) = Reliability of A(L, S), the expression:
S k
-LXT (k-1 + LK(k k(
RA(L, S)= e k LK c 1- e T (Eq 3)
k=O
We now define a hybrid-degraded system H(N, S, D), where N need not be an odd integer
and O D.N, as follows: Initially there are N+S modules in the system in which N are
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active and S are dormant spares. The system runs until only N active units are still
functioning, at which point it continues to operate until only D0O units operate. When
the number of active units falls to D-1 the system is considered to have failed but one
can still consider the system to be running until all modules are down. (Note: If D=O,
the system never fails). Since for large intervals of time during the mission, modules
may be turned off to conserve power and, presumably, to enhance the effect of redun-
dancy, since power-off failure rates are usually presumed to be lower than power-on
failure rates, we must allow for D=0, as a possibility. For example, when the space-
craft is traveling between planets and there are no important scientific experiments to
consider, the computer modules of several module classes may be turned off. Observe
that if one assumes perfect coverage or perfect voter and switching reliability, then both
H(N, S) and A(L, S) are special cases of H(N, S, D) as far as reliability is concerned. In
fact, for N= 2n+l,
H(N, S) = H(N, S, n+1)
while, for L arbitrary,
A(L, S) - H(L, S, L)
In the classical model of n+1/2n+l voting, it should be clarified that once all the spares
are exhausted and the system subsequently drops from 2n+1 to 2n operative units, one
maintains the criterion that n+1 modules must agree. Additional failures, which we
always assume to occur only one at a time, won't hurt the system performance there-
fore, until the system has only n+1 remaining modules. The next module failure will
then be a system failure.
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The term D is introduced to allow for module class mode degradation. Suppose, for
example, that in a TMR/S system, i.e., H(3, S), one operates as follows:
As long as two voters agree (see Taylor, [10]) the voter assumes that the third has
failed and thus will switch in a previously unpowered spare, if one exists. If no spare
is available, the system can still operate as long as the two remaining units agree.
However, when they disagree, the voter cannot tell which unit is in error and for that
reason the voter is useless from this time on. Since one does not wish a system to fail
if one good unit remains, software error detection may be introduced at this point to
determine the faulty unit. Through the proper use of software error detecting schemes,
(assuming perfectly reliable software, i. e. ) the final unit could then be utilized until it
fails.
Denoting by H* (3,S) the above hybrid-hardware-software-redundant procedure, then,
clearly, we again have a special case of the scheme H(N, S, D) where,
H*(3, S) = H(3, S, 1)
Thus, a complete reliability evaluation of the hybrid-redundant scheme H(N, S, D) will
encompass all the previous seemingly unrelated type redundancy schemes. In this
sense, in the absence of an exact design for performing coverage and replicated voting
and switching, one obtains a unifying principle for studying some of the more popular
redundancy configurations.
There is yet another type of hybrid-redundancy called Hybrid-Simplex Redundancy, [8],
which for N=3 is then TMR/Simplex Redundancy, in which one operates as H(3, S) until
two modules are left, and then one of the two remaining units are discarded, so that
from that time on the system is operated in a simplex mode. This might be done in the
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absence of a good software error detecting package so that, since the voter could not
distinguish a failure among the two remaining modules, one may as well be discarded
to simplify the executive decision logic. By the introduction of yet another two param-
eters D1 , D2 , one could consider TMR/Simplex as an H(N, S, D1 , D2 , D) system where
the latter notation means that one runs an H(N, S) system until D1 active units are left,
at which point D1-D 2 of these are discarded and the final system consisting of D2 active
units are run until the system has only D-1 left. All the above considered schemes are
special cases of this 5-parameter family of schemes whose reliability function is as
easy to derive as that of H(N, S, D). Thus, for N=2n+l one has,
H(N, S) = H(N,S, n+1, n+l, n+l)
A(L, S) = H(L, S, L, L, L) or in general H(N, S, D) = H(N, S, N, N, N)
which is equivalent to an H(N, S, D, D, D) scheme
TMR/SIMPLEX = H(3, S, 2, 1, 1)
Since no use of TMR/Simplex redundancy is planned in the ARMMS design, it is
mentioned only for completeness and to point out the extension and generality
obtainable from the present analysis.
II. Derivation of R(N, S, D) T ] and Pi (N, S, D) [ T]
We now proceed to obtain some preliminary results before precisely restating the
MPRP (mission profile reliability problem). We shall require for the MPRP not only
R(N, S, D) [ T] = Prob of success of the H(N, S, D) scheme at time T, but also, Prob (That
the number of non-failed modules = i when the module class is operated as an
H(N, S, D) scheme in the time interval [0, T]), which is denoted by P.(N, S, D)[ T],
where D-N, for O-i-N+1. If i-D, P.(N, S, D)[ T] represents the Prob (That there
exists a degraded mode of success of level i at time T).
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Problem Statement: Assume that there are N--S identical modules of which N are
simultaneously active and S are in standby at time 0, all being functional. Let each
of the active modules fail according to the negative exponential failure law,
P(71 <t) = Fl(t) = 1 - e- for X>0
while each of the standby modules fails with the negative exponential failure law
P(T2 <t) =- F 2 (t) = 1 - e-At, for >0
Here T is the random variable denoting time until failure occurs when the module stays
in the appropriate state (either active or standby). Assume further that all modules
fail independently of one another, and that the system operates by switching spares
into the bank of N operating modules as long as spares are available, but that once the
number of non-failed modules reaches the number N the system uses all available
modules until D are left. The system will then be considered in a degraded mode if
D< N and will be considered in the failed mode when the number of non-failed modules
reaches D-1. We determine,
Pi(N, S, D) [T] = Prob (At time T the number of non-failed modules = i)
Following, Bricker [11], let us define the random variables:
Xi i=lA-
A-9
where X. = Time from the instant of the (i-1) st failure, occurring in the system
1
H(N, S, D), until the instant of the ith failure,
and let
#t = Number of system failures (spares or operating) in the time interval [O,t].
i
T i = X. = Time of the i-th system failure
j=1
Then the event [Ti> t] is equivalent to the event [#t i-l]
Since,
[#t - i ] 
- I#t - i-1 ]  
= [#t = i]
Prob ([#t i]) - Prob ([#t i-1]) = Prob ([#t = i])
Prob ([Ti+1> t]) - Prob ([Ti>t]) = Prob ([#t = i])
or
(1 - Fi+ (t)) - (1 - F (t)) = PN+S-i(N, S, D) [t] = Fi(t) - Fi+(t), for O-i-N+S
(Eq 4)
where F(i)(t) = Prob (Ti.t) and F(0)(t) < 1, by definition.
Let f(i)(t) = Probability density function of the random variable
i
Ti = X for 1-iN+S
j=1
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Now Xi is a negative exponentially distributed random variable with failure rate Xi
where
ki = N) + (S- (i-1)), for 15iSS+1, (Eq 5a)
while for S 1si-N+S we have a system consisting entirely of active modules so that
ki = (N+S + 1-i) x for S+11iN+S (Eq 5b)
Thus, e.g. XN+S =
Since W, X>0 we see that: X1>2 3 X> ... > S+N = k>0 so that all the system (module
class) failure rates are distinct.
Let
(Xe )dtf
O - at -A it d .
1
0
be the Laplace Transform of f (t), for a> 0, where fi(t) is the pdf of the random
variable Xi.
i i
.. £(f ()(t))= 7 Z (f.(t)) since T i X
j=1 j=1
by the convolution theorem for Laplace Transforms, and one finds,
i i
£ (F(i)(t)) =7 7 1 Z a+ (Eq.5c)
j=1 j j 1j= A-1
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using partial fraction decomposition.
Therefore, by a standard argument one obtains:
kA k (Eq 5d)
j kj ("k'j)
1ski
Then for 1si -N+S,
i i
.. F(i)(t) f(i)(x) dx = A (1 - eXt) (Eq 5f)
o j=1
Letting t -- oo, we see that:
i A=1
j=1
Hence,
N+S-i+1
Pi(N,S,D) [t] = FN+S-i(t) - FN+S-i+l (t) =  AN+S-i+ e t
j=1
N+S-i
N+S-i - Aj t
-S-i eXt (Eq 5g)
j=1
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N+S-i N+S-i+1 - N+S-i+1
P.(N, S, D) [t] = A S-i -AN+S-i e AN+S-i+ e
j=1 (Eq 5h)
Clearly,
N+S-D+1
R(N,S, D) [t] = 1 - F(N+S-D+l)(t) = AN+S-D+l e- t (Eq 5i)
j=1
We will not enter into numerical analysis questions at this time, but it should be pointed
out that the A I are sensitive to small values of W, since the nature of the solution
changes as t -. 0.
III. The Markov Analysis of MPRP
A. The General Setting
Consider a mission profile defined by a sequence of consecutive time intervals 11 [0, T 1],
12 [T 1 , T 2], . . . Ij (TjJ-, TJ] into which the mission is broken, depending upon the
critical functions which the spacecraft must perform. Phase 1, occurring in 11 [0, T 1],
could be the launch of the spacecraft, Phase 2 might consist of initial and midcourse
guidance, etc. and since the trajectory of the spacecraft may be considered to be pre-
determined, one may assume, at least for the purposes of the present study, that the
times T 1, T 2 ' . . Tj, . . J are deterministic (non-random). Phase j occurring
during the interval Ij [Tj-1 Tj] could be a planetary flyby during which various scien-
tific sensors must function properly, etc. It is now a design analysis problem to "size
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up" the mission profile by specifying what kind and type of computer activity is
required during the Phase I . This must be done on a module by module basis so that
one, in effect, will be specifying a "shopping list" of computer module requirements,
in terms of the number of modules of each type required, type of redundancy to be
employed for each module/class/phase and the duration of on-time that each module
must be utilized. If during a given Phase I. there will be several changes of the com-
puter structure, then, for the determination of mission reliability, it may be neces-
sary to further subdivide each mission phase so that the amount of computer hardware
needed is fixed for that subphase. Assume that this has been done so that we shall now
refer to a mission "phase" as a time interval Ij [Tj_ 1, Tj] during which the number of
modules of a class required is constant, the type of redundancy is specified (either
TMR, or active-passive, etc) and the level of tolerable mode degradation, D, is de-
termined, beyond which that phase will be deemed a failure. One then wishes to
determine the reliability of the complete mission profile, viz:
R(Mission (J)) = R (I1, 12' . . IJ) = Prob (Phase Ij computer modules have suc-
cessfully operated during I. up to the levels
of degradation allowed, 1-j-J).
This term, R(Ij, 1-j-J) is called the Mission Profile Reliability. Here Mission (J)
(I1' .. I ) is the mission whose J successive phases consist of I = 1 (T 0, T 1), . .
Ij = Ij(Tj_1 , Tj). Thus, for each design specification of tolerable mode degradation/
module class/phase one may come up with a mission profile reliability. The analysis
is thus set up to produce an evaluation tool which allows the system designer to vary
the requirements of mission phase computer module use, the kind of redundancy he
feels is desirable for that phase, and the type of mode degradation that he is prepared
A-14
to live with on a phase by phase basis, thus allowing a large degree of design
flexibility.
Throughout the following analysis we make the additional assumptions listed below:
1) Not only are computer module failure law distributions during the active and
passive phases given by Fl(t), F2 (t) resp., but, in addition, if a module
which has not failed is turned off during a given phase Ij and subsequently
reconfigured into activity during Ik , j<k, then its failure law during the new
dormant or active phase remains invariant. Thus, if Fl(t) = 1 - e- was
the active failure law, initially, for the given module, then at all subsequent
resuscitations of that module (given no failure has previously occurred) the
failure law will remain Fl(t), with a similar rule pertaining to dormancy
periods.
2) Inter and intra modular switching will be assumed to be perfect.
3) Fault detection and isolation for A(L, S) types of redundancy will be perfect.
For TMR or NMR types of operation one may add a correction factor of
Rj (Tj-Tj_. ) = Prob (Voters operate successfully during mission phase
I.j [Tj_ 1 , Tj]).
4) All module failures occur independently of each other no matter what phase
is being considered.
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We next develop the Markov approach to MPR: Suppose the computer is partitioned
into W module classes where the first W 1 module classes might be the same, the next
W 2 are the same, etc. Each module class fails independently of all other module
classes so that, if we label the module classes as C 1 , C 2 , . . . C W CW1 + 1' . . CW'
it is irrelevant that the modules in either of the first W 1 classes are identical. The
prescription, fixed in advance, of how many modules/class/partition are required in
each given mission phase, allowing for mode degradation and different types of redun-
dancy usage, enables the analysis to proceed on a per partitioned module subclass
basis.
Thus, if R(Ci) [T] = Reliability of module class partition Ci mission at some prescribed
time T, then R(I, ... I) = R(Mission (J)) and one may write:
W
R(C 1 , C2 .. C)[ T = 17 R(Ci)[ T ] = R(Mission (J)) (Eq 6)
4 1
It suffices then, to consider the problem for a specific module class (or module class
partition) C which has N+S = M total modules of the same structure in it. One may
assume that all modules are in the non-failed state at time t=O. Consider the Markov
chain obtained by examining the module class C at the end of Phase Ii = Ii[Ti_l,T. ].
Let Sk = State that there are k non-failed modules among the M and that all mission
phases from Il to Ii have been successfully performed at time T i = instant after the
mission phases I., for 1sjsi, are over.
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Let rk(i) = Prob. that module class C is in state Si at time T..
Suppose the mission phase requirement for phase i+1 (Ti T + 1 ) is that Ni+1 modules
should be activitated during this period and if there are not that many non-failed
modules available at time T i , then all the available modules should be used but at no
time can this number drop below Di+ 1, the lowest (degraded) mode level allowable
without having that mission phase being a failure. We seek the transition probability
matrix for this phase of the Markov chain.
Clearly, we do not care whether we have TMR, NMR, etc. once Ni 1 , D.i 1 are
specified; it is irrelevant from a reliability viewpoint what type of instrumentation or
structuring is implemented. The system during li+ 1 is in one of the hybrid types
H(Ni+ 1 , max(0, k-Ni 1), D. i), if k N i+ while if k < N , the analysis of Section
IIA carries over with A1 = kX, A2 = (k-1)A,.. Ak = A substituted into Eqs 5a and 5b
and N+S substituted by k in Eq 5g.
Thus, we have the hybrid types H(N i+1 ki+ 1 , Di 1 ) with ki+1 = max (k - Ni+, 0), for
Ni+ 1 k, and the hybrid types H(k, 0, Di+l), for D 1 k < N.i For k < D.+ 1 there
is clearly a module class failure.
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Therefore, the Markov matrix equations may be written with associated transition probabilities as:
0 Di 1-1 Di+ 1 k i M
7 0 (i+1) 0 .. . 0 . . . . . 0 .. 0 0 7r (i)
. (i 1) . . . . 0D 1( )
rDi-(i+l) 0.. O *.. O **1 0 O 0 rDi+1-
S(i+1) 0.. 0 . . . (i+1) (i+) (i1)i1 M D i+1  mDi+, k+l mDi+l, M Di+(i) (Eq 7)
7rk( ) 0 . . .. 0 (i+ 1) (i 1) (i 1)
S1) k,k k,j k,M k(i)
S (i+-1) 0 . . . .0 (i+1) 7r(i)
M M,M M
where,
AT i = T.-T.-i i-1
and if D. = 0,
m00i+ 1) = 1 = P(0,0,0).00 0
The general term is:
= 0for k< Di+l, 0 _j IM or for k Di+ butj < Di+l
(i+ 1)mk = P (min(j, Ni+l)' max (0, j-Ni+l), Di+1 ) [AT] (Eq 8)kjk i 1  )+ D + [T]
for k Di+ , j _ D 1
17. (i+i1) = i+ (i) for 0 Si _ J-1 (Eq 9a)
where,
17 (i) is the vector of i-th stage probabilities,
and 9 i+1 = the matrix in the above system = kj k, j=0
. .17(J) = ( ji*j_-1 i 1 ) '(0) = (J) .17(0) (Eq 9b)
where,
0
0
17() =
0
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M.'. R(C)[T] = 7ri (J) (Eq 9c)
i=0
where,
T = T is the endpoint of the mission.
At most, then, each module class (partition) will involve J matrix multiplications of
order M+1 if the module class has M modules in it.
Since the matrices M i may have very many zeroes in them when Di is large relative
to M = N+S, where N and S are the initial numbers of working units and spares (re-
spectively) either when the initial use was TMR, NMR or standby (active-passive)
sparing, it is desirable to rework the form of Eq 7a.
It would be more efficient to write the matrix equations of Eq 7a in the form:
7r (i+1) = 7rTl(i+1) = D= 7 i 1_(i+1) = 0, while
i +11
rI '(i+ 1) = (Eq 7a)
7M (i+ 1)
is the reduced state space probability vector at level i+1 given by the matrix equation:
' (i+ 1) = IR'i+l l'(i)
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Hence, 1I '(i) is the reduced state space probability vector at level i, which is identical
to I '(i) with the first Di+1-1 terms removed, and 9 'i+1 is the reduced
(i+ 1)
m kj are the terms of the original matrix i+kji+1
B. The Space Station - A Special Case of Periodicity
As an example of a mission phase profile for which the above analysis may be presented
in a simpler analytic form, we consider the case of a self-sustaining Space Station.
Here, no repairs or logistic support is assumed possible. We wish to determine the
reliability at the end of some specified time T. The development will be studied for
a single module class, initially consisting of M modules.
The Space Station is visualized to operate in a periodic fashion. Thus, for some time
a 1 the station will be in the high computational mode (HCM), and then for time a 2
in the high reliability mode (HRM), and finally for the time a 3 it will operate in
the dormant mode (DM), in which everything is turned off. When in the HCM, every-
thing is assumed to be on, while in HRM we assume that Dw= 3 for module class
w, 1 w W. The o. are positive constants satisfying the equation a 1+ca2+3=1.
A-21
At the end of the DM operation the system will return to HCM, if possible, and the
cycle will attempt to repeat itself with the same time constants. It is obvious that if
we examine the case in which J is a multiple of three, i. e. J = 3J 1 , then we have:
i (J) = . J-1...... * "  2 1 1.(0)
=93 2 * 1 1 I(0)
Therefore, letting Mt * =(n3 " 2 * M 1) we have
l (J) = (m *) 1 (0)
Since everything is turned on in HCM, we observe that the structure of the matrix
'1 is simply:
IR 1 0 * *0 00
Therefore, the product matrix 9 * is of the form
I 1
o X2
S, i.e. only the last column has potentially non-zero
I entries.
SXM
But then,
I x M
-MMxM
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i.e. all columns, except possibly the last, are null columns.
By inspection, we find:
x (x)
J -1
1x2(xM)
= 0
I J 1 -
(xM
So that,
J -1
x1(xM)
J -1
J1 {x 2 (xM)
n(J) = (S*) H(0) =
* J-1
xM(xM)
Therefore, if C is the underlying module class we obtain,
M
J1-1
R(C) [T] = xM  • x i
i= 1
In the case of the self-sustaining Space Station, the effects of periodicity and the initial
HCM mode combine to produce a total matrix sequence which is easily reduced for
computational purposes.
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IV. Future Effort
The method presented here represents an initial step in the reliability analysis of the
ARMMS computer which will be used to compute predictions of reliability for sample
mission sequences and module failure rates. Further refinements in the analysis
will proceed in the direction of extending the model to include the following: 1) the
effects of fault detection, fault location, and intramodular and intermodular switch-
ing; 2) the effects of voter failures and voter replication; 3) the effects of bussing
failures and executive hardware failures; and 4) a treatment of non-exponential
failure laws, in the case when the dormant and active failure law distributions
are equal.
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CONSISTENCY OF R(N,S,D) WITH RESPECT TO STANDBY SPARING AND TMR/S
In this portion of the Appendix, we shall verify that the expressions for R(N,S,D) [t],
obtained from Eqs. 5a, 5b, 5d, and 5i, agree with those of TMR/S and standby sparing
(active-standby passive redundancy) found in the literature (Eqs 1 and 3, respectively,
of the text).
A. A(N, S) - H(N,S,N)
A. From Eq 3, taking c = 1, the case of perfect coverage, one finds that:
S
RA(N,S) [t] = e - N At  k-1 +NK 1- e - t k (Eq 3)
k=O
Now from Eq 5i, setting D = N, to make the H(N, S, N) scheme correspond to
A(N,S), we see that
N+S-D+1
R(N, S, N) [t] = A N+S-D+1 e
j=1
S+1 S+1
A= S + 1 e Xt = e-NXt A S 1 e- it (Eq 5i)
j=1 j=1
AS+1 7 Ak
k-j (Xk- X)
1! S+ 1
and k = NA + (S - (k-1)) A for 1-k- S+1
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Expanding, Eq 3 yields,
S k
RA(N,S) = e-Nt (k-1 + NK) (-1)r(k) e-rpt
k=0 r=0
S S
-NXt - r t ( ) r ( k ) (k- + NK
e (-1) k (Eq 10)
r=O k-r
S S
-NXt.C e-ryt (_)r (k) (k-1 + NK)
= e r k
r=0 k=r
It suffices to show then, in Eq 5i, that
S
s+i . (-k-1+ NK\A S+1-r =()r k k -1k NK (Eq 11)
k-r
For r=O, this is equivalent to showing that
S k- + NK S+1 1() ._._._._. (XS)
k =S+1 (l - S+) * 1 (  - S+ (Eq 1La)
k=O 15 k- S+1
_ (N+Sp) . . *(NX +) ) (1 + KN) . . . (S + KN) S+ NK)
(S) ... () S! S
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Br1 + NK (-1)r ( 1 )k -NK-r 
(Eq 12)
k=O
S-r
r ( k
k=O
which, by (Eq 11b), is equivalent to:
Br = (-1)r r-1 NK NK + S (Eq 13a)r r S-r
Now,
S+1 [(NX + Sp) ..... (NX + (r+1) p)] [(NX + (r-1) p) .. . . (NX)]
S+1-r [(S-r) p) . . * * . (p)] [(-p) . . . . . . . (-rp)]
[(S + NK) ..... . (r+1 + NK)I [(r-1) + NK) ..... (NK)]
(S-r) ! (-1)rr'
S( 1 )r (NK + r-1).(NK+S) (Eq 13b)
SAS + 1
Br S+1-r
and
R(N, S, N)[t] = RA (N, S)[tl (Eq 14)
B. TMR/O H(3, 0, 2)
We shall first prove the equivalence of TMR/O = H(3, 0) with that of our scheme
H(3, C, 2).
A-30
However, it is easy to show that,
S (k-1 + NK) S + NK (Eq b)
k = S (Eq lb)
k=O
by induction on S.
Now consider the general case and note that, for k, r positive integers,
with k_> r, and a any real number, one always has the identity:
(,).( ) =(c) (:r)
and also,
(k- ) NK k. (-1 NK)
It then follows that:
S
B (- l)r (k (k-1 + NK
k= r
S
= (1)r (k) (-NK) (-1)k
k= r
S(_1)r.(-K ( 1 )k (-NK-r)
k= r
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Now,
-2 h t -3At 2 3  (Eq 15)
RTMR/O(t) = 3e -2e 3R - 2R (Eq 15)
where,
-AtR=e
as is obvious from inspection.
Let us check R(3, 0, 2)[t] to verify that we obtain the same result.
From Eq 51 we have:
2
R(3,0,2)[t] = A e jt
j=1
where
X1 = 3X,
x2 = 2X,
while
2 2A = -2A=h2 - h I
2 1
A 232  h -
Therefore R(3, 0, 2)[t] = 3e -2e -  = RTMR/O(t) (Eq 16)
A-31
C. H(3,S) = H(3,S,2)
We now treat the general case of TMR/S.
From (Eq 1) of the text we find:
-2Xt S1 3K + S-i -At 2K - 1KS-1 2 S-]R(3,S)[t] = 3e -  K + S-i -e (3K + S-i)
i=0 = 0O i=O
S ( S - i
i (K + S-i)(3K + S-i) (Eq 1)
i=0
Comparing this with (Eq 5i) it is then sufficient to show that:
S+2
R(3,S)[t] = R(3,S,2)[t] = A +2 ejt
i=1
where,
AS+2 X k
J kzj (Xk - j
15 ks S+2
and,
Xk = 3A + (S-k +1)p , for 1s k5 S+1
XS+ 2 = 2X
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By matching up coefficients of the exponential terms, one sees that one
must verify that,
S-1
a) 3  3K + S-i AS+2k + S-i S+2 '
i=0
2 S-1 S-j+1
-6K T ~S (1) +2b) B = - (3K + S-i) = AS j-1 (K+S - j+l) (3K+S- j+l) 3
i=0
for 1sjS+1.
Now,
S-1S+2 (3X + Sp) • (3X+ p) (3) = 3 3K + S-iAS+ 2  (X + Sp) . . . (X + p) () i=0 K + S-i
establishing a).
For b), we find that for I: j_ S+1,
S+2
1 sk S+2
= (3A + Sp) * . . (3X + (S - j+2)p) • (3X + (S-j)p) . . . (3X+ p) (3U) (2X)
(j-1)p) * (A) * (-) . (-(S + 1-j)) • (-. - (S - j+l))
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Multiplying numerator and denominator by the missing term 3X + (S - j+l)p
yields, S-1
H (3K + S-i)
-2 (1) - j 6K 2  i=0
j (i-1) ! (S + l-j) ! (K+S - j+1)(3K+S - j+l)
S-1
6K2 (S) . (3K+ Si) (H_1S-(j+1 1
S! j 1 (K+S - j+1) (3K+S - j+l)i=0
which is exactly the term B in b) above.
Therefore, R(3, S)[ t], = R(3, S, 2)[tl, which agrees with Mathur's result as stated
in [1].
The proof that the NMR/S or H(N, S) scheme is equivalent to H(N, S, n+1) for
N=2n+1 is considerably more involved, and was omitted to save space; it was also
verified by a computer program. It is quite clear by looking at Eq 2 of the text and
comparing it with Eq 5i, that the results obtained here are easier to grasp and mani-
pulate mathematically. The fundamental idea is that one is dealing with sums of in-
dependent, but not necessarily identically distributed, negative exponential random
variables, and this is the unifying principle which unites the previous, apparently dis-
connected, results of [1], [2], [6], [7], [8], [9] and [10] into one simple result.
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